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
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## HISTORY OF ROME, 287-202 B.C.



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


THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE:  
A  
HISTORY OF ROME,  
287—202 B.C.


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# THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

A HISTORY OF ROME, 287—202 B.C.

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§ 1. To the Romans of the later Republic and the Empire the age of the wars with Pyrrhus and Hannibal seemed to be the golden age of Rome. Statesmen like Cicero, poets like Horace, and satirists like Juvenal looked back with longing to the time when the senate ruled, and ruled wisely, and when wealth and culture had not corrupted the primitive simplicity of manners.\* In it they found, or imagined that they had found, a time when the citizens still venerated the gods and paid due respect to their magistrates, when the honest

\* Cp. the words of Horace when deplored the general corruption of his own times (Odes, III. 6).

Non his inventus orta parentibus  
Infect aquae sanguine Punica,  
Pyrrhunque et ingentem occidit  
Antiochum Hannibalemque dirum:  
Sed rusticorum mascula militum  
Proles, Sabellis docta ligonibus  
Versare glebas, etc.

Also see Juvenal, II. 173—158.

yeoman was content to till his small holding and the cry of a lazy proletariat for Bread and Games was unheard; when the unscrupulous demagogue was as rare as the self-seeking general, and fortunes were not yet made from the pillage of a province. They delighted to remember how a Roman citizen would leave his plough to take the command of an army, and how Gaius Fabricius refused the bribes of Pyrrhus and yet died so poor that he was buried at the public expense. To them, men like this Fabricius and M'. Curius, the victor of Beneventum, seemed the embodiment of that severe simplicity that had once been the characteristic of the Roman, but was in their days well-nigh extinct. Possibly in their aversion to the evils by which they were surrounded they exaggerated the purity of the good old times, but in the main their estimate was just: the evils from which Rome afterwards suffered were not yet apparent; the extremes of great wealth and great poverty did not exist; the mass of the people were engaged in honest and remunerative toil; the government of the senate was vigorous and clean handed. The period was marked by peril, and even by disaster; but ultimately, thanks to the sacrifices cheerfully made by all classes, the nation emerged victorious from its struggles, and the attack of "stubborn" Hannibal was repulsed as completely as that of the impetuous Pyrrhus.

§ 2. For a hundred and fifty years after the expulsion of the kings Rome made little progress towards Character of the Wars of Rome, 509-343 B.C. that conquest of Italy which she was ultimately destined to achieve. At first it appeared as though the driving out of the foreign monarchs—for the Tarquinii no doubt symbolised Etruscan domination—would be fatal both to Rome and to Latium; the restless tribes which encircled the Romans—the Volscians, Aequians, and Sabines—renewed their hostilities, and carried their raids right up to the walls of the city. To repel their onset, Rome was compelled to look abroad for allies: she found them in the kindred cities of the Latin League (493 B.C.) and in the Hernicans (486 B.C.), both, like herself, too weak to stand alone. It was agreed that mutual assistance should be given in repelling and in attacking the common foes;

also that the spoils of the wars should be divided in equal proportion between the three allies ; and for nearly a century the compact was faithfully kept. At times Rome was reduced to the greatest straits, as the legends of Coriolanus and Cincinnatus sufficiently testify ; but gradually, with the cessation of dissension within her walls, she drove back the Volscians and Aequians, and even began to extend her possessions. Her first conquest of importance was Fidenae, an Etruscan town on the Tiber which commanded an entrance into Latium. This was effected in 426 B.C., and thirty years later (in 396 B.C.) Veii, the most powerful city of Southern Etruria, also submitted to her arms. At this point the progress of the Romans was checked by the Gallic raid (390 B.C.) ; but though the taking of the city was a severe blow, Rome soon rallied, and, when the Gauls retired, set about restoring her authority, which was seriously shaken by her late disaster. To secure her possessions in Southern Etruria, she formed four new tribes out of her citizens who were scattered over the land around Veii (387 B.C.) and fortified as colonies (383 B.C.) the strong posts of Sutrium and Nepete on the outskirts of the Ciminian forest. Caere, for many years Rome's faithful ally, revolted in 353 B.C. ; upon her submission (351 B.C.), she was incorporated with Rome as a *civitas sine suffragio* (§ 6). Thus Etruria was secured. In the south the Volscians, although assisted by the disaffected Latin cities, were beaten after a long struggle, and their peacefulness ensured by the foundation of colonies at Satricum and Setia ; much of the Pomptine territory was taken from them, and from the Roman citizens who settled upon it two new tribes were formed (358 B.C.). Most important of all was the submission of the Latin League, which in 358 B.C. agreed to accept the headship of Rome. Tibur and Praeneste, two of its strongest cities, held out for some time longer, but in 354 B.C. they also came to terms. Tusculum had as early as 381 B.C. been incorporated with Rome ; and, unlike the Caerites, its citizens received the full Roman franchise. To sum up, the result of this century and a half of warfare was as follows : whereas in 500 B.C. the dominions of Rome did not extend in any

direction more than twenty miles from the city, she now possessed the whole coast-line from the Ciminian range to the mouth of the Ufens; four tribes of her citizens were located in Southern Etruria and two in the Pomptine territory; her dominions were safeguarded by the posts of Sutrium, Nepete, Caere, Fideneae, Tusculum, Satricum, Setia, Antium, Circeii, and her authority was acknowledged by the Latin League.

§ 3. In 343 B.C. the Romans began to adopt a more energetic policy: by this time the old feuds between patricians and plebeians were for the most part healed; the senate had in consequence of the Licinian-Sextian Laws of 367 B.C. received a much needed accession of strength from the chief plebeian families; and the Roman army had been organised on a more efficient system than the phalanx of Servius. Wonderful progress was made in a surprisingly brief time; in the first Samnite war (343—341 B.C.), indeed, the Romans achieved nothing beyond getting a footing in the fertile land of Campania and its chief city Capua, but with the great Latin war, by which it was closely followed (340—338 B.C.), a decided advance was effected towards the union of Italy. This was the last effort of the Latin League to upset the arrangement of 358 B.C., which made her cities the subjects rather than the allies of Rome. After three hard-fought campaigns the victory rested with the Romans, who tightened their grip on the Latins and Volscians and extended their authority southwards to the Vulture. The Latin League was broken up (338 B.C.): some of its towns (e.g. Lanuvium and Aricia) were invested with the full franchise, just as Tusculum had previously been; Tibur and Praeneste continued to be *civitates foederatae*, while the rest became *civitates sine suffragio* (§ 6). Farther south, beyond the limits of Latium, Fundi, Formiae, Suessula, Cumae, and the great city of Capua became dependent on Rome as *civitates sine suffragio*. This advance in Campania was continued by the occupation of Cales with a Latin colony (§ 7) in 334 B.C.; two years later, Acerrae, on putting itself under Roman protection, became a *civitas sine suffragio*; in 329 B.C. the seaport of Tarracina, a chief fortress upon the coast road

Conquests of Rome, 343—287 B.C.

into Campania, was occupied by a citizen colony, and in the following year Fregellae, the key of the valleys of the Liris and the Trerus, through which ran the inland road from Rome to Campania, became a Latin colony. In 332 B.C. two new tribes of citizens (the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth) were enrolled in Latium, partly from Roman settlers, partly from Latins who received the franchise for their help in the late war. When the Samnites again took up arms, they found both roads to Rome blocked against them, while their own frontiers were dominated by a strong line of colonies and subject towns. The second Samnite war, which broke out in 327 B.C., lasted for twenty-three years: the Romans met with disaster at the Caudine Forks (321 B.C.), and at one period of the struggle were driven out of Campania; but despite these reverses, despite the wavering of Latin towns like Privernum and even Tusculum, and the combination, towards the end of the war, of the Etruscans, the Sabellian Marsi and Paeligni, and the Hernicans with the Samnites, they were ultimately victorious. They won little territory by this long war, but they took advantage of their enemy's exhaustion to secure their hold more firmly than ever upon Italy. They signalled their recovery of Campania (313 B.C.) by planting a Latin colony at Suessa Aurunca to guard the coast road; another at Saticula upon the Samnite border; and their continuous line of fortresses in Latium and Campania was connected into one strategic whole by the reconstruction of the existing roads along the coast. These were now united in the great military road known as the *Via Appia* because undertaken in the censorship of App. Claudius Caecus. About the same time Apulia was secured by the colonisation of Luceria, whither half a legion of soldiers was sent as a permanent garrison. On the conclusion of the war, the Samnites became allies of Rome; they retained intact the control of their internal affairs, but in matters of foreign policy accepted, nominally at least, the dictation of Rome. On the same footing were placed most of the other Sabellian tribes which stretched across the centre of the peninsula to the Adriatic—the Marsi, Paeligni, Frentani, Marrueci (304 B.C.), the Vestini (301 B.C.), and the Picentes (299 B.C.).

In 299 B.C. the number of tribes (raised in 318 B.C. to thirty-one by the enrolment of dwellers among the southern Volscians and in the Falernian district) was further increased to thirty-three by the inclusion of loyal Aequians and Hernicans. In 303 B.C. Sora, about the head-waters of the Liris, became a Latin colony, and its neighbour Arpinum received the *civitas sine suffragio*. The same year saw the construction of two new military roads: the first, afterwards known as the *Via Flaminia*, led due north through southern Etruria to Falerii, and thence across the Tiber and up the valley of the Nar to Nequinum, which in 299 B.C. became a Latin colony under the name of Narnia; it thus opened the way across Umbria towards the Adriatic coast and commanded that gap in the Apennines through which the Gauls had descended on Latium. The second, the *Via Valeria*, passed eastward up the Anio Valley by Tibur to Carseoli in the Aequian land and Alba Fuentia, which became a Latin colony in 303 B.C.: this road brought Rome into direct communication with the Marsi and Paeligni, and sundered the Sabellians of the south from the Etruscans and other peoples of the north. All these roads and colonies gave additional strength to the Roman state, and the Samnites, seeing that their case would soon be hopeless, formed a coalition with the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls, and declared war in 298 B.C., after six years only of peace. The confederates were routed at Sentinum 295 B.C.; the Etruscans and Umbrians submitted, and henceforth, with occasional outbreaks, accepted the sovereignty of Rome; the Samnites were as hostile as ever, but their resources were exhausted by the warfare of fifty years, and after this, their third struggle, they only ventured on fighting with Rome when they had secured the co-operation of some powerful ally. In 291 B.C. Venusia was made a Latin colony and furnished with the extraordinary number of 20,000 settlers; it now became the chief Roman outpost in southern Italy, and by its situation on the borders of Apulia, Samnium, and Lucania, while it held the Samnites to their allegiance and checked their intrigues with the Lucanians, it also faced towards Tarentum and the other Greek cities of the southern coast, destined to be the next

object of Roman attack. Simultaneously the *Via Appia* was extended from Capua to Venusia, traversing the very heart of Samnium, and even those Candine Forks that had once witnessed the ignominious surrender of a Roman army. Two new citizen colonies, Minturnae and Sinuessa, were in 295 B.C. planted on the Campanian coast. In 289 B.C. the Sabines were declared to be *cives sine suffragio*, and a citizen colony was established upon their eastern flank at Hatria in Picenum.

Thus in 287 B.C. a wide belt on the western coast from the Ciminian range to Mount Vesuvius was firmly held by the Romans: they had secured the whole of this plain inwards to the Apennine range by (1) their tribes, thirty-three in number, (2) their military roads,\* and (3) their colonies and municipia. East and south the highland tribes of Samnium, Apulia, and Lucania had become their allies; so that, roughly speaking, with the exception of a few Greek towns like Tarentum, all Italy south of a line drawn from Caere to Hatria acknowledged the rule of Rome.

§ 4. The Romans made it a cardinal feature of their policy to isolate as far as possible the peoples and Rome and her Subjects. communities which had become subject to them,

and they accomplished this aim by dividing them into a number of classes, each holding its own peculiar position with regard to the ruling nation. Before attempting to define this position, it will be necessary to explain the nature of the Roman *civitas*. Viewed from the standpoint of the Roman, every man was either a citizen (*civis*) or an alien (*peregrinus*), and each of these two great classes was further divided. The *cives* were subdivided into full citizens (*cives optimo iure*) and non-voting or passive citizens (*cives sine suffragio*), while the *peregrini* were either Latins (the *nomen Latinum*) or allies (*socii*). Now the citizen in the full sense of the word (*civis optimo iure*) enjoyed various rights (*iura*), some of which were private rights, while some were public rights. The citizen had, first, the right to

\* These were (a) the *Via Latina* from Rome past Tusculum, Anagnia, Fregellae, Aquinum, Cales, to Casinum; (b) the *Via Appia* past Aricia, Suessa Pomptina, Tarquinia, Formiae, Minturnae, Sinuessa, Casinum, to Capua; thence *via* Beneventum to Venusia; (c) the *Via Valeria* from Rome past Tibur, Carseoli, to Alba Fucentia; (d) the *Via Flaminia* from Rome past Falerii to Narnia.

inherit, acquire, and dispose of property with the aid and safeguards of Roman law ; as a consequence of this he could maintain his right to the same in a court of law. Secondly, the citizen was entitled to marry and rear children with the same aids and safeguards. These two private rights were technically known respectively as *commercium* and *conubium*. Thirdly, the citizen had the right of voting (*ius suffragii*) in the public assemblies, at the making of laws and the election of magistrates. Fourthly, the citizen might attain public office himself (*ius honorum*). Fifthly, by the Valerian law of 509 B.C. the citizen enjoyed the right of appeal (*ius provocacionis*) to the Centuriate assembly against a magistrate's sentence of capital or corporal punishment. These last were the three public rights. Any one who possessed part only of these rights was a *civis non optimo iure*, and as the three public rights were practically inseparable, a *civis sine suffragio* possessed the private rights only.

§ 5. The full citizens consisted first of the burgesses living in and round Rome ; secondly, of the citizens burgesses of communities like Tusculum and Lanuvium which were on their submission admitted to all the rights and privileges of Roman citizens ; thirdly, of the citizens who were sent out to the colonies established on the coast of Italy for the maintenance of Roman supremacy ; and fourthly, there were groups of citizens who had settled in various districts of Latium upon lands wrested from the Volscians, Aequians, and other peoples. All these were enrolled in the tribes according to the locality in which their property was situated : those who dwelt within the walls of Rome formed the four city tribes, named respectively the Suburana, Palatina, Esquilina, Collina ; those who dwelt without the walls were enrolled in the seventeen old country tribes, named after the patrician gentes whose villages had once surrounded the capital. Further there were four tribes — the Stellatina, Tromentina, Sabatina, and Arniensis — on the right bank of the Tiber in the conquered lands of Veii and Capena ; these, as mentioned above, dated from 387 B.C. In Latium the Pomptina and Publilia *tribus* were formed in the plain about Circeii

in 358 B.C. There was one—the Maecia—in the territory of Lanuvium, and another—the Scaptia—round Gabii and Pedum; both these were constituted in 332 B.C. Two more were added in 318 B.C.—the Ufentina, lying near the Ufens on land taken from Privernum, and the Falernia, situated in the *ager Falernus* upon the borders of Campania. The defeat of the Aequians was followed by the formation of the Aniensis on the upper Anio, and in the same year (299 B.C.) the Terentina was constituted on Volscian territory in the neighbourhood of Arpinum. There were thus at the commencement of our period thirty-three tribes, in one of which every Roman citizen was enrolled by the censor, and these tribes constituted the assembly of the Comitia Tributa. Two more were added in 241 B.C.; but after this year they underwent no augmentation, and whenever the inhabitants of other parts of the country received the franchise, they were, no matter to what district they belonged, enrolled in one or other of these thirty-five tribes.

When Rome had conquered a district, she was accus-  
The Citizen  
Colonies. tomed to send out colonies of the poorer citizens to every point which would serve as a convenient centre for securing her authority. The colonies were of two classes, Roman and Latin. Each was so far a model of Rome in that it was organised upon the Roman plan of government by a senate, popular assembly, and yearly magistrates; but whereas the members of a Roman colony were enrolled in the tribes and enjoyed the same full franchise which they had possessed in Rome, those of a Latin colony were entirely destitute of the public rights of the citizen. Roman colonies were formed with few exceptions upon the coast, while Latin colonies were sent usually into the interior; and lest the extension of the full franchise should be too rapid, the colonists in the former case were few in number and the Roman colonies themselves not many.\*

§ 6. The non-voting or passive citizens consisted of the

\* Before the war with Pyrrhus the most important are Ostia, the port of Rome, said to have been founded in the regal period; Antium, wrested from the Volscians and colonised, 338; Satricum, permanently colonised also in 338; Tarracina, 229; Minturnae and Sinuessa, 266.

burgesses of those towns which, like Caere and Capua, <sup>The Passive Citizens.</sup> were on their submission to Rome presented with the partial franchise only. Such citizens possessed the private rights of the Roman citizen, but they were not enrolled in the tribes, and so could not come to Rome to vote or be themselves elected to office. But they possessed *commercium* and *conubium* with Rome; hence it was possible for them to settle at Rome and acquire property there; also if a Roman citizen married a woman who belonged to this inferior class, the offspring of the union took the father's rank. These partial citizens were liable to taxation just as were the full citizens, and they served by the side of the latter in the legions. Some of the Campanians, however, formed legions of their own. The general name for a community of passive citizens was *municipium*, and it was so called because it had to bear the burdens (*munus, capere*) of full citizens without possessing their rights. *Municipia* of the best class managed their internal affairs in just the same way as the colonies did. They had a popular assembly to elect magistrates, a town council or senate selected in the first place from ex-magistrates, and magistrates bearing the title of dictators, aediles, and so forth. To this category belonged the Campanian towns of Capua, Cumae, Acerrae, Suessula, Atella, Calatia; the Auruncan Fundi and Formiae, the Volscian Privernum and Arpinum, the Samnite Allifae, etc. In all or most of these the Romans kept the administration of justice in their own hands, and every year the praetor sent *praefecti iuri dicundo* to judge in the courts of law, and see that Roman citizens suffered no wrong. Sometimes, as a punishment for insubordination or disloyalty, the Romans deprived a *municipium* of all control over its internal affairs; it lost its senate, magistrates, and popular assembly, and became a mere agglomeration of *municipes* who were governed by the magistrates of Rome. To this class belonged Caere, and after 211 B.C. Capua also, the degradation of the latter being the penalty it paid for joining Hannibal. Anagnia, which was deprived of all its magistrates, except such as attended to the worship of the gods, was another instance of the less

favoured *municipium*. Experience showed the Romans the importance of conciliating the *municipes*, and gradually all the *municipia* were raised to full citizen rank. The first community to be so honoured were the Sabines in 268 B.C. ; the privilege was during the next hundred years extended to the *municipia* between the Tiber and the Liris, and finally in 90 and 89 B.C. to all *municipia* throughout Italy.

§ 7. The Latin colonies occupied a less dependent position.

*The Nomen Latinum.* The oldest of these were the colonies founded jointly by the Romans, Latins, and Hernicans, in accordance with the treaty they made in the days of the early Republic. After a time, when the Romans became more powerful than their two allies, they began to send out solely on their own initiative so-called Latin colonies, though the colonists must have consisted entirely or almost entirely of Roman citizens. This they did to avoid the too rapid growth of communities with full citizen rights at a distance from Rome, for they regarded it as absurd to create citizens who were unable to discharge the primary duty of a citizen, *i.e.* to attend the meetings of the public assembly. Two of the earliest Latin colonies sent out by Rome were those of Sutrium and Nepete in southern Etruria ; after the dissolution of the Latin League in 338 B.C. they grew common, for now the conquests of Rome became extensive, and it was the duty of these colonies to protect the great military roads and ensure the subjection of the inland tribes of Italy. The colonists held the peculiar rights of the Latin franchise (*ius Latinum*), which did not comprise full citizen-rights—for those had never been enjoyed by the old Latins—but only *commercium* and *conubium*. Thus it was legally a degradation for a Roman to take part in a Latin colony, since he lost the most honourable of his rights, but the offer of lands and the prospect of attaining to eminence in their new homes tempted many to accept the change. Whenever a Latin colony was sent out, the original occupants of the town and district forfeited so much of their land as was necessary to provide allotments, and retained the rest as subjects, originally without legal rights, and when we hear of the revolt of a Latin colony we may generally understand that it was a rising of this

lower class against their privileged and alien masters. The situation of the two classes much resembled that of the patricians and plebeians in Rome, and, as at Rome, length of time assimilated the one to the other, so that they became one. From the settlement of Latium to the foundation of Ariminum among the Gauls, seventeen Latin colonies at least were sent out :\* they are found among the Volscians, among the Marsi, in the lands of the Aequians, in Campania, in Samnium, in Lucania, in Apulia, in Picenum, in Umbria, and among the Gauls. Central Italy was completely dominated by these miniature Romes, which guarded the frontiers, advanced as conquest advanced, and served as cities of refuge to all loyal to Rome. They were so strong that an enemy rarely assailed them with success, while he dared not, unless he had the genius of a Hannibal, pass on and leave them to fall upon his rear. They proved the salvation of Rome in the second Punic war.

These Latin colonies resembled the allied states in that they possessed the right of coinage, served not in the legions, but in separate cohorts of their own, enjoyed their own laws, and controlled their own administration of justice. They differed from them in possessing *conubium* and *commercium* with Rome. This at least was the position of the above-mentioned colonies, but with the foundation of Ariminum in 268 B.C. the Romans began to curtail their privileges, and in sending out further Latin colonies, refused them *conubium* altogether, and limited their *commercium*. Whereas previously a Latin colonist had been able to settle at Rome with full citizen rights, provided he left a son behind him to discharge his military duties, he could now only exercise the franchise in the capital if he had filled a public office in his colony. This peculiar charter was known as the *ius Arimini*, and the colonies where it obtained were known as the Twelve Colonies.†

\* Among the Volscians, Fregellae 328, Interamna 312, Sora 303; the Insulae Pontiae 313; among the Marsi, Alba 303; among the Aequians, Carseoli 298; in Campania, Cales 334, Suessa Aurunca 313, Cosa 273; in Samnium, Satricula 313, Beneventum 268; in Lucania, Paestum 273; in Apulia, Luceeria 314, Venusia 291; in Picenum, Hatria 289; in Umbria, Narnia 299; among the Gauls, Ariminum 268.

† These were Ariminum 268, Beneventum 268, Firmitum 264, Aesernia 263, Brun-dusium 244, Spoletum 243, Cremona 218, Placentia 218, Copia 193, Vibo Valentia 192, Bononia 189, Aquileia 184.

§ 8. The position of the allies (*socii*) differed very materially according to the treaties which they <sup>s. 8. iii.</sup> concluded with Rome. The best off were the communities which, entering into alliance of their own free will, could claim to be treated with more than usual consideration. The main feature of their position was that, while they lost their independence in the matter of external politics, and were bound in technical language to have the same friends and the same enemies as Rome, they retained intact the administration of justice and the management of their municipal affairs. The chief burden imposed upon them was the obligation to assist Rome in war ; they had to send a contingent of horse and foot or ships and sailors. The character and exact amount of the aid expected from them was fixed in the treaty ; it was invariably a condition with the Greek cities that they should assist Rome in the matter of marine. The chief *ciritates foederatae* in 287 B.C. were Tibur and Praeneste in Latium, and Nola, Nuceria, and Neapolis in Campania : to the same category belonged the Frentani, the four cantons of the Samnites, the Lucanians, and Iapygians, but some of these—the Samnites in particular—bore the Roman yoke with impatience, and were continually on the look-out for a chance to throw it off.

§ 9. Until the Licinian-Sextian rogations of 367 B.C. the <sup>The Senate, the</sup> senate was composed, almost without exception, <sup>Magistrates, and of</sup> patricians, and in consequence had to face <sup>the People.</sup> not only the discontent of the small farmers and the proletariat, but the hostility of the rich among the plebeians as well. The great plebeian families regarded their exclusion from the chief offices of state as an intolerable injustice, and, so long as this state of things continued, took up an attitude of the most determined hostility to the government : when, however, by the reform of 367 B.C., they became eligible to the consulship and consequently to the senate, their position underwent a radical change, and they became the staunchest supporters of senatorial rule. From this date the old division of the people into patricians and plebeians ceased, for all practical purposes, to exist ; and the struggle of parties now lay

between the wealthy families who had won their way into the circle of the government and those who had not: it was a conflict, not between those of noble descent and the baseborn, but between rich and poor, and the keenest opponents of the senate were the small farmers and the landless men, who resented the appropriation of all the profits of government by the new ruling class. Fortunately for the senate, the years after 350 B.C. were marked by important and extensive conquests, and on the territory thus acquired the senate was able to plant numerous colonies, which gave solid relief to the destitute, and quieted discontent against itself. This extension of the state, coupled with the strengthening of the senate by the inclusion of plebeians, tended to raise the power of the senate at the expense of the other factors in the constitution—the magistrates and the popular assembly. Theoretically, at least, the people was the source of all power; from it the magistrate derived his authority, and the only function of the senate was to tender advice to the magistrate. But ever since the time of the kings, the power of the chief magistrate had been constantly diminishing; unlike the king, the consul was elected for a limited period, so that usually he was careful not to offend the body of which he would one day form a member, and which might retaliate on him as soon as he returned to a private station. Moreover the consul of 300 B.C. had lost many of the duties that had been entrusted to the consul of 500 B.C.; he did not act as the supreme judge of the community, as the earlier magistrate had done; neither did he draw up the census lists or fill up vacant places among the senators and equites. Another magistracy—the tribunate—had also undergone a striking transformation in the interests of the ruling class. Originally the tribune of the plebs had been elected to protect the weak and poor members of his order against the tyranny of the wealthy and the patrician magistrates. With the codification of the law (449 B.C.), the repeal of the severe procedure in cases of debt, and the relief of the needy by colonisation, there was less need of the tribunate, but the senate, instead of abolishing the office altogether, preferred to utilise it in carrying out its own

scheme of government. The tribune was in some respects placed on an equality with the consul; and like the consul he acquired the right of convening the senate, and eventually of becoming a member of the House. By annexing the tribunate, the senate could be confident that no distasteful measure would be carried in the Comitia Tributa, and if a tribune or consul seemed likely to prove troublesome, the senate had only to secure the election of one adherent among the ten, and his veto would at once check any attempt at innovation. Simultaneously with this alteration in the position of the magistrates, the popular assemblies—the Comitia Tributa and Centuriata deteriorated in point of practical efficiency. This was the inevitable result of the extension of the Roman dominions. So long as the burgess-body was concentrated within a few miles of the city walls, and the only questions at issue were such as the people could easily appreciate, as, for example, a declaration of war against the neighbouring Volscians or the repeal of an oppressive debt law, it was possible for the Comitia to be representative of the nation and to come to a sensible decision. But when the tribes became scattered over Latium to the borders of Campania, they could only come to the capital at rare intervals; and even had they been able to attend the Comitia with regularity, the growing complexity of Rome's relations with distant nations would have prevented them from directing the policy of their country. As a rule the senate had little difficulty in controlling the Comitia; though a series of enactments—the Valerio-Horatian Laws of 449 B.C., the Publilian Laws of 339 B.C., and the Hortensian Law of 287 B.C.—had removed its veto on the resolutions of the centuries and tribes, the wealth and position of its members gave it so much influence over individual citizens, and the magistrates who presided over the Comitia were so completely its servants, that the popular assemblies rarely asserted their independence. Sometimes a wave of enthusiasm or indignation came over them, and popular candidates like C. Flaminius at the beginning of the second Punic war secured their election in spite of everything that the senate could do. But usually the senate's policy met with

the national approval, and though such a course had no constitutional sanction, its simple decrees (*senatus consulta*) came to possess equal validity with laws passed by the Comitia. The senate controlled the domain land and imposed taxes and import dues. It directed the public worship of the state, and introduced when it thought fit foreign forms of worship, such as that of the Phrygian Cybele in 204 B.C. When war had been declared it assigned the various commands to the magistrates, decided what forces were to be raised among the Romans, the Latins, and the allies, and what proportion was to be entrusted to each commander. Its authority was indeed, to a great extent, usurped, but it was exercised, as a rule, with judgment and with benefit to the governed. As Mommsen says: "Called to power not through the empty accident of birth, but substantially through the free choice of the nation; confirmed every five years by the stern moral judgment of the worthiest men; holding office for life, and so not dependent on the expiration of its commission or on the varying opinion of the people; having its ranks close and united ever after the equalisation of the orders; embracing in it all that the people possessed of political intelligence and practical statesmanship; absolutely disposing of all financial questions and controlling foreign policy; having complete power over the executive by virtue of its brief duration and of the tribunician intercession which was at the service of the senate after the termination of the quarrels between the orders,—the Roman senate was the noblest embodiment of the nation, and in consistency and political sagacity, in unanimity and patriotism, in grasp of power and unwavering courage, the foremost political corporation of all times—an 'assembly of kings' which well knew how to combine despotic energy with republican self-devotedness."

## CHAPTER II.

### THE WAR WITH PYRRHUS.

§ 1. Greek Colonisation in Italy—§ 2. Tarentum—§ 3. Rome declares War against Tarentum—§ 4. Early Life of Pyrrhus—§ 5. First Italian Campaign of Pyrrhus—§ 6. Battle of Heraclea—§ 7. Second Italian Campaign, Battle of Asculum—§ 8. Greeks and Carthaginians in Sicily—§ 9. The Cities of Sicily—§ 10. History of Syracuse—§ 11. Pyrrhus in Sicily—§ 12. Third Italian Campaign of Pyrrhus, Battle of Beneventum—§ 13. United Italy—§ 14. Further Colonies.

§ 1. THE close of the third Samnite war in 290 b.c., associated as it was with the foundation of Venusia in Italy, and the extension of the Appian Way as far as that great colony, brought the Romans one step nearer to the Greek cities of the southern coast. The Greeks had crossed the seas to Italy at a very early date, how early we cannot say with certainty, though tradition placed their colonisation of the Campanian Cumæ as early as 1046 b.c. Cumæ, founded by combined bands of emigrants from Eubœa and the Aeolic town of Cyme in Asia Minor, became a flourishing city, and sent off at least two offshoots of importance—Parthenope, later called Neapolis (*Naples*), and Dicaearchia, otherwise Puteoli (*Pozzuoli*). Greek enterprise did not again turn to the West until 743 b.c., when Rhegium (*Reggio*), holding the entrance to the Straits of Messina, was founded by more colonists from Eubœa, and a few years later (about 728 b.c.) the Sicilian side of the straits was secured by emigrants from the Campanian Cumæ who settled at Zancle, afterwards Messana (*Messina*). About this time the Achaeans of the Peloponnesus began to move westward, and founded the powerful and luxurious Sybaris (721 b.c.) and Crotona (710 b.c.), on the western shore of

the Tarentine Gulf. These Achaean colonies were less commercial than agricultural, and with their numerous dependent cities occupied a wide tract of land across to the Tyrrhenian Sea. To Crotona belonged Terina, Caulonia, Petelia; while Sybaris, still more powerful, possessed five-and-twenty towns—the most famous was Poseidonia or Paestum, whose ruins still testify to its wealth and magnificence—and ruled over four native tribes. These two great cities were at constant variance, and their quarrels did not cease until Sybaris was taken and razed by the men of Crotona two hundred years after the foundation of the latter city. In 708 B.C. Epeunactae and Partheniae, said to be bastard Spartans expelled from Laconia at the close of the second Messenian war, effected the only Dorian settlement on Italian soil by colonising Tarentum (*Taranto*), at the head of the gulf of the same name. This city, which was destined to outrival in wealth and duration all its neighbours, founded dependent settlements at Heraclea, Callipolis, and Hydruntum (*Otranto*). About 683 B.C. a band of Locrian outlaws founded a city not far from Rhegium, which they called Locri Epizephyrii, in memory of the country from which they had come. From this Locri were settled the smaller towns of Hippoium (afterwards Vibo) and Medma, both on the Tyrrhenian Sea. About 543 B.C. Velia or Elea was founded on the Lucanian coast a little to the south of Poseidonia by Phocaeans who were fleeing from Asia Minor to escape the Persian yoke. After their own city had been destroyed by the Crotoniates, the Sybarites colonised Laus, and in 441 B.C. Thurii, which soon flourished so vigorously that it was able to bring an army of 14,000 foot into the field. A glance at the map will show how completely the Greeks had taken possession of the southern coast of Italy,\* and such was their prosperity in their new homes that they were not without justification in calling the country *Magna Graecia*, or Great Greece. Until about 500 B.C. their advance met with scarcely a check; but now they became involved in perpetual strife with the navies of Etruria and Carthage by sea, and with the Sabellian stocks of Italy—Lucanians

\* For the synchronous occupation of Sicily by the Greeks, see pp. 80, 81.

and Samnites—by land. Thanks to their maritime skill, the Greeks could always hold their own at sea; but the swarming mountain tribes that pressed down upon them, in envy of their commercial wealth and their fertile lands, were foes too powerful to contend against. In 420 B.C. Cumae fell before the Samnite onslaught, and during the next century the same fate was constantly threatening her kinsmen at Tarentum and Thurii.

§ 2. In the fight against the Lucanians, Tarentum <sup>Tarentina and</sup> naturally assumed the leadership. By the <sup>the Lucanians.</sup> middle of the fourth century B.C. the prosperity of the Greeks in Italy had to a great extent passed away. Most of their cities—Thurii, Crotona, Loeri, Rhegium—were but the shadows of what they once had been, and, with one brilliant exception, were so worn out by the assaults of the Sabellian tribes as to be willing to submit with feelings of relief to any power which would guarantee them peace. The one exception was Tarentum, which even now, in the fourth century of its existence, had in Italy at least no rival in point of commercial importance. It was still the great emporium of the peninsula, and carried on with the ports of the Adriatic an extensive trade in the produce of its rich fisheries, its woollen fabrics, and purple dyes. Its situation was one of great strength, for it lay on a narrow tongue of land, defended at the seaward extremity by the citadel, which crowned a considerable hill; and between this hill and the opposite shore there was but a narrow passage leading into a magnificent harbour for the city's multitude of ships. A commercial city of such wealth could afford to pay well for help in its wars, and for such help it naturally turned to the kindred states of Central Greece. Already in 338 B.C., the year in which Rome secured for ever her dominion over the Latins, the Tarentines called in the Spartans under King Archidamus to assist them against the Lucanians and Messapians. Despite some successes, Archidamus was in the same year defeated and slain; but the Tarentines found another champion in Alexander, chief of the Molossi in Epirus, and uncle of Alexander the Great of Macedon, whose career of conquest was just commencing (336 B.C.). In 332 B.C. the

Epirote army entered Magna Graecia, and overran much of Bruttium and Lucania. The Romans, seeing in Alexander only a foe of the Samnites, did not hesitate to conclude a treaty of peace with him, and it appeared as though he would establish himself firmly in Italy. His growing power now attracted the jealousy of the Tarentines; and although he defeated them in the field, he soon afterwards fell by an assassin's hand. Throughout the second Samnite war (327—304 B.C.) the Tarentines maintained an attitude of neutrality; for much as they distrusted Rome, they had still too vivid a recollection of the raids of the Samnites to join them in their struggle. The utmost they did was on one occasion (320 B.C.) to command both parties to come to terms under pain of their hostility. The Romans paid no heed to this intervention; and though, towards the end of the war, the Tarentines hired a force of 5,000 mercenaries under the command of the Spartan Cleonimus, no actual breach occurred. The Tarentines pursued the same apathetic policy during the third Samnite war, but shortly afterwards events occurred that roused them from their inaction.

§ 3. In 285 B.C., five years after the conclusion of the third Samnite war, the Lucanians, who had been given a free hand in dealing with the Tarentum. Greek cities in consideration of their services to the Romans in the late struggle, made an attack on their old enemy Thurii. The Thurians could obtain no assistance from Tarentum; and as they were unable to make head against the Lucanians, they offered to put their city under the supremacy of Rome, if she would undertake its protection. The senate accepted the offer, and by an embassy warned the Lucanians not to meddle further with Thurii. Thus balked of their prey, the Lucanians joined the Samnites and Tarentines in declaring war against Rome, and at the same time sent envoys to Northern Italy to secure the support of the Umbrians, Etruscans, and Gauls. Etruria responded by revolting against Rome, and invited the Gauls to come to their help. Although the Gauls had sustained a crushing defeat at Sentinum, only ten years before, they accepted the summons of the national party in Etruria, and

crossed the Apennines to attack Arretium (*Arezzo*), an Etruscan city in which the aristocratic party had got the upper hand, and concluded a treaty of friendship with Rome. The Romans sent an army under the praetor L. Caecilius to the relief of Arretium, but it was annihilated beneath its walls by the Senonian Gauls, and the ambassadors who went to demand the restoration of the prisoners were put to death by their chieftain Britomaris. Leaving Etruria to be dealt with later on, the consul L. Cornelius Dolabella passed by way of the Sabine land into the territory of the Senones, massacred the greater part of the male population, enslaved the women and children, and drove into exile such as were fortunate enough to escape the sword (283 B.C.). Henceforth there was no nation of Senones in Italy: they were the people which had more than a century before sacked Rome, and this was the retribution. The neighbouring tribe of the Boii, terrified into revolt by the dreadful fate of their kinsmen, united with the disaffected Etruscans, and being reinforced by the remnant of the Senones, marched direct upon Rome, to retaliate upon her the barbarities of Dolabella. At Lake Vadimo (*Laghetto di Bassano*), near Narnia, they sustained a bloody defeat; and a subsequent disaster near Populonia, on the coast of Etruria, forced them to conclude peace.

Now, if during these years the Tarentines and Samnites had acted with vigour, the advance of Rome might have been checked for a period. But Tarentum showed her usual indolence, and allowed the moment for action to slip by. In 282 B.C. C. Fabricius Luscinus, the Roman consul, marched to the relief of Thurii, which was defending itself with difficulty against the Lucanians, defeated Sthenius Statilius, the general opposed to him, and placed a garrison in the city. Not long afterwards Locri, Crotona, and Rhegium submitted, and were occupied by Roman garrisons, so that of all the important Greek cities Tarentum alone retained its independence. In Tarentum, as in Capua and elsewhere, the wealthy merchants looked with favour on the Romans, who they knew would follow their usual policy of installing an oligarchy in power. The rest of the citizens, however, were angered beyond control at the thought

of yielding ; but they saw that prompt action was more than ever necessary, for Rome was advancing on all hands. After the expulsion of the Senones, the question had come before the senate whether they should occupy the desolated country—the *Ager Gallicus*—beyond the Northern Apennines, a region where it had never yet ventured to make permanent acquisitions. It determined that henceforth its attitude to the Gauls should be one of attack rather than of defence, and in token of its resolve established a citizen colony at Sena (*Sinigaglia*), the old Gallic capital of the land. This new outpost, together with the colony of Hatria (planted 289 b.c.), gave the Romans a firm hold on the Upper Sea, where they forthwith stationed a fleet. All these facts tended to fill the patriotic party in Tarentum with the keenest apprehension. At this critical moment it happened that ten Roman vessels, while on the voyage from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic Sea, cast anchor off Tarentum. There was an ancient treaty which forbade the Romans to appear east of the Lacinian promontory (*Capo della Colonna*), and the popular party in Tarentum seems to have imagined that the Romans had made an agreement with the aristocratic party within the walls, and hoped to surprise the city. At any rate they were so exasperated by the sight of the Romans, that they rushed upon the ships, captured four, sank another, and sold their crews into slavery. Following this, a Tarentine corps surprised Thurii and expelled the Roman garrison thence. The senate sent an embassy to demand that the prisoners should be released, that Thurii should be restored, and the leaders of the democratic party surrendered. L. Postumius, who was at the head of the ambassadors, appeared in the public assembly, only to be greeted with ridicule, because of his imperfect mastery of the Greek tongue. A drunken buffoon crowned this insult by sullying the Roman's white toga with filth, an action which was regarded as an excellent jest by the whole assembly. Thereupon the senate declared war ; and the Tarentines called in the aid of Pyrrhus, the king of the Molossi in Epirus.

§ 4. From his cradle the life of Pyrrhus had been one of strange vicissitudes. His father, Aeacides, a cousin and

vassal of Alexander the Great, perished in an insurrection, and Pyrrhus, then but an infant, was saved

Early life of with difficulty by some faithful retainers, who conveyed him to the court of Glaucias, an Illyrian chief and a relative of the Aeacidæ by marriage. At the age of twelve he was restored by his kinsman's aid to his father's dominions, but five years later the Molossi again broke into revolt, and this time Pyrrhus made his way to Asia. There he took service under Antigonus, one of those who had shared among them the vast empire of Alexander, and whose son, the impetuous Demetrius Poliorcetes, had married Pyrrhus' sister, Deidamia. Misfortune, however, still dogged his footsteps: in spite of his gallant deeds at Ipsus, the "battle of the kings" (301 B.C.), Antigonus was defeated and slain, and soon afterwards Pyrrhus found himself a hostage of the Egyptian King Ptolemy in Alexandria. His handsome person and daring courage soon made him popular at the Egyptian court, especially with Berenice, the most powerful of Ptolemy's wives; and Ptolemy not only gave him the hand of his stepdaughter, the princess Antigone, but supplied him with Egyptian troops and Egyptian gold wherewith to win back his rugged inheritance of Epirus. The wild Epirotes welcomed their young prince with enthusiasm, and Pyrrhus easily secured his restoration (296 B.C.). Thereafter, for many years, he showed all the qualities of a brave and politic ruler: to obtain an outlet for the commerce of Epirus, he forced his way from the highlands about the source of the Aous (*Vojussa*) and Arachthus (*Arta*), the centre of his dominions, down to the sea, and took possession of Ambracia (*Arta*) and Coreyra (*Corfu*), the latter of which formed part of the dowry brought by Lanassa, daughter of Agathocles the tyrant of Syracuse. The weakness of Macedonia made it possible for him to extend his dominions in an eastward direction as well; and in 287 B.C., when his relative Demetrius Poliorcetes was expelled from the Macedonian throne, the crown was offered to Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus, however, only reigned for seven months: the Macedonians were jealous of the semblance of foreign rule, and Pyrrhus was soon glad to retire from his difficult position. From 287 B.C. to 281 B.C.

he lived at home in comparative quietude ; but the commonplace life of an Epirote chieftain was little suited to his character, and all the while his brain was teeming with plans for the foundation of a great empire that might compare with that of his kinsman Alexander. The East offered little scope for his ambition, but he remembered what had been attempted in Italy by Alexander of Epirus in 332 b.c., and dreamt of conquering the West. Accordingly, when the war party at Tarentum appealed to him for help, he eagerly welcomed its overtures. He thought it possible to unite under his rule the Greeks of Italy and Sicily, and their foes the Carthaginians of Africa ; and even if he failed in his aims, there is no reason to brand his enterprise as insane or impracticable. Against all but one of the peoples of the West Pyrrhus was more than capable of holding his own : but he was altogether at fault as to the real strength of Rome, and it was to the peculiar solidity of Roman political organisation that he owed the overthrow of his schemes.

§ 5. The Tarentine embassy that came to Pyrrhus told him that the Lucanians, Samnites, and all the peoples of Southern Italy were burning to take the field against Rome, and that an army of

First Italian

Campaign of

Pyrrhus,

280 b.c.

350,000 foot and 20,000 horse would place itself

under his orders. Pyrrhus knew that the numbers were exaggerated ; but as other circumstances were favourable, he agreed to help the Tarentines, on condition that they bore the expenses of the war, admitted an Epirote garrison into their citadel, and gave him the supreme command over all the forces of Italy. At the same time he reserved his right to remain in Italy until the war was fought out and matters had settled themselves in a way of which he approved. He at once took prompt action to prevent the Tarentines from receding from the bargain, and sent across to Tarentum 3,000 troops under Milo, the ablest of his generals (autumn, 281 b.c.). Cineas, the diplomatist to whom he entrusted his negotiations with foreign states, was already in Italy ; and while he was present Pyrrhus could be sure that his interests would not suffer, so far as they could be furthered by address and eloquence. For Cineas was regarded in the

opinion of the times as the greatest of Demosthenes' pupils, and Pyrrhus himself declared that Cineas had gained more cities by his oratory than he had himself won by his arms. Early in 280 B.C. Pyrrhus himself landed with a further force of 25,000 troops, drawn from almost every nation of Northern Greece. In his army were Molossians, Thesprotians, Chaonians, and Ambraciots, Macedonian infantry and Thessalian cavalry, and mercenaries from Aetolia, Acarnania, and Athamania ; and, as Pyrrhus doubtless knew, the force was little inferior to that which Alexander had led to the conquest of Asia.

Pyrrhus soon discovered that the energy and resources of his allies left a great deal to be desired. The Italians contributed a small contingent instead of the host they had been represented as ready to supply, and the Tarentines themselves were altogether averse to actual service in the field. A faction even entered into negotiations with Rome, so that Pyrrhus was compelled to seize some of the leading men as hostages, and to treat Tarentum as a conquered city. The political clubs and places of amusement were suppressed or closed, and from a gay and luxurious commercial centre the town was transformed into a camp and an arsenal. Now that he had secured his base of operations, Pyrrhus was ready to commence the fray.

On their side the Romans did not underrate the powers of their antagonist : such of the allied towns (like Praeneste) as showed symptoms of disaffection were secured by a garrison of Roman troops, and their leaders either executed or transported to Rome. A war loan was levied, and contingents summoned from all their allies and subjects. In filling up the legions not even the proletarii were exempted from service. One army was sent under T. Coruncanius into Etruria, where the men of Volei and Volsinii were in motion ; and the main force, numbering at least 50,000 men, marched under the other consul, P. Valerius Laevinus, to meet Pyrrhus.

§ 6. With a view to protect Heraclea, a dependency of

Battle of Heraclea. 280 B.C. the Tarentines, Pyrrhus posted his army between that town and Pandosia, and awaited the

Roman attack on the eastern bank of the Siris (Sinno). As he looked across the river, the good order

and discipline of the Romans is said to have extorted from him the remark that the strategy of the barbarians had very little of the barbarian about it. Laevinus forced the passage of the river, and commenced the battle by a cavalry charge, which routed the Thessalian horsemen of Pyrrhus; but though his infantry dashed seven times against the Epirote phalanx, it could make no permanent impression on that serried mass of pikemen; and when Pyrrhus at length brought up his twenty elephants, the Roman horse took flight and fled, and the infantry was thrown into confusion. Leaving at least 7,000 of his men on the field of battle, the consul retreated across the Siris, and thence fell back on the strong outpost of Venusia, which had already proved its utility by preventing the Lucanians and Samnites from forming a junction with Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus himself, who had been in the greatest danger in the first cavalry engagement, suffered considerable loss, which was of all the more consequence to him because it fell exclusively on his veterans. The battle cost him some 4,000 of his seasoned troops, and he made no immediate attempt to follow up his retreating foes. Yet whatever the cost, his victory was amply repaid by the results: the Greek cities at once fell away from Rome; Locri was given up by its Roman garrison; Lucania passed into the hands of the invader; and Bruttians, Samnites, and Lucanians—in fact, all Southern Italy—prepared to engage with energy in the war. About this time, also, the Romans lost Rhegium, which they had entrusted to a force of 800 Campanians and 400 men from Teanum Sidicinum, under a certain Decius.\* These troops, following the example of the Mamertines of Messana on the opposite side of the strait (see p. 35), and having first concluded an alliance with them, rose against the city they were intended to protect, massacred the citizens, and held the place for themselves. Their next proceeding was to destroy the neighbouring town of Caulon and to cut to pieces the Roman garrison in Crotona. Yet in spite of all these encouraging circumstances, Pyrrhus was anxious to come to terms with Rome. No

\* These troops belonged to the Campanian *cives sine suffragio*, who were enrolled in legions by themselves, the *legiones Campanae* (see p. 10).

doubt he saw more clearly now than when he had entered upon the war the magnitude of the task he had in hand. Not a single Latin town wavered in its allegiance to Rome; and, a fact which must have impressed Pyrrhus deeply, though he offered to take into his service the 2,000 Romans and Italians who had been made prisoners at Heraclea, they refused to a man, declaring that they were citizens fighting for their country, not mercenaries to accept any man's pay. Pyrrhus was therefore ready to come to terms: if he could by negotiation induce the Romans to recognise the freedom of the Greek cities, still more if he could compel the evacuation of Lucezia and Venusia, the Roman advance would be thrust back and a secure basis obtained for further operations against them in the future. Before those operations were undertaken Pyrrhus might find time to achieve the conquest of Sicily, or even to found a Hellenic empire in Africa. With proposals to this effect Cineas proceeded to Rome. His reception was encouraging, and the senate seemed likely to temporise with the invader, instead of devoting its energies to crush him; but at that moment Appius Claudius, the famous censor of 312 B.C., now aged and blind, came into the senate-house and delivered so vehement an oration against all concession, as to persuade the hesitating council to continue the struggle without compromise. Cineas was told that the Romans would consider about a treaty of alliance when Pyrrhus had quitted Italian soil; and thus defeated, the diplomatist returned to Pyrrhus to report that the senate was an assembly of kings, and that the Roman people was, from its numbers, as invincible as the hydra of Lerna.

On the failure of the negotiations, Pyrrhus, who was already in Campania, marched on Rome. Closely followed by Laevinus, who had raised two additional legions to replace the troops lost at Heraclea, he crossed the Liris, seized Fregellae, and pushed on to Anagnia. He was now only thirty-seven miles from the capital; but as not a single town stirred on his behalf, he retraced his steps to Campania, and thence to Tarentum, where he passed the winter. By this time T. Coruncanius had reduced Etruria to peace. From this time forward there is no further mention of any

armed collision with the Etruscans, who, in this respect far different from the Samnites, lost nearly every trace of national unity, and became a memory only. The two consuls passed the winter round Firmum among the Picentines.

§ 7. While Pyrrhus was wintering in Tarentum, C.

Second Italian Fabricius Luscinus, who has been mentioned in Campaign, the events of 282 B.C., came to negotiate the 279 B.C. ransom and exchange of prisoners. Fabricius,

a Roman of the type of Curius and Cincinnatus, was equally proof against avarice and fear, and refused all Pyrrhus' presents. He acquired, however, the esteem of the king, who released his prisoners on parole, in the hope that the senate would agree to a peace. When spring came Pyrrhus prepared for a second campaign, but chose a different region for his operations. In 279 B.C., probably hoping to surprise the great fortress of Venusia, he advanced into Apulia. At Asculum (*Ascoli di Puglia*) he met the Romans a second time. The forces on either side amounted

Battle of Asculum, 279 B.C. to about 80,000 men, and on this occasion Pyrrhus was assisted by numerous Samnite, Lucanian, and Bruttian levies. The Romans, supported by Umbrians, Marrucini, Paeligni, Frentani, and other allies, were led by the consuls P. Sulpicius Saverio and P. Decius Mus, son of him who fell at Sentinum. The fight raged for two days: on the first, Pyrrhus was unable to manœuvre his phalanx, which was involved amongst broken ground; but on the morrow he moved it into the plain, and though his main body did not obtain any overwhelming advantage, the onset of the elephants once more gave him the victory. He did not win the battle without extreme difficulty: he was wounded in the arm when fighting, as he always did, in the thickest of the fray, and lost 3,500 at least of his men, so that there was much justification for the words which tradition has assigned to him, "Another such victory and we are undone."\* The Romans were undoubtedly defeated, but Pyrrhus' success was not sufficiently brilliant or decisive to assist him much in his main object of breaking up the Roman confederation in Italy. We hear of no further

\* Άντι μίαν μάχην Ῥωμαίους νικήσωμεν, ἀπολούμεθα παττελώς (Plutarch, *Pyrrhus*, 21).

operations on his part. Whether his apathy was due to the wound he had received, or to his heavy loss in troops, or to the threat of trouble in his own kingdom of Epirus, certain it is that he left the Romans in possession of Apulia and retired to Tarentum.

As he was passing there the winter of 279 B.C., there came Sicilian envoys who offered to place Syracuse, Agrigentum, and Leontini in his hands, if he would assist them against the Carthaginians. For Syracuse, that had been more than once the mistress of all Greek Sicily, was sore pressed by her inveterate enemy Carthage. The Carthaginians, whom Agathocles, the late despot of Syracuse, had confined to the western part of the island and to their impregnable fortresses of Panormus (*Palermo*), Eryx (*S. Giuliano*), and Lilybaeum (*Marsala*), had at the moment of his death (289 B.C.) resumed the offensive, and there occurred one of those transformations so common in the history of Sicily: the Carthaginians, bursting from their territory in the west, overran the whole island as far as the walls of Syracuse, and were at this moment attacking those massive fortifications with their whole energy. In their distress, the Syracusans, remembering that Pyrrhus had married Lanassa, a daughter of the dead Agathocles, turned to him for help. Before relating the story of his adventures in Sicily, it will be necessary to give some account of the history of that island, which, as we shall see, was the occasion of the first Punic war, and played a not insignificant part in the second.

§ 8. The earliest peoples that we hear of in Sicily are the <sup>Greeks and</sup> Siculi, the Sicani, and the Elymi. The Siculi <sup>Cathaginians in</sup> extended over the whole of the eastern half of Sicily. the island as far as Enna; the Sicani possessed the western portion, with the exception of some half-dozen townships at the extreme north-west, where Egesta and Eryx were occupied by the Elymi. Who these peoples were and whence they came, and whether they were really one people, were questions much debated among the Greeks. The Elymi claimed to be descendants of the Trojans, and pointed to the legendary foundation of Egesta by Aeneas in proof

of their assertion: some modern writers are inclined to believe them Ligurians, who came into the island by way of Sardinia; others consider them to be akin to the Messapians and Iapygians, who still maintained themselves in the heel of Italy—in Calabria—and who were probably descended from the Illyrian stock. The Sicani were in Thucydides' opinion Iberians who had crossed from Spain, and this view is to some extent supported by the fact that the skulls found in this part of the island belong to the Iberian type. It is, however, perhaps safer to regard them, like the Siculi, as akin to the Sabellian stock to which the Lucanians and Samnites belonged. At any rate they were not a commercial people, any more than were their Italian kinsmen: so they permitted the settlement of the Phoenician traders at many points about the coast, and bartered with them the produce of their agricultural labours. Most of the strong positions in which the highlands of the interior abound were crowned by Sicel or Sican fortresses: such were Abacaenum in the north-east, Centuripa and Acrae in the east and south, and above all Enna, styled the navel of Sicily, 3,000 feet above the sea. The Phoenicians, who probably made their way to Sicily from the opposite coast of Africa, possessed three great emporiums on the western or northern coast in Motye, Panormus, and Soloeis, known by the Romans as Solus; and in addition they had settled at other favourable positions, as at Megara Hyblaea and the island of Ortygia on the eastern, and at Macara (afterwards Heraclea Minoa) on the southern, shore.

Reports of the wonderful fertility of the island and of the shores of the western Mediterranean reached Greece at a time when the older cities were rapidly rising in wealth and numbers, and seeking for new land in which to plant their surplus population. In the year 735 B.C. the first colony was planted in Sicily by one Theocles, who led a band of settlers from the Euboean Chaleis and from Naxos, one of the most powerful of the Cyclades. His colony, which he established at the foot of Etna, he called Naxos, in memory of that island. In the following year Archias, a member of the Bacchiadae, the family that ruled in Corinth, was expelled from his native city, and came with a band of

adherents to Sicily : he drove out the Sicels and Phoenicians from Ortygia, and so laid the foundations of what was afterwards the powerful Syracuse. Six years later the citizens of Naxos under Theocles colonised Leontini, and a little afterwards Catana as well. In 730 B.C. arrived Lamis from Megara, and assisted by the Syracusans and Naxians, established himself on the coast. But the Sicels, grown jealous of the new-comers, drove them from their settlement, and even from a second position at Thapsus, a few miles to the north of Syracuse. Finally their chief, Hyblon, came to terms with the invaders, and allowed them to found a new Megara, surnamed Hyblaea, upon a bay slightly to the north of Thapsus. A pause followed in the tide of immigration, during which the Hellenes perhaps waited to see the results of these first experiments. The rapid growth of the new colonies soon proved the feasibility of fresh attempts, and in 690 B.C. a body of Rhodians and Cretans founded Lindii, at the mouth of the little river Gelas, in the most fertile region of all Sicily. The name was afterwards changed to Gela, and the town became the rival of Syracuse. The latter town was in a few years able to send out, on its own account, colonists, who occupied Acrae (664 B.C.) and Casmeneae (644 B.C.). Its neighbour, Megara Hyblaea, was strong enough in another fifteen years to send out settlers to Selinus, on the very borders of Motye (628 B.C.); and in 599 B.C. the Syracusans founded a third colony among the marshes at Camarina. About 582 B.C. the Geloans set the foundations of Acragas or Agrigentum, whose magnificence was for a time to eclipse even that of Syracuse. The date of the foundation of Zancle (afterwards Messana) is uncertain: it is usually said to have been settled by adventurers from the Italian Cumae in conjunction with Chalcidians of Euboea about 728 B.C. Subsequently it occupied Mylae and sent out a colony to Himera, close to the Phoenician settlements of Panormus and Soloeis. It received its later name of Messana upon its conquest by Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who was of Messenian origin (c. 490 B.C.).

Such was the map of Sicily in the sixth century B.C. Within two hundred years the island had virtually passed from the hands of the Phoenicians to those of the Greeks.

It was not the habit of the Phoenicians to build cities where they came. They were content to have harbourage and a market only, a fact which explains their constant preference for occupying small islands off the coast. Hence the ease with which the Greeks supplanted them, the more as Carthage did not yet see the need of constituting herself the champion of the Phoenician race. Decisive action might have prevented for ever the Hellenising of the island; but the opportunity slipped away; and when at last Carthage emerged from her great fortresses of the north-west to dispute by force of arms the possession of what she had lost, she found her rivals securely settled in strong and wealthy walled cities.

§ 9. The history of Sicily is now for some time the  
The Cities of history of Syracuse and of its struggles with  
Sicily. the Carthaginians. The other towns play only a secondary part: next to Syracuse came Agrigentum, which was strongly built near the shore on a cluster of hills 1,100 feet above the sea-level. Agrigentum was long famous for her wealth, her temples, the luxuriance of her crops of grapes and olives; while her name was proclaimed repeatedly before all Greece as the home of victors at the Olympic games. Three hundred of her citizens could furnish racing-cars drawn by teams of white horses to welcome home one of their number who had proved victorious at the games of 408 B.C. Messana, commanding the straits of the same name, was also of importance. Its original name was Zancle—the Sickle—from the curved form of the bay on which it stood. Opposite to it lay Rhegium—the Rift—whose name commemorated the volcanic convulsion which had riven Sicily from the mainland of Italy. Though both Ionic in their origin, the two cities were deadly foes, owing to their jealousy of each other and their struggles to monopolise the trade which passed over the waters between them. Selinus and Himera, the one on the southern, the other on the northern shore, stood as the bulwarks of Grecian Sicily against the Carthaginians. Selinus—so called from the parsley that grew in abundance round about—stood on a narrow strip of land between the streams of the Hypsas on the east and

the Selinus on the west. Despite its late foundation, it surpassed in magnificence most, if not all, of the Sicilian cities of its time, and flourished long after its metropolis had sunk into insignificance. The prosperity was doubtless due to the trade with the neighbouring Carthaginians, which fell naturally into the hands of the nearest city. To such a degree was this the case that Selinus was regarded as half Carthaginian, and was chosen as a home by exiles banished from Carthage herself.

It will be noticed that all the chief Hellenic colonies were situated on the eastern or southern shore of the island. The absence of plains near the coast debarred the early settlers from frequenting the northern shore; and when in later days they made attempts to settle there, they were usually prevented by the hostility of the native tribes, aided by the comparative proximity of the Carthaginians. In the north-west and west the three great Phoenician marts maintained a long prosperity, interrupted only in the case of Motye. That town, situated at the point of Sicily nearest to Africa, was built on an island exactly similar to Ortygia, and was made a position of immense strength by artificial means. After its capture by Dionysius I. in 397 B.C., it gradually sank in importance, and its place was taken by Lilybaeum, a few miles farther south, whose harbour was at once the safest in Sicily and the most difficult of access, owing to the shoals and sandbanks at its mouth. Panormus still remains as Palermo, and is even now the mart of Sicily *par excellence*. Solus, least of the three Phoenician settlements, a few miles west of Thermae and Himera, early sank into decay.

§ 10. Until 485 B.C. Syracuse was ruled by an oligarchy

History of Syracuse, 500—289 B.C. of landowners. In that year, being expelled by a coalition of serfs and the lower classes, they

appealed for help to Gelo, the despot of Gela. Gelo seized the opportunity to take possession of Syracuse, which under his sway at once became the foremost city in the island. In 480 B.C., the year of Salamis, Gelo won a great victory at Himera over an immense Carthaginian armament—a success that inspired the Greeks with gratitude so intense that on his death in the following year

they worshipped him as a demigod. He was succeeded by his brother Hiero I., who defeated the Etruscans with great slaughter off Cumae in 474 B.C., and maintained or even extended the power which had been bequeathed to him. He died in 467 B.C.; and towards the end of the same year, with Thrasybulus, his successor, the Gelonian dynasty came to an end. The government of the city now became a democracy. No event of great importance occurred until the spring of 415 B.C., when the Athenians despatched the famous expedition for the conquest of Sicily which was annihilated two years afterwards before Syracuse. In 405 B.C. the Carthaginians, who had ceased hostilities since their defeat at Himera, again attacked the Greeks. Amid the confusion occasioned by their devastations, Dionysius contrived to make himself despot of Syracuse, a position which he maintained until his death in 367 B.C. Besides reducing to subjection all the Greek cities of the island, he waged four wars against the Carthaginians, in which fortune varied in an extraordinary manner. In 396 B.C. the Carthaginians besieged and nearly took Syracuse: the general result, however, of these hostilities was that neither side could claim any decisive advantage, and the river Halycus became the boundary between Greek and Carthaginian Sicily. In Italy Dionysius met with more uniform success. Sometimes in alliance with the Lucanians, sometimes without external assistance, he waged an unremitting war against the Greek cities of the southern coast. Rhegium was his chief conquest; but he also took Caulonia and Crotona, while he made his power felt in the Adriatic by sending colonies to Ancona and to Issa, an island near Salona. His son Dionysius II. reigned for ten years (367—357 B.C.), when he was driven out by his relative Dion, whom he had previously expelled. Dion, in spite of his promises of freedom, tried to seize the tyranny at Syracuse, but was assassinated by one of his captains, 353 B.C. His death was followed by a period of terrible confusion, which lasted until 343 B.C., when the Syracusans, terrified by a further Carthaginian attack, requested Corinth, their mother city, to send some one to their relief. Timoleon accepted the apparently hopeless task: he settled

matters in Syracuse, gained a brilliant victory over the Carthaginians at the river Crimessus (340 B.C.), and completed his work by expelling the tyrants who had set themselves up in the other Greek cities. Sicily then enjoyed a few years of peace and prosperity; but troubles soon commenced anew, and the government of Syracuse passed into the hands of a close oligarchy called the Six Hundred. About the year 325 B.C. Agathocles, who had distinguished himself in a war between Syracuse and Agrigentum, acquired great influence; and though exiled in 323 B.C., he speedily returned, and in 317 B.C. upset the oligarchy and made himself tyrant. The greater part of his reign, which lasted until 289 B.C., was consumed in warfare with the Carthaginians. In 310 B.C., at a time when Syracuse was actually undergoing siege by the enemy, he left the city and boldly sailed to Africa. He maintained himself for four years in the territory of Carthage; and though his success fell short of his hopes, he was able to make a treaty of peace on equal terms in 306 B.C. Like his predecessor Dionysius, Agathocles busied himself with affairs in the Adriatic, and on one occasion he got possession of Coreyra, which, as above related, he made over to Pyrrhus as a dowry for his daughter Lanassa. On his death some of his Campanian mercenaries, styled by themselves Mamertines, *i.e.*, sons of Mars, set out for Italy: on their way thither they were hospitably received by the people of Messana, but they repaid this kindness by massacring their hosts and seizing on their wives and property. This act of perfidy, as we shall see, ultimately brought Rome into collision with Carthage.

§ 11. Despite the fact that Carthage as well as Rome was now opposed to him—for the two countries had by this time formed an alliance—Pyrrhus was glad to abandon his difficult and unprofitable fight in Italy. He is said to have been confirmed in this resolution by the generosity of the consul Fabricius, who cautioned him against a treacherous physician, when the latter had offered to remove him by poison. The story belongs no doubt to those inventions with which the Romans delighted to adorn a period of history of which they were justly

proud. Pyrrhus, quite apart from this, had every inducement to turn to a fresh field of battle, and accordingly in the course of the year 278 B.C., in spite of the entreaties of the Samnites and Lucanians and the protests of the Tarentines, he embarked for Syracuse. Before setting out he made the best arrangements he could for the safety of his allies: the Romans, it seems, in consideration of Pyrrhus' withdrawal from Italy, agreed not to molest Tarentum, and the rest of the Grecian cities were protected by Epirote garrisons, Milo being specially entrusted with the safety of Tarentum. With Pyrrhus' coming, the aspect of affairs in Sicily changed as if by magic. As the Mamertines of Messana were hostile, Pyrrhus did not attempt to force his way across the straits that separate Sicily from the mainland, but sailed direct from Locri to Tauromenium (*Taormina*),\* near Mount Etna, where he was received with effusion. Taking on board the troops of his allies, he sailed onwards to Catana, where his presence was equally welcome, and thence to Syracuse. The Carthaginians at once abandoned the siege, and Pyrrhus made his entry without opposition. He forced to reconciliation the contending parties in the city, and then moved against the remaining Greek strongholds. Everywhere he was welcomed as a saviour: the Carthaginians lost one place after another, and were even driven from Eryx, in the storming of which Pyrrhus displayed a gallantry which reminded men of the deeds of Agamemnon's chieftains. He was now master of the whole island with the exception of Lilybaeum, the last refuge of Carthage in the west, and Messana. So dejected were the Carthaginians that they entered into negotiations for peace. But Pyrrhus was insatiable. Nothing, he said, would content him but the complete conquest of the island and the entire withdrawal of the Carthaginians therefrom, and to bring this about he began to equip a great fleet. But here his good luck deserted him. Pyrrhus was a magnificent soldier, but totally wanting in the arts which could steer a man with safety through his dealings with

\* Tauromenium was founded 358 B.C. by a certain Andromachus, with the remains of the inhabitants of Naxos, which, despite its antiquity and fame, was ruthlessly destroyed by the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, 403 B.C.

a score of Hellenic towns, all jealous of their rights and resolved to escape the rule of a despot. He had also lost his faithful minister, the diplomatist Cineas, whose services would have been invaluable at this juncture. The Syracusans were disaffected, owing to the execution of a leading citizen called Thonon; while the other Greek cities murmured at the burdens entailed by the building of the fleet, and for the most part concluded secret agreements with Carthage or the Mamertines. The Carthaginians emerged once more from Lilybaeum with a great army that had recently landed from Africa. They suffered a defeat, but Pyrrhus was too sorely beset by the fermenting discontent among his allies to reap the fullest advantage from his success. Besides this, pressing messages for help had come from the Samnites and Lucanians. Renouncing his dreams of an African empire, Pyrrhus sailed back to Tarentum, 276 B.C. He reached his destination, although not without sustaining severe losses at the hands of the Carthaginians and Mamertines. His return was the signal for the downfall of his Sicilian kingdom.

§ 12. Meantime, in Italy his position had altered greatly

<sup>Third Italian Campaign.</sup> for the worse. The Samnites, besides being weakened by a successful campaign of the

<sup>275 B.C.</sup> consuls C. Junius Brutus and P. Cornelius

Rufinus in 277 B.C., were irritated with Pyrrhus for his withdrawal to Sicily, and showed no enthusiasm towards him. The compact line of friendly fortresses which he had left behind him three years before had been broken up by the Romans. Heraclea had quickly surrendered; Crotona was surprised by Rufinus; the citizens of Locri rose and massacred the Epirote garrison, an act which Pyrrhus punished with great severity on his return. The two parties, in fact, were precisely where they had been at the outbreak of the war. But, apart from this, Pyrrhus was far less favourably situated now than when he first set foot in Italy: he had held his own against the legions indeed, but he had deserted the allies whom his presence had induced to revolt, and now men regarded him as no better than a discredited adventurer, who had wasted the fruits of two successful campaigns by a wild venture in Sicily. His

best officers had fallen: his faithful Greek troops were largely replaced by untrustworthy Italian levies whom he had not the means to pay. On the other hand, the Romans, despite their great losses—the census roll of 275 B.C. showed, as compared with that of 281 B.C., a decrease of 17,000 citizens—were as full of resolution as ever, and filled up the legions with enthusiasm. Still Pyrrhus did not abandon the struggle. He opened the third campaign (275 B.C.) by marching to the aid of the Samnites, whose territory was occupied by the consul M'. Curius. Pyrrhus resolved to give battle before Curius could be joined by his colleague from Lucania, and at Beneventum (*Benevento*) he fought for the third and last time against Rome. His attempt to surprise the Roman position miscarried; the legions held their own; and his elephants, terrified by the Roman archers, wheeled

Battle of Beneventum, 275 B.C. about and charged through the ranks of the army they were intended to protect. His troops

dispersed and his camp taken, Pyrrhus had neither men nor money wherewith to continue the struggle. His applications for help to the kings of Macedonia and Syria met with refusal, and in the same year he returned to Epirus, leaving Tarentum under the care of Milo with a considerable garrison. His subsequent career—which, however, belongs rather to Grecian than to Roman history—continued to show the old restlessness. For a short time he was in possession of the greater part of Macedonia. But soon, on the invitation of an exiled Spartan, he engaged in an invasion of the Peloponnese. An attempt to storm Sparta was frustrated by the efforts of the inhabitants, aided by the enthusiasm of the women; and Pyrrhus turned towards Argos. He made his way into the market-place; but finding it impossible to maintain his position there, tried to escape from the town. Near one of the gates an Argive engaged in single combat with Pyrrhus. His mother beheld the fight from a housetop, and, seeing that her son was in deadly peril, took hold of a large tile with both hands and hurled it at Pyrrhus. The missile went true to its mark, crushed through the helmet, and inflicted a mortal wound on the Epirote chief. So fell the most chivalrous character of the ancient world, a man who could

carve out an empire with his sword like those later heroes of romance, the Norman conquerors of Italy and Sicily.

As long as Pyrrhus was alive, even though separated from Italy by the sea, his lieutenant Milo held Tarentum. When news of his master's death came, he resolved to give up the place. The leaders of one party in the town were in communication with Carthage, and a Carthaginian fleet was in the harbour. At the same time a Roman army was encamped before the town on the land side, longing to seize the prize that meant for them the sovereignty over Southern Italy. The decision rested with Milo, who cared little for either country. But as the consul L. Papirius guaranteed that the Epirote garrison should march out of Tarentum with all its stores and booty, he gave up the place to the Romans. Tarentum was treated with no particular severity by its conqueror: it retained its autonomy, though deprived of its wall and ships. In the same year the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians laid down their arms, though there was further trouble with the Samnites in 269 B.C., when two consular armies were required to reduce them to submission.

The fall of Tarentum left the Romans free to deal with those Campanian legionaries who, in defiance of all discipline and good faith, had taken advantage of Pyrrhus' victory at Heraclea to seize Rhegium for themselves. Knowing the fate that awaited them, the mutineers held out with the courage of desperation. Their allies, the Mamertines of Messana, gave them what help they could, but against this had to be set off the fact that Hiero, the new ruler of Syracuse, supported the Romans with enthusiasm. At length Rhegium fell: the survivors of the garrison, some 300 in number, were sent to Rome, where they were scourged and beheaded. The old citizens were as far as possible restored; and Rhegium, like Tarentum, became a *ciritas foederata*.

§ 13. The Romans were now undisputed masters of the United peninsula. From the Ager Gallicus to the Italy. Straits of Messana every opponent had been discomfited and disarmed; and Etruscans, Samnites, and Greeks became every year more inclined to bear the supre-

macy of Rome with patience. The principles on which Rome treated her subjects and allies have been indicated (Ch. I., §§ 6-8): briefly, they were to isolate as far as possible state from state and community from community, and at the same time to encourage friendly relations between each and Rome, their mistress. In this way the cantons of (e.g.) the Hernicans and Aequians were, on their submission, separated as much as possible, a separation which was greatly assisted by the feuds which habitually prevailed between tribes of common origin, as, for example, between the Samnites and Lucanians. No state, allied or dependent, was permitted to have any views of its own upon a question of foreign policy: its relations with other states were regulated by the sole discretion of Rome, who jealously monopolised the right to make war and to conclude treaties. On the other hand, every state, whether allied or dependent, was allowed to retain a large measure of self-government. The decrees of the Roman senate and the commands of Roman magistrates might on occasion be made binding throughout all the communities of Italy; but such power was as a rule kept in reserve. Throughout Italia—now extending as far northwards as the Arnus (*Arno*) and the Aesis (*Esino*)—the old policy was pursued of favouring the aristocrats at the expense of the popular and patriotic party. In the Etruscan towns, which nominally at least retained their independence, the government was entrusted to aristocracies who were but the nominees and servants of Rome. Similarly in Capua, the Campanian knights, who had been mainly instrumental in admitting the Romans to the town, were invested with the rights of a privileged class, and even pensioned with funds extorted from their fellow-countrymen. But in other respects the subjects of Rome had little ground for complaint: no tribute was directly levied from them, though the valuation of property which was made quinquennially throughout Italy must have had its origin in the determination of the senate to know what were the resources of the people under its rule, and how far these could be drawn upon in an emergency. They were indeed compelled to place a contingent in the field, and to provide for its maintenance during a campaign; but

to a nation of warriors, as were especially the Sabellian tribes, this could hardly have been a grievance. The Greek cities, on becoming *civitates foederatae*, were as a rule commanded to contribute ships towards the naval force of Rome. The other side of the picture is seen in the fact that among these subject communities their local self-government, their language and customs, remained intact; and if it performed nothing else, Roman rule at least established peace in lieu of the perpetual conflicts which had hitherto been the bane of Italy. Tarentum was no longer permitted to quarrel with her Lucanian neighbours, still less to call in a foreign force to her assistance. The Lucanian was bidden to keep peace with the Bruttian. The Samnite no longer swept down in forays on the Greek cities of Campania. The *par Romana* was a reality from the Apennines to the lighthouse of Messana; and men knew that Rome was prepared to shed her blood and spend her treasure even beyond those limits, if by so doing she could keep herself and her subjects safe against a foreign enemy. Rome justified her supremacy in the eyes of every Italian when she cowed the restless Gaul and prevented the horrors of such another raid as that of Brennus one hundred years before.

§ 14. When the war was ended, Rome pursued her usual

<sup>Further Colonies.</sup> policy of extending her military roads and strengthening her hold on the conquered districts by a further series of colonies, both of citizens and Latins. In 273 B.C. one or more colonies were established to secure the allegiance of the Lucanians: there was one at Paestum,\* on the western coast, and another at Cosa, perhaps near Thurii.† A Latin colony was sent (268 B.C.) to Beneventum in the heart of the Samnite land. It was situated on the great Appian Way, which was about the same time prolonged from Venusia to Tarentum and Brundusium. Brundusium, which possessed an excellent harbour, was fostered in the hope that it would prove a rival of

\* Paestum is the ancient Poseidonia, a famous colony of Sybaris established before 524 B.C. It was captured about a hundred years later by the Lucanians, and gradually lost its Greek language and civilisation. It is still famous for the ruins of two fine Doric temples.

† By some historians this colony is said to be the Etruscan Cosa, a coast town about 70 miles N.W. of Rome.

Tarentum, but did not become a colony until the close of the first Punic war (in 244 B.C.). With a view to keep the Samnites in check, another Latin colony was founded (263 B.C.) at Aesernia (*Isernia*), a few miles to the north of Beneventum. Three colonies—Ariminum (*Rimini*, 268 B.C.), Firmum (*Porto Fermo*, 264 B.C.), and Castrum Novum (at the mouth of the *Salinello*, 264 B.C.)—served as outposts against the Gauls. Of these the last alone was a citizen colony: the two others were Latin; and it is a noteworthy fact that the Ariminum did not receive to the full extent the privileges that had hitherto been bestowed on all Latin colonies. In what point these privileges were curtailed is a matter of dispute;\* but the motives which actuated Rome are quite clear. When Rome was weak, it was a gain to her that Latin citizens should take up their residence with her; but now that she was mistress of Italy, her citizenship was of great and ever increasing worth, and she did not intend that such a boon should be too easy of acquisition. Still these same years offer evidence that Rome was not turning from her old far-seeing policy of strengthening herself by the admission of new blood into the ranks of her citizens. In the year 268 B.C. the whole body of the Sabines, with only a few exceptions, such as the inhabitants of Reate (*Rieti*) and Amiternum (*S. Vittorino*), received the full franchise. They were probably enrolled among the tribes in 241 B.C., at which date were formed the *tribus Velina* and *Quirina*, the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth respectively in order, and the last to be created.

\* See on p. 12.

## CHAPTER III.

### CARTHAGE.

§ 1. The Phoenicians.—§ 2. Foundation of Carthage.—§ 3. Growth of Carthage.—§ 4. Military Organisation.—§ 5. Government of Carthage.—§ 6. Religion.—§ 7. Literature.

§ 1. CARTHAGE was a colony of the Phoenicians, established, <sup>The</sup> so tradition declared, a century before the <sup>Phoenicians.</sup> foundation of Rome (853 b.c.). The Phoenicians were a Semitic nation who came from the upper shores of the Persian Gulf and settled about the year 2000 b.c. along the Syrian coast. Their territory, Phoenicia, was a mere belt of coast land, not more than 180 miles long, and at no point exceeding forty in width. The barrier of the Lebanon range protected them to some extent against the powerful nations of the interior, but they never utilised it, as they might have done, to form the bulwark of a national liberty. They were a nation of traders. They had no ambition for empire, and indeed they were never sufficiently numerous to have made head against the mightier nations of Babylon, Nineveh, Persia, and Egypt. They desired only so much space as should provide them with a home, whence they might sail to explore the remotest shores. From the very earliest times they must have been a commercial people, for their island homes in the Persian Gulf still remain the natural emporium of the trade between Europe and the Indian coasts. They may have maintained this trade by means of caravans, for we know they kept up a constant intercourse with the Assyrian empire; they certainly opened new routes towards the west, and rapidly monopolised the entire commercial wealth of the Mediterranean. They made no conquests by war, but quietly extended their factories and trading stations from island to island through

the Aegean to the coasts of Greece, and along the shores of Macedon to the Black Sea. Most of all they were attracted by the precious metals and the murex, a shell-fish which furnished them with the famous dye known as Tyrian purple. In quest of one or other of these objects they came to Cyprus and Chalcis of Euboea, rich in copper ores; to Thasos, where their gold-diggers "overturned a whole mountain"; to Laurium, where they brought to light the treasures of the silver mines afterwards so valuable to Athens; to Troezen and Hermione for murex. The names of Megara and Samos, of Macaria the fountain of Marathon, of the Cadmea the acropolis of Thebes, all bear witness to their presence; so do Cythera where the armed Aphrodite was worshipped, Amyclae where the death of Hyacinthus (*i.e.* Adonis) was mourned, Nauplia the abode of Palamedes, Corinth which honoured Melicertes (*i.e.* Melcarth). Many of the important names in Crete, and still more of those in Cyprus, are Phoenician. From the eastern and southern shores of Hellas they passed westward to Sicily and Africa, where in 1140 B.C. they founded their factory of Utica, on the Gulf of Tunis. Finally Spain presented to them a virgin land teeming with precious metals, and there before the year 1000 B.C. they founded the town of Gades (*Cadiz*), on the coast of that land of Tartessus or Tarshish whence they brought gold for the temple of Solomon in Jerusalem. This westward bent of the Phoenicians was due not only to innate enterprise and quest of traffic, but also to the fact that the Hellenes of the eastern Mediterranean were now waking up to emulation and gradually ousting the Phoenicians from the islands and mainland of Greece. The Phoenicians retired without a struggle and turned with fresh energy to the west.

§ 2. While the Phoenicians of Tyre and Sidon were Foundation of troubled by the aggressions of Assyria, a body Carthago. of exiled citizens fled to Africa, where they founded (853 B.C.), a few miles distant from Utica, the older city, a town known by its inhabitants as Kirjath-Hadeschath, "the New Town," by the Greeks as Carchedon, and by the Romans as Carthago, the famous Carthage. According to the story as related by Vergil, Sychaeus, king

of Tyre, was murdered by his brother in law Pygmalion, and his widow Elissa or Dido fled secretly with a band of wealthy Tyrians whom the cruelty and rapacity of the usurper forced to seek safety elsewhere. All we can certainly say is that Carthage was a direct off-shoot from Tyre, and that it never forgot its filial duty towards the mother city. Thither was sent a yearly tithe to the temple of Melcarth, and when Tyre was taken by Alexander the Great (332 B.C.) the refugees found a welcome within the walls of Carthage.

The new colony was situated on the eastern shore of the Bay of Tunis, about thirty miles distant from the modern town of Tunis, and a few miles southward of the estuary of the Bagradas (*Mejerda*). In the heart of the most fertile region of the African coast, it was admirably fitted to be the home of the merchant princes who spent in quiet country enjoyments the gains of earlier commercial efforts; while its bay furnishes almost the only safe harbour on the whole coast from Alexandria to the Pillars of Hercules (*Gibraltar*). Eastward the promontory of Hermaeum (*Cape Bon*) juts out towards Sicily, from which it is but ninety miles away, and beyond lies the great indentation known to the ancients as the Lesser Syrtis (*Syrtis minor*), or "Drifts," from the shoals and sand-banks which stretched along the coast. The coast itself was then, as now, little better than a sandy desert for a distance of 800 miles. After this, the fertile lands of Cyrenaica were reached, conterminous with the western boundaries of Egypt. In contrast with the desolation of the eastern desert was the wonderful productiveness of the coast westward from Cape Bon. Here it was no uncommon thing for crops to yield one-hundred-and-fifty-fold, and even now the provinces of Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco retain something of their ancient luxuriance. But there is no reason to suppose that the founders of Carthage chose the site of the new town only for its fertility. It possessed inestimable advantages as a centre for trade, commanding as it did the whole of the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean, and the resources of continental Africa to boot. The soil was left in the hands of the native Libyans, to whom the

Carthaginians at first even paid a yearly tribute—the rental of their holding; and it was to commerce that the new city was devoted. And the growth of that commerce was marvellous. Three hundred factories stretched round the western shoulder of Africa, and the traders of Carthage penetrated beyond the Canaries to the Cameroons, whence they brought back captive gorillas, ivory and gold, and stories of the fiery Cameroons mountain. Spain, with its mines of silver, iron, and quicksilver, was almost a home to them. They reached even to the Silly Isles, where they purchased the tin of Cornwall, and to the Baltic, whence they brought home amber. The products so obtained they wrought into vessels and implements whose design was borrowed from the inventiveness of Greece, of Egypt, and of the East, but whose workmanship was entirely Phoenician.

§ 3. At the date of the founding of Carthage, the <sup>The Greek</sup> greatness of Tyre and Phoenicia was rapidly <sub>of Carthage</sub> waning. On the other hand, a century later the Greeks were pressing westwards, and, in Sicily above all, threatened to drive out the Phoenicians from the western, just as they had previously done from the eastern, Mediterranean. Thus compelled to act, Carthage renounced the apathy of the old Phoenicians, made herself the head of the national interests in the west, and set herself to the task of consolidating a great empire. The westward advance of the Greeks, who, as we have seen, had Hellenised most of the coast of Sicily by the year 600 B.C., received an official check. The Etruscans, whose corsairs traversed the Tyrrhenian Sea without let or hindrance from any except the Greeks, learned that Carthage was more to be desired as an ally than as a foe, and early concluded an amicable pact with the new power that had arisen. By the year 500 B.C. the Carthaginian territory extended eastwards along the African coast to Barca and Cyrene, and westwards beyond the Pillars of Hercules. Corsica and Sardinia, the western half of Sicily, with its great fortresses of Motye, Panormus, and Solus, she regarded as her provinces. Malta, the Lipari and Balearic Islands, were hers; and through Gades and other Phoenician settlements about the coasts of Spain, she had gained a hold on that peninsula.

which was subsequently to prove of great use towards a more complete conquest of the land. The Carthaginians were notoriously severe masters to their subjects, especially those of Africa. The tribute soon ceased to be paid to the Libyans, who were in their turn reduced to the position of serfs cultivating the soil. The intermarriage of Carthaginians with native Libyans gave rise to a half-breed population called Liby-Phoenicians, who occupied the great cities of the home province. These were treated with the same harshness as the pure Africans, and not allowed to fortify their towns. With a solitary exception all these—Hippo Regius (*Bona*), Hippo Diarrhytus (*Bizerta*), Hadrametum (*Susa*), the Greater Leptis (*Lebda*) and the Lesser, etc.—were denied every right of self-government, and taxed heavily both in men and money. The Lesser Leptis, for instance, paid to Carthage the extraordinary tribute of a talent a day. The ancient settlement of Utica alone escaped this fate, probably because there the Phoenician element was too strong to allow of any fear of disaffection; and as a rule, whenever Carthage concluded a treaty with a foreign state, she placed Utica on an honourable equality with herself. The country round the immediate possessions of Carthage was occupied south and west by Numidians, Mauretanians, and Gaetulians—branches of the native Libyan race—who for the most part acknowledged Carthaginian supremacy by paying tribute and supplying contingents in war.

§ 4. Carthaginian citizens furnished only the officers of <sup>Military</sup> her armies. On one occasion indeed a <sup>Organisation.</sup> Sacred Band or bodyguard of 2,500 citizens is mentioned, but as a rule they did not serve in the ranks—a fact not due to any cowardice or lack of enterprise on their part, but simply to the consideration that their lives were too valuable to be thrown away when other material was plentiful. Hence, as money was more plentiful with the Carthaginians than any other nation of antiquity, mercenaries were lavishly employed, and they were collected from every nation, subject or not. The main strength of the army was composed of Liby-Phoenicians and subject Libyans; but soldiers were procured from many other

sources as well: the roaming Numidians supplied in inexhaustible numbers the finest light cavalry of the world; the Spaniards were equally good as foot or horse; from the Balearic islands came slingers of unsurpassed excellence; the hardy Ligurians made an admirable light infantry; and we hear of Gauls, Campanians, and even Hellenes (mostly exiles and slaves, it is true) in the Carthaginian armaments. From the days of Pyrrhus' invasion of Sicily the Carthaginians, following his example, attached to every army an elephant corps. It was, however, for her navy that Carthage was especially famous: her vessels of war were counted by hundreds, and now that the Etruscans and Greeks had lost their old power, her seamen had no rivals in the west. Yet the weakness of her military system is palpable enough. Armies of 150,000 to 300,000 men were not unusual with the Carthaginians. But they lacked all the moral strength of war—unity of blood and language, attachment to their leader; above all, attachment to the country which they professed to serve. Their very numbers rendered them unmanageable to the run of Carthaginian commanders, who had no especial talent for war or diplomacy. Yet when there arose a heaven-born general, who could attach them to himself by favour or fear, and remedy the perpetual remissness of the government in supplying the sinews of war, it was possible, as Hannibal showed, to obtain wonderful results from this collection of heterogeneous material. The general was chosen by the oligarchic council, and despite the jealousy with which an oligarchy commonly views any extensive military command, the Carthaginian commander-in-chief was invested with an authority limited to no fixed term and almost dictatorial in character. There were two checks only upon his powers: first, he was accompanied by a civil commission which exercised at least a moral control over his actions; and secondly, he knew that failure, perhaps not even due to his own fault, was likely to meet with terrible requital. In the hey-day of the nation's prosperity, more than one unsuccessful general met his death on the cross.

§ 5. Our knowledge of the constitution of Carthage is

very defective, derived as it is from a few short statements of Aristotle and scattered references in Polybius and Livy. Aristotle, who wrote towards the end of the fourth century B.C., says that it was remarkable for its stability, inasmuch as he could find no occasion on which it had been seriously endangered even by attempts of its own members to make themselves despotic rulers. In its earlier form, the government seems to have been in the hands of a council of old men (*γεροντεία*), which consisted of two suffetes or kings (who acted as presidents and originally no doubt had possessed regal authority) and twenty-eight ordinary members. It declared war, made peace, and appointed generals, while the suffetes acted generally as its executive, occasionally leading the army in person. The suffetes seem to have held office for life.\* The mass of the people had little voice in the government.

But in the nature of things such a constitution could not remain unaltered, particularly in a mercantile state where wealth was every day bringing new men to the front. A council of thirty men, holding their position for life, afforded too few prizes for the ambition of a nobility of merchant princes at once rich, powerful, and numerous; the more as the offices of suffete and councillor, and consequently those of general and admiral, had fallen inevitably into the hands of a few families to the exclusion of their fellow-nobles. Accordingly there was formed a second council of one hundred and four "Judges," known roundly as "The Hundred," who controlled the smaller council just as the latter controlled the suffetes. Thus the original council was gradually superseded and its powers transferred to The Hundred, which now exercised an absolutism so complete that they are compared by Aristotle to the Ephors at Sparta, who controlled in the same way the two kings and the Gerusia. The Hundred were selected by certain boards of five called Pentarchies, and they appear to have held office for life.† With The Hundred rested the audit of the

\* Cornelius Nepos, however, says: *Ut enim Romae consules, sic Carthaginē annibim rego creabantur.*

† Indicunt oratio Carthagine ea tempestate (195 B.C.) dominabatur eo maxime quod quinque perpetui indices erant. Res fama vitaque omnium in eorum potestate

actions of gerusiasts, suffetes, and generals alike ; and they seem to have purposely avoided office themselves, content to enjoy the control of others. Thus the constitution of the city was still an oligarchy of the closest kind, although the actual centre of power had shifted to a somewhat larger if not less irresponsible body than the original council. The mass of the people remained as destitute as ever of political rights. In a Greek town the presence of a commercial lower class carried with it the assurance of political disquietude and democratic agitation : it was otherwise with Carthage, whose seafaring multitude retained the old Phoenician indifference to political questions and theoretic freedom.

§ 6. Like most of the old Oriental nations, the Phoenicians tended towards a gloomy and morbid cruelty, Religion. and their vindictive treatment of their generals was but the reflection of their religious ceremonials—the “abomination of the Sidonians.” Their great deity was Baal, or Bel, the Moloch of the Bible, God of the Sun. His consort was Astarte, or Tanith, Goddess of the Moon, sometimes surnamed Mulitta. The former was the god to whom they sacrificed human victims, usually infants, who were laid in the outstretched hands of an image so constructed that, when a fire was kindled within, their bodies fell backwards into the flames. The state sacrifices in honour of Baal were the chosen children of the noblest families, and when, on the occasion of Agathocles’ invasion, it was discovered that the promptings of affection had induced some parents to keep back their own children and offer in their stead the purchased children of baseborn and less humane parents, the pious fraud was condoned by a holocaust of two hundred infants. It was this practice, long ago extinct amongst the Hellenes, which roused so fiercely their detestation for the Phoenicians at large ; and it was from this god that so many Carthaginian names derive their termination—*bal*.

Hardly less debasing was the worship of Astarte, the erat. Qui unum eius ordinis offendisset, omnes adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infenos indices dererat. Upon this Hannibal carried a law that the judges should be elected for one year only. On the doubtful points Mr. Strachan-Davidson’s *Selections from Polybius*, Prolegomena, IV., may be consulted.

Phoenician Venus. She was the original source of the Greek Aphrodite, with whom the Romans identified their Venus. Closely connected with the cult of Adonai (Adonis), it early found its way into Greece, where Corinth attained an unenviable notoriety for a ritual entirely unGreek in its impurity. Corinth, indeed, was particularly the centre of Phoenician tradition in Greece, for here was worshipped Melicertes, identical even in name with the Phoenician Melcarth. He was worshipped with no bloody sacrifices, or at least with none of human blood, and his temples contained no image. Tyre was especially his city, and there Herodotus saw its pillars of emerald and gold; but Thasos, too, had a famous temple in his honour, and at Gades, in the far west, Hannibal registered to him vows for the fair issue of his war upon Rome. He was the God of Enterprise, Commerce, and Travel, and was known to the Greeks as the "Tyrian Hercules"—a name which contributed largely to the growth of the legends concerning their own Hercules.

§ 7. Of the literature of Carthage there are no remains.

*Literature.* When Rome took the town the whole of the voluminous libraries there found were handed over to the native princes of Africa, in whose hands they gradually melted away. One Mago had, however, composed a lengthy treatise on husbandry, which was so excellent, at least in its precepts, that it was translated into Latin by order of the senate, and became a standard book on the subject even for the Romans. What its style may have been there is nothing to show us. There remain also two transcriptions of the records of Carthaginian explorers. The first, the *Periplus* of Hanno, relates how that admiral coasted southward from the Pillars of Hercules, carrying with him a crowd of colonists, whom he planted on the Moorish coasts. Then, sailing still southward, he tells how he saw the Fiery Mountain, supposed to have been the Cameroons Volcano, and the hairy apes, whom he named gorillas. The narrative was inscribed and dedicated in a Carthaginian temple, whence it was copied and translated by an unknown Greek. The other translation, a rendering in Latin verse by Festus Avienus of a similar voyage to the

Northern seas, now goes by the name of the *Ora Maritima*. It is only a fragment, but it speaks of the Scilly Isles, and the “Holy Island” (Ireland), and the “broad island” of Albion. Beyond a few inscriptions dug up on the site of Carthage, there is no vestige to-day of what must once have been the language of a varied literature.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

§ 1. Syracuse, Carthage, and the Mamertines.—§ 2. Arguments for and against the War.—§ 3. Capture of Messana.—§ 4. Second and Third Campaigns.—§ 5. The First Roman Fleet.—§ 6. From Mylae to Ecnomus.—§ 7. Expedition of Regulus.—§ 8. Defeat of Regulus.—§ 9. Fate of Regulus.—§ 10. Capture of Panormus.—§ 11. Battle of Panormus.—§ 12. Siege of Lilybaeum.—§ 13. Battle of Drepanum.—§ 14. Hamilcar Barca in Sicily.—§ 15. Battle of the Aegates Insulae.—§ 16. Terms of Peace.—§ 17. Sicily a Province.

§ 1. WHEN Pyrrhus quitted Sicily on the failure of his schemes in that island, he is said to have <sup>Syracuse, Carthage, and the Mamertines.</sup> claimed, “What a wrestling ground we are leaving to the Carthaginians and the Romans!”\* His remark was prophetic, for in little more than twelve years later, when the two nations commenced their struggle for supremacy, the scene of their conflict was Sicily. In 264 B.C. that island was in unequal proportions divided between three masters. By far the largest, though not the wealthiest, part was in the hands of the Carthaginians, who, as already related (p. 37), had regained their position on the withdrawal of Pyrrhus, and now claimed as their own the great fortresses of the extreme western coast, together with Selinus, Heraclea Minoa, and Agrigentum (*Girgenti*), once flourishing centres of Greek commerce, learning, and magnificence, but now given over to a barbarian conqueror. The eastern shore of the island was under the influence of Syracuse, ruled by Hiero, a young and capable general, who has been already mentioned as helping the Romans at the siege

\* *αντιτελεπομετε Καρχηδονιος και Ρωμαιος παλαιωστραν* (Hist., *P*, v. 1, c. 22).

of Rhegium. The Mamertines were still in possession of Messana, the town which they had seized twenty years before, but they had long had the greatest difficulty in beating off the attacks of Hiero. Hiero's rise dates from about the year 274 B.C., when he was an officer in the Syracusan army sent against the Mamertines. He was young and handsome; his family was an illustrious one, being descended, according to repute, from Gelo, the first despot of Syracuse (p. 33); and his conspicuous bravery had attracted the attention of Pyrrhus, in whose Sicilian campaigns he had served just previously. At this time Syracuse was in a state of anarchy; so unsettled was it in fact that the army renounced allegiance to the government, put Hiero and another officer in command, and seized the city. To every one's surprise this success was followed by no sentences of banishment or confiscation, a moderation ascribed by men to Hiero, who soon won the confidence of the citizens as completely as he already had that of the army. In the year 269 B.C. he set himself seriously to the task of crushing the Mamertines. His energy met with instant success; he won Mylae, Tyndaris, and other places under the control of the Mamertines, defeated them in a pitched battle near Mylae, and blockaded them in their town. At this juncture the Carthaginians appeared on the scene. They saw that it was altogether against their interests for so powerful a state to fall into the hands of their old rival Syracuse, but their general, Hannibal, preferred to temporise rather than to assist the Mamertines actively. He therefore formed an alliance with Hiero, but rendered him as little help as possible, hoping all the while that an opportunity might enable him to seize Messana for himself. This state of affairs continued until 265 B.C., when the Mamertines, worsted in the field and torn with dissension at home, felt that they were incapable of holding out single-handed much longer. It was not to be expected that the Syracusans would show any mercy to the men who had put Greek citizens to death, as they had done; the question was whether they should appeal for aid to Carthage or to Rome. At last the Romanising faction got the upper hand, and an embassy proceeded to Rome.

§ 2. The senate debated long and anxiously as to the course it should pursue. On the one side men and against the War asked how Rome could help the Mamertines with any decency, when she had put to death the mutineers of Rhegium for precisely the same treachery by which the Mamertines had made themselves masters of Messana. Was it fair and honest to make war on Hiero, who had assisted them so faithfully five years before at the siege of Rhegium? But putting aside all considerations of right, was it prudent for the Romans to cross the sea in order to pit themselves against so powerful a naval power as Carthage? Hitherto Rome had confined herself to Italy, and all her wars had been fought by land. Who would guarantee the result of so vast a change in policy? On the other side it was urged, and with perfect justice, that the case of the Mamertines differed *in toto* from that of the men of Rhegium. The latter were troops in the Roman service, who had betrayed the trust reposed in them. The Mamertines had never taken the oath of allegiance to the consuls, and their punishment was no concern of Rome's. Moreover, if the Carthaginians were once admitted into Messana, they would hamper Italian trade even more grievously than they now did, and they would have a splendid base of operations against the Greek towns of the south, where Tarentum was notoriously disaffected towards her new rulers. The senate could not decide upon its line of action, but the war party, headed by Appius Claudius Caudex and M. Fulvius Flaccus, the consuls designate for 264 B.C., would not let the matter drop. They referred the question to the assembly of the people, which eagerly granted the request of the Mamertines. The Mamertines were accordingly admitted to alliance as a *critis foederata*, and put on the same footing as Tarentum and other Italian *socii* of Rome, 265 B.C.

§ 3. In the spring of 264 B.C. the allied towns of Naples, <sup>Capture of</sup> Tarentum, Velia, and Locri sent ships to <sup>Messana.</sup> Rhegium for the purpose of conveying the Romans across the straits. To Rhegium also came C. Claudius, an able and determined military tribune, who had received orders from the consul to effect a footing in Sicily at all risks. He learnt that the Carthaginian

party in Messana had been too strong for the opposite faction, and that the town was already occupied by a Carthaginian force under Hanno. But Claudius was not the man to be daunted by difficulties. His first attempt to cross the straits was a failure, some of his ships even falling into the hands of the Carthaginian admiral, who sent them back to the Romans with the sarcastic advice not to venture on so dangerous an element as the sea. The second time the wind was favourable, and Claudius effected a landing. He summoned the citizens to a conference, and invited Hanno to be present. No sooner had the admiral appeared than he was seized by Claudius, who told him that he could only regain his liberty by marching the garrison out of Messana. Hanno complied—a weakness for which he was afterwards executed by the Carthaginian government—and the Romans secured their prize without further trouble. This untoward event occasioned Hiero the greatest perplexity: he dreaded war with Rome; he distrusted the Carthaginians as allies; above all he was deeply chagrined to find that the object of ten years' labour had slipped from his grasp. However, he determined to act with the Carthaginians, and while another Hanno, the new Carthaginian admiral, besieged Messana from the north, he himself encamped a little to the south of the town. Claudius and his scanty force, thus shut in by such powerful foes, were in no slight danger, but soon the consul, Appius Claudius Caudex, came to Rhegium with the bulk of the Roman army, and on a dark night contrived to cross the straits without being discovered by the Carthaginian fleet. He then attacked and defeated Hiero, who, uncertain of the good faith of his allies and angry at the remissness with which they had allowed the Romans to land, retreated in the direction of Syracuse, and left the consul free to throw his whole force upon the Carthaginians. Appius routed the Libyans so completely that they did not dare to face him again in open field, but he was less successful when he marched against Syracuse. The walls of that city were far too strong for him to attack; privation and sickness decimated his army, and after assaulting Echetla in vain, he returned to Messana. The

end of his campaign by no means fulfilled the promise of its brilliant commencement, and Appius was not honoured with a triumph. Still the solid gain of Messana rested with the Romans.

§ 4. In the following year both consuls, M. Otacilius Crassus and M. Valerius Maximus, were sent to Sicily with a double army of four legions, or about 40,000 men. Such extensive preparations seem to point to the fact that some serious reverse had been sustained towards the close of the first campaign,\* and it is further curious that the surname of Messalla ("the Hero of Messana") was assumed by Valerius and not by Appius Claudius, in whose consulship the town was taken. Valerius soon won a decisive victory over the combined forces of Carthage and Hiero, and little further resistance was offered to him. Such a panic seized on the smaller Greek towns that no fewer than sixty-seven of these opened their gates to the Romans, and the consuls marched up to the gates of Syracuse. Hiero, alarmed at the feebleness displayed by the Carthaginians and never much enamoured of their alliance, changed his policy and opened negotiations with Valerius. The consul was only too delighted to secure the assistance of a power which would furnish him with an abundance of supplies, and on the payment of a hundred talents Hiero was admitted to alliance with the Romans. His first reward was the addition to his dominions of Leontini, Megara, Tauromenium, and other considerable towns. Henceforward for nearly fifty years he was the faithful and unwearying friend of Rome.

Thus far the Carthaginians had evinced an apathy only explicable by the supposition that the war had come upon them by surprise and that they were entirely unprepared to meet it. Messana had been in their hands, but they had lost it through the

\* Neumann (*Punische Kriegs*, p. 88) conjectures that the Carthaginian control of the sea had reduced the Romans to the utmost distress in the matter of provisions, and that at the close of the campaign of 264 B.C. they were driven back to Messana and there besieged; that in consequence the Romans not only sent out a double army in the following year, but also equipped a fleet of 220 ships to secure communications between Italy and Sicily (this rests on a statement of Pliny that a fleet of this size was built against King Hiero, which must be assigned to the year 263); and that Valerius relieved Messana from siege and won a great victory, which secured for him the name Messalla.

The Second  
Campaign.  
263 B.C.

The Third  
Campaign.  
262 B.C.

cowardice of their general. With their overwhelming superiority in ships, the Carthaginians, the first naval power in the world, might have prevented the Romans from ever setting foot in Sicily. At least they should have retained the friendship of Hiero. Yet in every instance their cause had been ruined by their lack of energy. In the third campaign they bestirred themselves in earnest. Two armies were equipped: one of these was sent under the command of Hanno to Sardinia, with a view to landing thence upon the Italian coast; the other followed Hannibal to Sicily and took up its headquarters at Agrigentum. The Romans, on the contrary, now that they were certain of Hiero's help and could shelter themselves in Syracuse as well as Messana, only raised a single consular army of two legions. Both the consuls, L. Postumius and Q. Mamilius, were engaged in Sicily, and they resolved to make Agrigentum the object of their campaign. Now Agrigentum, situated on a plateau surrounded by precipices, was so defended by its position as to be impregnable on three sides; only on the west, where the road ran to Heraclea, could it be assaulted with any hope of success. The Romans, who were little skilled in siege operations, saw that they could only reduce the place by starving out the defenders. They therefore constructed two camps, at about a mile's distance from Agrigentum on the north and west respectively, and waited patiently for famine to do its work. For four months the siege went on. Agrigentum was now surrounded by a double wall of circumvallation, and its defenders were daily becoming more pressed for food. Hannibal sent repeated messages for help, and at last, in October, the admiral Hanno concentrated an army of 50,000 men at Heraclea with a view to succour Agrigentum. He harassed the Romans in a series of petty engagements and captured their chief magazine at Herbessus, but though he encamped but a quarter of a mile away from the Roman lines, he resolved not to risk a decisive battle. Unfortunately for his plans, the Carthaginians in the town could hold out no longer, and when Hannibal declared that his troops would desert unless they were relieved, Hanno much against his will drew up his men in regular order of

battle. His mercenaries fought bravely enough, but were no match for Roman citizen troops, and being driven back upon the elephants, caused such confusion that the battle was at once lost. The fugitives betook themselves to Heraclea. During the battle Hannibal made a determined attempt to come to the help of his compatriots, but the Roman lines hemmed him in too closely. On the following night, however, profiting by the darkness of the night and the exhaustion of the consuls' men, the garrison crept over the hostile fortifications and for the most part got away in safety. Thus Agrigentum, next to Syracuse and Messana the most important town of Sicily, was conquered by the Romans. The soldiers, irritated by the hardships of a seven months' siege, pillaged the town without mercy, while its inhabitants to the number of 25,000 were sold into slavery. For the second time in its history, Agrigentum was blotted out of the map of Sicily.

§ 5. Both the consuls for 261 B.C., L. Valerius Flaccus <sup>The First</sup> and T. Otacilius Crassus, were engaged in Sicily, <sup>Roman Fleet</sup> but we know little of their movements beyond the fact that they reduced most of the small towns in the interior of the island. The Romans, in fact, made little progress towards the overthrow of the Carthaginians. The great fortresses of the west were impervious to their attacks. On the other hand, the naval force of Carthage was showing a most dangerous activity. Not only were such coast towns of Sicily as had been won by the Romans continually exposed to the attack of Carthaginian squadrons, but the coast-line of Italy itself, notwithstanding the citizen colonies long since established expressly in view of such a contingency, was equally at the enemy's mercy. Disembarking from their galleys, the latter harried the open country, firing and destroying everything within reach; and carrying off the population into slavery, disappeared as swiftly as they came. If these aggressions continued, the trade of Caere and Ostia, Tarentum and Syracuse, would be utterly ruined. It was not enough to keep open the communications between Italy and Sicily. Rome must prepare to wrest the mastery of the seas from an antagonist who was almost as skilled in naval matters as

the Romans, despite the events of the last three years, were inexperienced.

Yet, as we are told, in less than two months after the axe had been laid to the first timber, a fleet of one hundred and twenty sail put out to sea. Whatever credence we attach to the various stories related by patriotic writers —how, for instance, the Romans only secured a pattern for the quinqueremes (vessels with five banks of oars) in a Carthaginian ship that had luckily stranded on the coast two or three years before—and whatever qualifications of our own we impose on their achievement—for it is impossible to doubt that they derived very material assistance from the skilled mariners of the Greek and Etruscan cities—with all these deductions, the achievement remains amongst the most notable in their annals. Not less striking an instance of their resourcefulness is afforded by the novel tactics which they adopted. At that period vessels of war were manœuvred, not by sails, but by oarsmen, and the actual combatants on deck were comparatively few in number; for the first object in naval warfare was to disable the enemy's vessels by charging them in such fashion as either to sweep away their oars or to sink them by the thrust of the powerful iron beak (*rostrum*) attached to the prow. Success therefore depended on the readiness with which oarsmen and vessel responded to the captain's orders, while personal bravery was of little account. The Romans were as remarkable for physical courage as they were deficient in seamanship. They could not hope to hold their own against the long-practised skill of the Carthaginian mariners. To neutralise this, and to avail themselves of the valour of their legionaries even at sea, they invented boarding-bridges. To a mast in the fore-part of the ship was fastened by a strong hinge a ladder or drawbridge, thirty-six feet in length and four feet broad, protected by railings and furnished at the farther end with a sharp spike. While not in action the bridge rested against the mast: when within range of an enemy's vessel it was suddenly allowed to fall; the spike sank securely into the adversary's deck, forming a stable gangway across which the legionaries might rush and so reduce the struggle to a mere hand to hand fight.

This device had probably already been tried, but not on a large scale, as it was upon this occasion. The consuls for this year were Cn. Cornelius Scipio and C. Duilius. Scipio, who was invested with the supreme command at sea, sailed away to Sicily with the first seventeen ships that were ready. On reaching Messana he heard that the island of Lipara (*Lipara*), the chief station of the Carthaginian fleet, was ready to submit to the Romans, and believing the news, he hurried to Lipara, only to find that he had fallen into a trap. He was obliged to surrender with his whole squadron.\* His colleague was more fortunate. As he was sailing along the Italian coast Duilius fell in with a Carthaginian fleet of fifty vessels under Hannibal. After routing this force, he sailed on to Sicily, when he learnt the disaster that had befallen Scipio. He entrusted the land forces to the military tribunes with him, and then went in search of the Carthaginian fleet, which he found off Mylae (*Mila:eo*) on the northern coast of Sicily. Hannibal, the Carthaginian admiral whom he had beaten just before, bore down on his antagonists in the full assurance of an easy

Battle of Mylae. <sup>200 B.C.</sup> victory, but the boarding-bridges and Roman bravery disconcerted the skill of his sailors: of a fleet of a hundred and thirty vessels, fifty were sunk or captured, among them being the admiral's own monstrous seven-banked galley, taken fifteen years before from King Pyrrhus. Duilius followed up his victory by relieving Segesta, which was hard pressed by the Carthaginians. The enthusiasm aroused at Rome by this first naval victory was intense, and Duilius on his return received unprecedented honours. Besides voting him a triumph, the senate erected in the Forum a column decorated with the beaks of the captured vessels—the famous *Columna Rostrata*.†

\* Scipio is said to have received the surname *Asina* in consequence of this affair. But he cannot have been much blamed, for his brother was elected consul in the following year, and he himself received the unusual honour of a second consulship in 214 B.C.

† There is still in existence an inscription, seemingly a close copy of the original, which describes the exploits of Duilius.

(C. Dauidis M. F. M. N. consul aduersum Poenos en Seccelias Secestianis . . . oblatione) exemit levi orbeis drapique Cartaginensis in extremitate incolitatis aetate Iun palam post dies novem castris exposito Macellum epidem opificiis nautis exposito exinde eadem in secessu bate rati navelles nauti consilii primos deinceps expositi eisque navales primos omnes patres expositi que eis navales classis Poeniyas emulsi et max. unius copias Cartaciniensis presentatae Hannibale)

§ 6. The Romans were encouraged by the victory of Operations Duilius to extend the sphere of the war. They after Mylae, sent the consul L. Cornelius Scipio, the grandfather of Africanus, to attack the Carthaginian possessions in Corsica and Sardinia, and so to revenge upon them their devastations on the coast of Italy. Of the two islands, Sardinia was rich in mines of silver and lead, but notoriously unhealthy by reason of its malarious climate ; Corsica was useful for its extensive pine forests, which were invaluable for ship-building. Scipio landed in Corsica, and reduced Aleria, its most important town, facts which are mentioned in his epitaph.\* Further we are told that he fought a second campaign in Sardinia, where he took Olbia, and that he then returned to Rome with many thousand captives and celebrated a magnificent triumph, 259 b.c. These latter exploits seem to be the invention of some family panegyrist, for we know that though the consul Sulpicius was busily employed in Sardinia in the following year, the Romans were by no means in complete possession of the island. Meanwhile they suffered some serious reverses in Sicily,

dictated ol[or]um in altod marid puen[andod] viciet v[er]ique navei[sc] cepe[t] cum  
socieis sept[e]res mon unam quinqueresm[os]que triresmosque naveis X[XX] merset  
XIII aur[um] captom numei [here follow the figures] [primos qu]o[que] navaled  
praedad poplom [donavet primosque] Cartacini[ens]is [ince]mios d[omi]nuxet in triumpho  
cum rostris [clasis] Carta[ciniensis] captai quorum erco S.P.Q.R. hanc columnam  
eei P.]

The translation is as follows :—C. Duilius, the son of Marcus and grandson of Marcus, when consul against the Carthaginians in Sicily, relieved the people of Segesta from siege by means of his legions, and while the Carthaginians and their chief magistrate fled by daylight from their camp nine days afterwards, he took the town of Macella by siege. Also in the same magistracy when consul he was the first to win a success at sea with his ships, and the first to equip and get ready forces and a fleet for sea, and with these ships he overcame in fight on the high seas all the Carthaginian fleets and their very great forces, Hannibal their dictator being present, and he took in battle the following ships with their crews, one septireme, and thirty quinqueremes and triremes, and he sank thirteen. . . . He too first presented the people with booty won at sea, and first led in triumph free-born Carthaginians, with the beaks of the captured Carthaginian fleet, and on account of these deeds the Senate and people of Rome raised this column to him.

\* The epitaph runs as follows :—

Hunc oino plorunno consentioint R[ome]ae  
Duonoro optumo fuise viro  
Luciom Scipione. Filios Barbati  
Consol censor aedilis hic fuit a[pu]d vos  
Hie cepit Corsica Alerianique urbe  
Dedit tempestatibus aide merito.

*I.e.*—Hunc unum plurimi consentiunt Romae (at Rome), | bonorum optimum  
fuisse virum virorum | Lucium Scipionem. Filius Barbati | consul, censor, aedilis  
hic fuit a[pu]d vos. Hie cepit | Corsicam Alerianique urbem pugnando ; | dedit  
tempestatibus (to the Winds) aedem merito votum.

partly owing to their unmerciful treatment of the Greek towns, partly because the Carthaginians had found a leader of rare ability in Hamilcar. The Roman allies grumbled at their share of the booty, and made a separate camp for themselves near Thermae, only to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians. Internal treason put Camarina and Enna into the power of Hamilcar, who about this time converted Drepanum into a strong fortress by transporting thither the entire population of Eryx. In the year 258 B.C. the tide of war turned somewhat in favour of the Romans ; they recovered most of the revolted towns, but signalled their success by a harshness which did them little good in the long run. At least half a dozen towns were levelled to the ground with a barbarity as revolting as it was impolitic, and the most fertile island of the Mediterranean seemed likely to be converted into an uninhabited wilderness. In 257 B.C. no decisive success was gained by either side, although a great naval battle was fought off Tyndaris (*Tindaro*), not far from Mylae.

In 256 B.C. the Romans, weary of the protracted struggle, equipped an enormous armament of 330 vessels, manned by something like 150,000 sailors. In the hope that one decisive blow might end the struggle, they determined to carry the war into Africa, which had hitherto gone scathless, while Sicily and Italy had suffered by repeated devastations. The Carthaginians made a great effort to outdo the Roman preparations : they collected a fleet of 350 vessels, and entrusted its command to Hamilcar, their best general. The fleet left Lilybaeum and came to anchor off Heraclea. Meanwhile the Romans, under the consuls M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso, after sailing round Cape Pachynum, were coasting the southern shore of Sicily on their way to the opposite coast of Africa, when they came in sight of the Carthaginians at a point between the promontory of Ecnomus and the town of Heraclea. On the day of battle they arranged their ships in three squadrons forming the sides and base of a triangle whose apex was directed towards the enemy, while at some distance behind the base they stationed another squadron in reserve. The two squadrons which formed the

Battle of  
Ecnomus,  
256 B.C.

sides of the triangle were led by the consuls into battle, and after a severe engagement put the main body of the Carthaginians to flight. Meantime the third squadron of the triangle and the reserve were hotly attacked by the Carthaginian left and right respectively. They held their ground until the consuls returned to their assistance, and when darkness fell more than one half of the Carthaginian fleet had been either sunk or captured. As at Mylae, the victory was chiefly due to the boarding-bridges.

§ 7. Though the way to Africa was now open, the consuls <sup>The Expedition</sup> did not make an immediate descent on the coast. <sup>of Regulus,</sup> The reason for their delay is not apparent, but <sup>256 B.C.</sup>

probably their vessels had suffered such damage in the hardfought battle that they were in need of thorough repair. The period of inactivity was utilised by the Carthaginians in strengthening the defences of their capital, before which their fleets were posted with a view to oppose the landing of the Romans. But Regulus, when at last he reached Africa, did not make an immediate attack on Carthage. After sighting the Hermaean promontory (*Cape Bon*), he coasted eastwards until he came to the town of Clupea, which was situated on a shield-shaped eminence at the head of an excellent bay. Regulus saw the advantages of the position, and occupied the town with all the less resistance because the Carthaginians had summoned all their available troops to the defence of the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. Clupea was at some height above the sea-level and remarkably healthy, while the country round about, favoured by the climate and the irrigation of innumerable canals, was like a garden in its luxuriant fertility. On every side the Romans saw evidences of matchless prosperity: vineyards and olive plantations alternated with stretches of pasture land, and the plain was dotted with the magnificent villas of the wealthy Carthaginian merchants. Over all this region Regulus ranged at his will. His men ransacked the nobles' mansions, drove off whole herds as their prey, and embarked on their ships more than 20,000 captives. While they were still busied in this fashion, a message was sent by the senate to the effect that one of the consuls was to return with nearly

the whole of the fleet and half the army. To withdraw a single soldier at such a time appears an unaccountable act of folly. Rather we should have imagined that Rome would have strained every nerve to strengthen the force in Africa and to bring the war to an end by a decisive blow. But Vulso was probably anxious to triumph for the victory at Ecnomus, and Regulus, a man of enormous vanity and selfishness, wanted to enjoy by himself the fruits of his conquest. Both the consuls therefore informed the senate that success in Africa was as good as won, and thus Regulus was left in sole command with 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. After Vulso's departure, Regulus' depredations went on as before. He defeated a Carthaginian force which marched out against him from the capital, and took up his winter quarters at Tunes, barely three miles from Carthage. To deepen the Carthaginians' evil plight the Numidian tribes broke out into rebellion and ravaged the country far and wide.

§ 8. So miserable was their condition in the winter of

<sup>Defeat of</sup> <sup>256 B.C.</sup> Regulus, however, spoke as though he was <sup>255 B.C.</sup> already in possession of Carthage, and insisted

not merely on the evacuation of Sicily, but on the complete submission of Carthage in matters of foreign policy. He demanded in fact that Carthage, the mistress of the seas, should degrade herself to the position of a *civitas foederata* of the rank of Tarentum or Syracuse. The Carthaginians naturally rejected such terms, and resolved to fight to the last. While Regulus in his foolish self-confidence took no measures to increase his scanty force of cavalry, the Carthaginians were steadily gathering strength for a renewal of the conflict. They collected numerous levies of Numidian horse, and raised mercenaries from all quarters. Among these latter was a Spartan officer, Xanthippus by name, whose career, somewhat glorified no doubt by the Greeks who have related it, is among the most interesting known to history. When Xanthippus, who had perhaps been serving in Asia, came to Carthage, he saw an abundance of excellent war-material, but no leader of capacity, and this fact so moved him that he declared the

Carthaginians had not been beaten by the enemy, but by the lack of skill of their own generals. The remark, coming as it did from a Greek soldier of much experience, enforced general attention, and Xanthippus was summoned before the governing board, apparently the Suffetes and the Gerusia, with the result that he received a general commission to instruct the assembled forces in his own tactics. Throughout the winter the drill went on, and when spring came the soldiers were eager to measure their strength against the Romans. To the astonishment of the Romans, who imagined the enemy would not venture again out of their walls, Xanthippus led his men down into the plain and offered battle. He had 12,000 foot, 4,000 horse, and 100 elephants. He placed his elephants in a long line in the centre as a protection to the citizen foot-soldiers ; on the wings were the mercenaries and the powerful cavalry. The weak force of Roman horse was at once put to flight, and though the legionaries kept up the struggle and even had some success on the left wing, the fight ended in a massacre. Two thousand Romans made their escape to Clupea ; five hundred more, including Regulus, were taken prisoners ; the rest were cut to pieces, 255 b.c.

On hearing of this disaster the Romans collected a huge fleet of 350 sail, and despatched it under the consuls Servius Fulvius and M. Aemilius Paullus to rescue the survivors. They encountered the Carthaginians off the Hermaean promontory, destroyed the greater part of their fleet, and took on board the troops from Clupea. Yet the misfortunes of this fatal year had not yet come to an end, for on the return voyage all but eighty vessels perished in a fearful hurricane off Camarina on the southern coast of Sicily. The whole sea-shore between Pachynus and Camarina was strewed with wrecks and dead bodies. Those that escaped were treated with the utmost hospitality by King Hiero and escorted as far as Messana.

§ 9. Regulus himself, it is nearly certain, died a natural death in captivity, and there would be no need to mention his name further but for a magnificent fable which, originating in an attempt to conceal an act of Roman barbarity, was fostered by the patriotism of

The Fate of Regulus.

historians and immortalised by Horace.\* The story runs, that after he had languished in prison for five years, the Carthaginians released him on parole in the expectation that he would advise the senate to make peace. But nothing was further from his mind: when he came to Rome, he exhorted the senate to fight on until Carthage was subdued; and then, refusing to look on his wife and children, he departed once more with cheerful countenance into captivity, though he well knew the tortures that awaited him. On his return he was put to death with the most brutal cruelty: according to one account he was imprisoned in a cask studded with nails, until he died of hunger or want of sleep. Another version says that he was crucified. Now the Carthaginians were cruel enough on occasions, and if we were told that Regulus had fallen a victim to popular fury immediately after his capture, there would have been nothing incredible in the statement; but it is not probable that he was put to death after he had been allowed to live so long, and had further been entrusted with an important mission to Rome. Moreover it is significant that Polybius, our only first rate authority for the period, is silent about the matter. But there is another side to the picture. We learn from a fragment of Diodorus that the senate had entrusted two distinguished Carthaginian prisoners, Hamilcar and Bostar, to the care of Regulus' wife as in some sort a pledge for her husband's safety. When the woman received tidings of Regulus' death, she proceeded to take a revolting vengeance on the helpless captives. She confined them in a cage so narrow that movement was impossible, and deprived them of food. Bostar died of hunger, but, in spite of Hamilcar's appeals, his dead body was not removed until the very slaves were

\* The lines are well known (*Odes*, III. 5, beginning "Hoc caverat mens provida Reguli"):-

Fertur pudicæ coniugis osculum  
Parvusque matos ut capit is minor  
Ab se removisse et virilem  
Torvus humili posuisse vultum:  
Donec labantes consilio patres  
Firmaret auctor numquam alias dato.  
Interque maerentes amicos  
Egregius properaret exul.  
Atqui scribat quae sibi barbarus  
Tortor pararet.

disgusted at such atrocity and the matter reached the ears of the senate. The consuls at once summoned the sons of Regulus into their presence, and bade them end the horror. The body of Bostar was burnt, his ashes sent to Carthage, and Hamilcar was released from his misery. Modern historians are unanimous in regarding this discreditable episode as the sole element of truth in the whole story : the rest was invented to palliate the brutality of a Roman matron. Thus by a strange freak of history Regulus, a man conspicuous only for arrogance, selfishness, and obstinacy, was canonised by Romans of a later age among their chief heroes and martyrs.

§ 10. After the defeat of Regulus, the scene changes again to Sicily, whither the Romans, undaunted by recent failures, sent a fresh fleet of over

Capture of  
Panormus,  
254 B.C.

200 vessels in 254 B.C. The consuls, Cn. Cornelius

Scipio (the man who had been captured at Lipara in 260) and A. Atilius Calatinus, sailed to Messana, where they found the ships that had escaped from the storm of the preceding year. They then coasted along the northern shore of the island, and made an attempt on Drepanum. But Hamilcar's fortifications proved too strong for them, and they turned back until they came to Panormus (*Palermo*), one of the three great cities that still belonged to the Carthaginians. They captured without much difficulty both the new and the old towns, the latter being surrendered by the inhabitants on the terms that they were to go free provided they paid a ransom of two minas per head. Fourteen thousand paid the money ; the rest, 13,000 in number, were sold into slavery. The fall of Panormus, afterwards the chief seat of Roman authority in the island, was followed by the surrender of Solus, Cephaloedium, and Tyndaris, so that Thermae was the only place of importance on the northern shore of Sicily that remained in the hands of the enemy. The inactivity of the Carthaginians is explained by the fact that they were busily engaged at home in chastising the Numidians for their late revolt.

In 253 B.C. the consuls Cn. Servilius Caepio and C. Sempronius Blaesus sailed with a fleet of 250 sail to

pillage the coasts of Africa. In the lesser Syrtis their ships were stranded owing to the ebb of the tide,—a phenomenon which caused the greatest amazement, and could only be got off again by the sacrifice of all the booty that had been acquired. They sailed back round Lilybaeum, but when they reached Panormus they tried to proceed straight across the Tyrrhenian Sea instead of pursuing the safer route along the coast. A hurricane, which arose in the west, drove them on the shore of Italy, and no less than 150 sail foundered off the promontory of Palimurus in Lucania. These repeated disasters at sea lent irresistible weight to the party at Rome which disapproved of naval warfare as a new-fangled innovation which could only lead to misfortune. It was resolved that the fleet should be reduced to sixty sail, a number just sufficient to protect the coasts of Italy and supply the soldiers in Sicily with provisions.

§ 11. The years 252 and 251 passed by without the occurrence of any important event; almost the only incident in the former year was the taking of Thermae (*Termini*) and Lipara by the Romans, while in 251 b.c. the Carthaginians sent over to Lilybaeum an army of 30,000 men and 140 elephants. Such a force might have won a decisive advantage, but its commander, Hasdrubal, the most irresolute of men, wasted the whole year in marching to and fro in the territory of Selinus. Early in 250 b.c., however, he took heart of grace and proceeded against the proconsul L. Caccilius Metellus, who had spent the winter with his small force at Panormus. Hasdrubal offered battle in a narrow tract beneath the walls of Panormus, where not only was he prevented by his position from using his cavalry and elephants to advantage, but a river in his rear cut off his retreat. As Metellus hoped, the Carthaginian elephants pursued the Roman skirmishers right up to the walls, but here they were met by such a storm of missiles that they turned and threw the whole army into confusion. Metellus seized the decisive moment to hurl his men on the Carthaginians. He won a most decisive victory: 20,000 Carthaginians are said to have fallen, and more than a

hundred of the elephants were captured and exhibited at Rome in the conqueror's triumph.\* So depressed were the Carthaginians in spirits that they again made fruitless overtures for peace, and it was to this occasion that legend referred the imaginary embassy of Regulus. Even before this victory became known, the Romans, now recovering from the despondency caused by the failure of their last naval effort, had equipped a fleet of 200 sail, with which the consuls, C. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso, brother and colleague respectively of the African Regulus, advanced against Lilybaeum (*Marsala*). Since the defeat at Panormus the Carthaginians had abandoned Selinus, so that they were now confined to the coast-line of the extreme west with its two great fortresses of Lilybaeum and Drepanum (*Trapani*). By far the most considerable of the two was Lilybaeum, situated on a tongue of land and protected on two sides by the shallows and sunken rocks of the environing sea; on the third, where it joined the land, it was secured by massive walls and a moat so wide and deep as to be almost unassailable. Besides this its harbour was rendered well nigh impracticable by the sandbanks and hidden reefs that lay before it. Such was the fortress that the Romans set about besieging in 250 B.C. They could hardly suspect that, in spite of their unremitting efforts, ten years would elapse before their object was attained, and that they would secure an entry, not by force, but in accordance with the terms of peace. Against the ineffective siege operations of the time, Lilybaeum was impregnable.

§ 12. While the Roman fleet with its complement of

Siege of 60,000 or 70,000 men rode at anchor before Lilybaeum, the harbour of Lilybaeum, an army, 40,000 strong, beset the town upon the land side. The consul began operations by an attempt to fill in the great ditch, but Himilco, the Carthaginian commander, was on the alert. He drove counter mines beneath the Roman works, and did his best to destroy by fire the machines which Hiero of Syracuse had sent. Sallies were constantly being made

\* This was the Metellus who saved the Palladium at the cost of his eyesight, when the temple of Veata caught fire. Read the description in Ovid, *Fasti* VI., 437-454.

from the besieged town, which cost more lives than a regular battle. The difficulties of Himilco were deepened by treachery within the walls. Some officers of the Gallic mercenaries in his pay proposed to deliver up the town, being confident that they could count upon the help of their men for this purpose. However, when they were negotiating in the Roman camp, Himilco, who had received information of the whole affair from a Greek, made a harangue to the troops and persuaded them to drive away their officers on their return with a shower of stones. All this while Himilco was anxiously expecting reinforcements from Carthage, and at last a squadron of 51 ships, with 10,000 men on board, anchored off the Aegates Insulae. For some time their admiral, Hannibal, was sorely perplexed by the presence of the Roman fleet before the harbour of Lilybaeum, for his force was too small to render it safe for him to give battle. But one day a strong wind sprang up from the west, which forced the Roman vessels to keep to their moorings, and profiting by this fact, Hannibal hoisted every sail, and, under the guidance of experienced pilots, forced his way into the harbour under the eyes of the Romans. The arrival of help proved so encouraging to the besieged that the next morning they ventured upon a general attack on the enemy's lines, but without achieving any great success. A subsequent sally, however, resulted in the utter destruction by fire of all the siege engines of the Romans. It was now winter, and the position of the besiegers was deplorable. They were harassed by the constant raids of the Carthaginians from Drepanum, and only the incessant exertions of Hiero prevented the complete breakdown of the commissariat.

§ 13. But if nothing was effected in 250 B.C., the following year brought positive misfortune. The consuls were L. Junius Pullus and P. Claudius Pulcher. This Claudius was the son of the great censor of 312 B.C., and, like his father, possessed a full share of the arrogance and violence which were believed to be the special characteristics of the Claudian line. After he had restored discipline in the fleet by the exercise of great severity, he sought to blockade the harbour

Battle of  
Drepanum,  
249 B.C.

of Lilybaeum, and so to cut off from the town the supplies thrown into it by Carthaginian cruisers. Failing in this, he resolved to attack Adherbal, who was perpetually sailing out from his headquarters at Drepanum to harass the Romans round Lilybaeum. Claudius set out at midnight, and reached his destination at daybreak. Before he could give battle, it was essential that the auspices should be taken, and this was done on the present occasion by observing whether certain sacred chickens ate greedily or not of the food thrown to them. Word was brought that they refused to eat; whereupon Claudius ordered them to be thrown overboard, remarking "If they will not eat, they shall drink." Probably the anecdote would never have been heard of, if Claudius had been successful, but his failure was imputed to this impiety. The entry of the Romans by one horn of the sickle-shaped harbour of Drepanum took Adherbal by surprise, but he at once drew off his ships to the open sea without confusion. Meantime Claudius, seeing that he could not manœuvre in the narrow waterway, resolved to retreat. But Adherbal, now ready for battle, fell upon the Romans as they were cooped up close to the shore in extreme confusion. Claudius was utterly defeated: though he himself escaped, 20,000 of his men were captured, and of his ships all but thirty were sunk or taken. The indignation against Claudius knew no bounds. The senate ordered his immediate recall, and bade him name a dictator. Still maintaining his arrogant demeanour, Claudius had the impudence to appoint a client of his own, M. Claudius Glieia, to the highest office in the state. The senate deposed this strange dictator, and, departing from the constitutional usage, appointed A. Atilius Calatinus without the intervention of the consul. Atilius selected L. Caecilius Metellus, the victor of Panormus, as his Master of Horse. Claudius was subsequently brought to trial, and appears to have been punished with a heavy fine. The tale of Roman misfortune did not end with the disaster at Drepanum. As L. Junius Pullus, the other consul, was bringing up provisions to the starving forces before Lilybaeum, his fleet of transports was driven inshore at Ecnomus by the Carthaginian admiral Carthalo, with the

loss of eighty sail, while the residue was wrecked to the last ship near Camarina. Undeterred by this calamity, Junius immediately resumed the offensive, and won the solitary success of the year by seizing the temple of Venus on the summit of Mount Eryx. The position was valuable because of its proximity to Drepanum, which the Romans were anxious to capture. A further enterprise of Junius was a failure; while attempting to seize a promontory on the coast midway between Lilybaeum and Drepanum, he was captured by the Carthaginians, and, according to one account, slew himself.

§ 14. After the great defeat of Claudio at Drepanum, <sup>Hamilcar Barca</sup> the character of the war changes: the Romans in Sicily no longer attempted to meet the Carthaginians on the sea, contenting themselves with a blockade of the still unconquered harbour fortresses of Lilybaeum; the Carthaginians on their part despatched no more large armies to the scene of war. Both nations were in the utmost financial distress; Carthage, who, despite her enormous wealth, found great difficulty in raising funds, tried to negotiate a loan of 2,000 talents from Ptolemy of Egypt, but the latter was not willing to place himself in conflict with Rome. In 248 B.C. Hiero obtained a renewal of his treaty, which expired in that year, on more favourable terms. The yearly tribute which he had hitherto paid was remitted, a reward not too great for the never-failing energy with which he had supported the Romans for fifteen years. The year 247 B.C. was marked by the appearance in Sicily of the famous Hamilcar Barca or "Lightning," the father of the greater Hannibal. Entrusted with the command of the fleet, this young officer resumed the depredations on the Italian coast which had caused the Romans so much annoyance at the commencement of the struggle. After an expedition against the Greek town of Loeri, he occupied Mt. Herete (*Monte Pellegrino*), a rocky eminence which rises from the plain immediately west of Panormus. From this height not only was he a continual menace to Panormus, but he could in addition harass the rear of the Romans as they were besieging Lilybaeum and Drepanum, while a little harbour at the foot of the mountain secured his

communications with Carthage. For three years Hamilcar held out on Mt. Hercte. The Romans, who had not understood the importance of the position until Panormus was threatened, were compelled to fortify a camp at the foot of the mountain, and here daily conflicts took place. So incessant was the activity of the combatants that it is compared by Polybius to a contest between two skilled boxers, whose blows are so rapid as to be almost invisible to the bystanders. But Hamilcar did much more than merely beat off the Romans from Hercte: one author relates how he besieged a castle near Catana; by another we are told how he wasted the coast-line of Italy as far north as Cumae. Our wonder is increased when we consider the means at his disposal: his soldiers were mere mercenaries, badly paid and badly fed by the home government, and yet out of this unpromising material Hamilcar made soldiers who could hold their own against the Roman legions, the finest infantry in the world.

§ 15. In 244 B.C., probably to be closer to the beleaguered <sup>Battle of the fortresses, Agates Insulae.</sup> Hamilcar changed his quarters to Mt. Eryx, a little to the east of Drepanum. Halfway up the mountain was the nearly deserted city of Eryx, which had been captured by Junius Pullus in 249 B.C., and occupied by a Roman force as a convenient post for the siege of Drepanum. This Hamilcar seized, although both the famous temple of Venus on the summit of the mountain and the plain below were in the enemy's hand. He continued to pursue the tactics which had been so successful at Hercte; but now as then he was left absolutely to his own devices by the Carthaginian government. The apathy of Carthage is probably to be accounted for by a revolt among her subjects, which demanded the exercise of her whole strength in Africa. To meet the expenses of the war, she had doubled the contributions of the tributary towns; from some of the subject tribes she had exacted a tax amounting to one half of the crops, and these extortions had led to a widespread rebellion. The Roman treasury was equally impoverished; indeed so utterly was it exhausted that, when it was decided in 242 B.C. to make a final bid for victory, the senate was unable to collect a fleet at the public

expense. Shortly before some citizens had made considerable gains by manning vessels and sending them to raid the cities of the African coast—Hippo was among those that suffered—and in this way private persons undertook to equip a fleet, provided that the profit should be theirs if the enterprise was successful. Two hundred vessels were built, the command of which was given to the consul C. Lutatius Catulus. Next to him in authority was the praetor Q. Valerius Falto. The whole of the year 242 B.C. was spent by Catulus in exercising his crews. Although an attempt on Drepanum failed, he was able to cut off provisions from the besieged fortresses, and this scarcity forced the Carthaginians to send to sea a fleet of 250 ships. Hanno, who was in command, anchored off Hiera, the most westerly of the group of islands styled the Aegates. As soon as Catulus was informed of this, he took up his station at Aegusa with the determination of forcing a battle, which Hanno was anxious to avoid until he had relieved his vessels from their freight of provisions and strengthened his crews by part of Hamilcar's veterans. The fight soon ended in the complete discomfiture of Hanno's heavily laden vessels, of which fifty were sunk, while seventy more were captured with 10,000 men on board. The date is March 10, 241 B.C., just before the end of the consul's year of office.

§ 16. After this defeat, which practically determined the fate of Libybaeum and Drepanum, the Carthaginians <sup>Terms of Peace.</sup> commissioned Hamilcar Barca to negotiate for peace. Hamilcar was justly annoyed that he should lose the fruits of his seven years' struggle through no fault of his own, but he saw clearly enough that he could not hope to maintain his position now that the Romans were undisputed masters of the sea. He therefore opened negotiations for a truce. At first Catulus declared that the Carthaginians should only obtain peace by passing beneath the yoke, but when Hamilcar said that he would prefer death to such dishonour, the consul grew more reasonable, especially as he was desirous of the glory of bringing the war to a close. It was agreed that Carthage should evacuate Sicily; should take no measures of retaliation against Hiero of Syracuse; should give up all

prisoners of war, and pay an indemnity of 2,200 talents in twenty years. When these terms were discussed at Rome, it was felt by the people that this ransom was far from covering all the losses in war-material, fleets, trade, and property that had been caused by the war, and a commission of ten senators was despatched to Sicily to enforce more favourable conditions. The indemnity was finally raised to 3,200 talents, a thousand of which were to be paid at once and the remainder in ten annual instalments. So ended the first Punic war. Though victorious, the Romans had suffered terribly in the struggle. While the census of 252 B.C. showed a roll of 297,794 citizens, that of 247 showed only 251,222, a decrease of 46,000. The Italian allies had been drained even more profusely of their best blood; how many had perished it is impossible to say, but as they furnished the greater proportion of the crews for service by sea, the disasters of the war must have told with especial severity on them. The depopulation of Italy, commenced by the Pyrrhic war and destined to be completed by the struggle with Hannibal, was already in full swing.

§ 17. Sicily was in an even worse plight. Important centres of commerce like Agrigentum and Province. Sicily a Camarina had been reduced to heaps of ashes, and Greeks throughout the length and breadth of the island had been sold by thousands into slavery. Only in the territory of King Hiero did any trace of the ancient prosperity and culture remain. The Romans naturally did not interfere with their old ally on the conclusion of the war, but outside of the domains of Syracuse they ruled the country at their will. Their policy was the old one they had pursued in Italy: they divided Sicily into a number of petty communities, isolated atoms without any power beyond limited rights of self-government. Over the whole they set (227 B.C.) a praetor, whose period of rule lasted a year. Of the communities, the best treated was Messana, which had had its rights defined and guaranteed when it entered the ranks of the *civitates foederatae*. Next to this favoured city were five *civitates liberae et immunes*, Centuripa, Alesa, Panormus, Segesta, and Halicyae, which,

as their description implies, were exempt from ordinary taxation. Their immunity, however, was not conferred by treaty, but by the grace of the Roman senate. The great majority of the communities were *civitates stipendiariae*, bound to pay a tithe of their produce to Rome. Some of these were deprived of all their public land, which was placed under the control of the Roman censor: such communities were styled *civitates censoriae*. Even when this drastic treatment was not resorted to, the condition of the tithe-paying states was miserable enough. They were probably without exception deprived of *commercium*, i.e. the citizens had no right to own land beyond the limits of their own petty canton. This resulted ultimately in a general decrease of the freeholders: their lands were bought up by Roman citizens and others who were possessed of the *ius commercii*,\* and in this way originated those wide-spreading estates (the *latifundia*), badly tilled by slave labour, which alike in Italy and Sicily were regarded by all right-minded men as a symbol of decadence and coming ruin.

\* The men of Centuripa, a community in the enjoyment of *commercium*, acquired land all over Sicily.

## CHAPTER V.

### BETWEEN THE WARS.

§ 1. The Inexpiable War.—§ 2. Sardinia, the Second Roman Province.—§ 3. Constitutional Changes at Rome.—§ 4. Reform of the Comitia Centuriata.—§ 5. Gallie War and Law of Flamininus.—§ 6. Gallie War of 225 B.C. and Battle of Telamon.—§ 7. The Boundary of the Alps is reached.—§ 8. First Illyrian War.—§ 9. Second Illyrian War.

§ 1. THE loss of Sicily was the most crushing blow that had <sup>The Inexpiable</sup> befallen Carthage for many years. She had War. maintained her hold on the island for more than four centuries, despite the repeated and desperate attempts of the Greeks to drive her out of it. Now it was lost for ever, and in place of the island serving as a convenient post to secure her traffic between the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean, it was a hostile camp, whence she might daily expect an attack to be delivered against her capital. But deep as was the mortification of the Carthaginians, and, above all, of Hamilcar Barca, this feeling was drowned amid a new and even greater peril. It was only by his consummate genius that Hamilcar had kept his untrustworthy mercenaries to their allegiance during the last years of the war, for the home government had furnished him neither with money nor supplies. Consequently, when he sent back his troops from Sicily to Carthage, considerable arrears of pay were due to them. The Carthaginian government either could not or would not satisfy their claims, and disturbances constantly broke out in the capital. To get rid of their importunity, the Carthaginians quartered them in Sicca, on the middle course of the Bagradas. But

their discontent still remained, and when Hanno the Great attempted on behalf of the government to drive a bargain with them, they suspected treachery, and to the number of 20,000 marched on the capital. Their leaders, Spendius, a Campanian freebooter, and Matho, a rebel Libyan, were determined to drive matters to extremities, for Spendius feared that he would be given up to the Romans, and Matho knew that there was no mercy for him, should the Carthaginians once get him into their hands. These desperate men persuaded the mercenaries to seize the Carthaginian envoys who were attempting to arrange terms with them, and now hostilities commenced in earnest. From the camp at Tunes Matho instantly sent to arouse the Libyans to revolt, and so enthusiastic was the response that in a few weeks his forces had risen to 70,000 men. Of all the tributary towns in the west, two only, Utica and Hippo Diarrhytus, remained faithful to Carthage. The government appointed Hanno the Great to the chief command: he gained a slight success over the insurgents; but soon the latter rallied, defeated Hanno's army when it was still flushed with its apparent victory, and laid siege to Utica. The Carthaginians, disgusted at Hanno's conduct of the war, now turned to Hamilcar Barea as the only man capable of saving the state. Hamilcar was successful in breaking out of Carthage and relieving Utica; he defeated the rebels, but instead of pressing them to extremities attempted to win them over by leniency. Spendius saw that he was lost unless he implicated his men in some act of cruelty. By his impassioned denunciation of treachery on the part of Hamilcar, he roused the mercenaries to fury, and the envoys who were prisoners in their camp, including some of the noblest Carthaginians, were put to death. The conflict now began to deserve its title of the "Inexpiable" war. The insurgents took a solemn oath to slay every Carthaginian and to cut off the hands of every Carthaginian ally who fell into their power. Hamilcar retaliated by ordering his troops to give no quarter, and caused all prisoners of war to be trampled to death by his elephants. For long the insurgents maintained their ground. The incapacity of Hanno, who was reinstated in the command by the side

of Hamilcar, brought about the loss of Utica and Hippo; but at last Hamilcar blockaded 40,000 rebels in their camp, and slew them to the last man. The final victory was won near Leptis, after which the tributary towns were one by one reduced to obedience, and the Inexpiable or Truceless War came to an end, 238 B.C. It had lasted three years and four months.

§ 2. Meanwhile Sardinia had been lost by Carthage.

Sardinia, the Second Roman Province. That island was garrisoned by a small force of mercenaries, who, hearing of the revolt of their

fellows in Africa, threw off their allegiance and murdered their officers. Too weak to hold the natives in check, they volunteered to surrender themselves and the island to Rome. At first the Romans hesitated, but when it became apparent that Carthage would use all her energies to win back its lost province, now that she was unhampered by the revolt at home, the senate accepted the offer in defiance of all justice. The expostulations of Carthage were met only with the threat of instant war unless she would at once abandon her claim to Sardinia and pay a further indemnity of 1,200 talents. The Carthaginians had the additional grievance that the Romans had done their best to supply the rebels in Africa with provisions and material of war, but they were too exhausted to risk another conflict. For the time Hamilcar advised compliance, but the wrong sank deeply into his soul. Under the smart of this injustice he caused his son Hannibal, now a child of nine, to take a vow of eternal hatred to the Romans, while he himself hurried on the preparations for his Spanish enterprise. Sardinia, to which was soon added Corsica, became (like Sicily) a Roman province, ruled after 227 B.C. by a praetor. Only on the coast, however, was the authority of Rome paramount: the interior was inhabited by savage and intractable tribes, which retained their liberty for many years.

§ 3. Since the final secession of the Plebs in 287 B.C., Constitutional Changes. Rome had been too busy with foreign foes to have time for internal disputes. The constitutional changes which occurred during these years were effected quietly—so quietly, indeed, that the precise date of

the most important cannot be definitely fixed. In 253 B.C. the Pontifex Maximus was for the first time a plebeian. The new pontiff, Ti. Coruncanius, was apparently not even a Roman by birth, being a native of Cameria who had acquired the franchise by settling at Tusculum. Coruncanius was a great jurist, a close friend of Curius Dentatus and C. Fabricius, and had fought with credit an Etruscan campaign in 280 B.C. His successor, L. Caecilius Metellus, the victor of Panormus, was also a plebeian. It was, perhaps, at the choosing of Metellus that the old system of co-optation was abolished: henceforth a minority of the tribes (*i.e.* 17 tribes, after 241 B.C.) selected the Pontifex Maximus from the members of the College of Pontiffs.\* About the same time the Vestal Virgins, instead of being nominated by the Pontifex Maximus, were chosen by lot from a list of twenty names drawn up by the Pontifex Maximus and submitted by him to the Comitia Calata.

Of greater importance was the increase in the number of <sup>The Quaestors, 267 B.C.</sup> quaestors, rendered necessary by the extension of Roman authority over Southern Italy. Now that such important seaports as Paestum, Rhegium, Locri, Crotona, Heraclea, and Tarentum had submitted to Rome, it was essential that officials should be appointed to act as intermediaries between them and the senate, and to see that they obeyed the orders of the central government, especially in regard to the maintenance of a fleet for the control of the seas. To the four quaestors already in existence, of whom two (*quaestores urbani*) exercised financial duties in the capital, and two accompanied the consuls to war as paymasters of the troops, there were, in 267 B.C., added four others, named *quaestores classici*, each of whom was invested with the superintendence of a portion of Italy. One, who was stationed at Ostia, the port of Rome, had, among other duties, charge of the corn supply of the capital; the second, at Cales, looked after the cities of Campania and Southern Italy; the third, at Ariminum, was respon-

\* This system was extended by the Lex Domitia of 104 B.C. to the choosing of Pontiffs, Augurs, and the *Decemviri sacris faciundis*. In the case of all these, seventeen tribes, chosen by lot, elected a candidate from a list drawn up by the colleges. The law was repealed by Sulla 81 B.C., but re-enacted by the tribune T. Labienus, 65 B.C.

sible for the coast of the Adriatic ; the fourth, who was not assigned to any particular district, perhaps acted as paymaster to a consul whose period of command might be prolonged. As the name implies, these quaestors had in the first place to see that the allies furnished their proper contingents for the fleet ; but they had also to supervise the state finances in their respective districts, so that it would fall to them to collect the harbour duties and rents for the state domains, and, besides this, they superintended the taking of the census and the raising of levies.

Another result of the conquest of Southern Italy was the  
The Praetors, increase of traffic between foreigners and Rome.

247 B.C. Out of this arose numbers of lawsuits in the capital, with which the single praetor was unable to cope, either because they were unusually numerous, or because he was engaged in repelling the ravages of the Carthaginians on the coast. A second praetor, styled *praetor peregrinus* to distinguish him from the *praetor urbanus*, was therefore elected in the Comitia Centuriata to adjudicate in cases between foreigners, or between citizens and foreigners. The appointment of this new official had a remarkable influence on the development of Roman law ; for as he had to deal with men whose codes of law varied extremely, he was obliged, in giving his decision, to rely on principles which were as far as possible common to all parties, and were naturally much more free from technicalities than any existing code, and these principles were gradually adopted even in cases between Roman citizens, to the great simplification of the law. Two more praetors were elected in 227 B.C., to administer the newly formed provinces of Sicily and Sardinia.

§ 4. At some date between the formation of the last two  
Reform of the tribes (241 B.C.) and the second Punic war, the  
Comitia Centuriata Comitia Centuriata was reformed. Until then,  
Centuriata in accordance with the old arrangement of  
Servius Tullius, the Centuriate Assembly consisted of 18  
centuries of knights, 80 centuries of the first class (where the  
qualification was property to the amount of 100,000 asses),  
90 centuries of the second, third, fourth, and fifth classes  
(where the qualification ranged from 75,000 to 11,500 asses),

4 centuries of engineers and musicians, while the *proletarii* (i.e. all those who had no property or less than 11,500 asses) formed another century. There were thus 193 centuries in all. At first the Centuriate Assembly was a democratic institution, in which the centuries of the first class contained as many citizens as those of the lower classes; but by this time, owing to the growth of large estates and the decay of the small farmers, the first class had diminished so greatly in comparison with the steady growth of the other classes, that it probably did not contain more than three or four thousand citizens out of the total census of a quarter of a million.\* Yet this small number comprised 80 centuries, and as the Equites were divided into 18 centuries, it was only necessary for the first class to combine with the Equites in order to secure an absolute majority in the assembly of 193 centuries. The third and fourth classes would rarely be called upon to give their votes, and it seems to be a fact that the fifth class never voted. The result of this unequal distribution was that the reforming party in the state employed all its strength to carry its measures through the Comitia Tributa, where no distinction was made between rich and poor. The Comitia Centuriata came to be used only for the election of the higher magistrates—the consuls and praetors—and there was a danger that it would disappear entirely, when the nobles' party came to the rescue with a prudent determination to reform it. They resolved to base it on the tribes, but at the same time to retain the classes and the existing division into old (*seniores*) and young (*iuniores*). In each of the 35 tribes the citizens were divided into five classes according to their property qualification, and each class was divided into two centuries, one of *seniores* and one of *iuniores*. Thus in each tribe there were ten centuries: the reformed Comitia Centuriata therefore consisted of 350 centuries, in addition to the 18 centuries of Equites which remained unaltered. The centuries of

\* At the census of 229 B.C. the total number of citizens was 270,213. Neumann (*Passus in the Krieg*, p. 197) estimates that the first class may have numbered 12,000, the second class 8,000, the third 12,000, the fourth 20,000, the fifth 70,000, while the *proletaria et capita cessi* amounted to no less than 140,000. The Equites were 1,900 in number.

engineers and musicians seem to have disappeared. A further important change lay in the abolition of the Equites' privilege to vote first, for such prior voting would exercise a great influence on the country voters who had come up, for the day and knew little of the merits of the candidates. It was now enacted that a century chosen by lot from the first class should vote first;\* that the other centuries of the first class should next vote simultaneously; then the Equites and the remaining classes. While the reform did not absolutely abolish the preponderance of the first class, the latter now only had 70 out of 368 centuries, as opposed to 80 out of 193; and as 185 centuries formed an absolute majority, the voting would in all cases reach the third class.†

§ 5. Now that Rome had for a time nothing to fear from Carthage, she turned to the task of extending her northern frontier beyond the northern Apennines to the Padus, and securing her sovereignty over the Adriatic. Her recent colonies of Ariminum and Firmum were serviceable stations against the Gauls, and during the first Punic war she had sent a Latin colony to Spoletum (*Spolet*), which marked an advance from her former outpost of Narnia towards securing Umbria. The foe whom she had now to deal with was the Gaul. Ever since their terrible defeat at the Vadimonian Lake, this people had remained in a state of unwonted calm, which was due partly to the doom of the Senones, partly, no doubt, to the fact that their more restless warriors had found employment in the first Punic war, by serving as mercenaries on the Carthaginian side. They once more bestirred themselves in 238 B.C., when the Boii, the most powerful of the tribes, summoned to their aid whole hordes of their kinsmen beyond the western Alps, and prepared for the conflict. In that year, as in 237 B.C., the Romans could win no decisive advantage; but in 236 B.C.

\* This was termed the *centuria praerogativa*.

† The above account of the reform, which is that now generally adopted, was originated by Pantagathus, a scholar of the 16th century. Madvig, following Niebuhr, is of opinion that each tribe was divided into two centuries only, one of *seniores* and one of *veniores*, and that there were but 70 centuries in all.

dissensions broke out among the Gauls. The Transalpine Gauls quarrelled with the Boii, and, after a bloody battle, returned to their homes, leaving their confederates to their fate. So weakened were the Boii, that they were glad to obtain peace on condition that they surrendered a considerable tract of their land. By the side of these wars, the Romans had been engaged in conflicts with the Sardinians and the Ligurians, in the valley of the Arnus (*Arno*). In token of their success, the temple of Janus was closed in 235 B.C. for the first time since the mythical reign of Numa. Hostilities were, however, resumed in the following year.

The Gallic war led to an agrarian dispute which caused the utmost excitement in Rome. Men saw that it was desirable to secure the northern frontier by something stronger than the solitary outpost of Ariminum, and in 232 B.C. C. Flamininus, tribune of the plebs, and a trusted popular leader, proposed that the territory wrested from the Gauls in 282 B.C. should be allotted amongst the poorer citizens. This colonisation would relieve the ever growing distress among the lower orders; it would increase the diminishing ranks of the small farmers, while it also secured a strong bulwark against the Gallic tribes. The people supported Flamininus with enthusiasm: they were disgusted at the selfishness which thrust the main burden of warfare upon themselves, while the governing class reaped all its benefits; for the territory it was now proposed to distribute had, since it accrued to the state, been, like other *ager publicus*, in the possession of the wealthy. The senate opposed the distribution with all its power, and Flamininus, unable to secure its approval of his bill, carried the matter through the Comitia Tributa in spite of its protests. His action was contrary to the constitutional practice, for it was usual that all measures should be approved by the senate before they were laid before the Comitia, and it is on this ground blamed by Polybius, who regards it as the first step towards the conflict between senate and people which led to the overthrow of the republic. Nevertheless the measure was beyond doubt a salutary one, and, unlike most agrarian laws, it was enforced with vigour,

though, if Cicero is right in saying that it was vigorously opposed by Q. Fabius when consul in 228 B.C., its execution must have been impeded for some time. However, the perseverance of Flaminus won the day, and the Senonian lands were peopled with Roman colonists.

§ 6. For some time the Gauls looked on quietly at this Gallic War, <sup>225 B.C.</sup> appropriation of their territory, but in 225 B.C. the Boii, instigated by Carthaginian emissaries, broke out into hostilities. Their plans showed greater prudence than was customary with so wild a people, for not only did they make an alliance with the Aenates round Parma and the Lingones, threatened like themselves with extinction, but they were joined by most of the tribes on the other side of the Padus, notably by the Insubres, the most powerful of the Transpadane Gauls. Many of their countrymen also came to assist them from across the Alps. On the other hand, the Cenomani and the Veneti made common cause with the Romans. In Rome there was general consternation at these threatening proceedings, and many prodigies were announced. To quiet the prevailing alarm the Sibylline books were consulted by the *Decemviri sacris faciundis*, and in accordance with their injunctions two Gauls and two Greeks were buried alive in the Forum as an expiatory sacrifice. Ten legions were enrolled: of these two were stationed in Tarentum and Sicily, four more of the strength of 50,000 foot and 3,500 horse acted as a reserve in the capital, and the remaining four, consisting of 50,800 foot and 3,200 horse, were placed at the orders of the two consuls. C. Atilius Regulus led his two legions to Sardinia, where Carthaginian envoys had been busy, and L. Aemilius Papus took his stand with the other two legions at Ariminum, naturally supposing that that outpost and the newly founded settlements would be the first object of the Gallic attack. A body of 50,000 Etruscans and Sabines under the command of a praetor was stationed in Etruria, apparently in the plain of Pistoria and Florentia, to guard the northern passes of the Apennines. The Gauls did not make an assault on Ariminum, but set about crossing the Apennines forthwith. They eluded the praetor in Etruria and swept down the valley of the Clanis in full march for

Rome. They were not, however, to repeat the day of the Allia, although in the neighbourhood of Clusium (*Clusii*) they defeated the praetor who had followed them from Faesulae with a loss to the Romans of 6,000 men. By this time Aemilius Papus, summoned by the praetor's urgent messages, was upon their heels, and the Gauls, satisfied with the booty they had accumulated, determined to return to their homes. They struck their camp before daybreak, and to avoid a conflict with the consul marched in a south-westerly direction towards the sea-coast, along which they intended to march back. Unluckily for their plans, the other consul, Atilius Regulus, had at the command of the senate landed at Pisae (*Pisa*) with the army from Sardinia, and at Telamon (*Telamone*), on the coast of Etruria, near the river Umbro (*Ombrone*), the retreating Gauls were hemmed in between the two armies. On the first appearance of Regulus' horsemen, the Gauls only supposed them to be a part of Papus' force which had executed a flank movement, and accepted their challenge with alacrity. As soon as the truth dawned on them, their confidence turned into dismay; but retreat was impossible, Battle of Telamon, 225 B.C. and they drew up their forces so as to front both foes. The Boii and Taurisci were opposed to Regulus, the Insubres and Gaesatae (mercenaries from beyond the Alps) to his colleague. The Gauls fought with all the recklessness of their nation, but the odds were too heavy for them. Their position was from its nature untenable, and in addition to this their weapons were much inferior to their adversaries'. Their shields were too small to protect their bodies effectually, and their swords, of badly tempered steel, bent at the first stroke. Regulus fell at the first engagement of his cavalry; but after this incident everything went in favour of the Romans. At last the legions closed in on both sides, and the Gauls were cut down almost to the last man. Forty thousand fell; but few survived to grace the conqueror's triumph, and to be ironically reminded of their oath, that they would not lay aside their arms until they had climbed the Capitol.

§ 7. The Romans resolved to follow up their advantage and crush the Gauls in their own lands. Before the news

of the victory arrived they had chosen for the campaign of 224 B.C. two of their most distinguished generals, <sup>The Boundary of the Alps is</sup> T. Manlius Torquatus, who had defeated the <sup>reached.</sup> Sardinians in his first consulship 235 B.C., and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had as consul defeated the Boii, 237 B.C. In 224 B.C. the consuls led a powerful army against the Boii and Lingones. They encountered no resistance, for the disaster at Telamon had completely enfeebled the Gauls; but they were prevented by incessant autumn rains from crossing the Po and reducing the rest of the nations to submission. That task was left to the consuls for 223 B.C., who were C. Flaminius, the author of the agrarian law of 232 B.C., and P. Furius Philus. Flaminius had only secured his election in the face of the most determined opposition from the senatorial party. All kinds of prodigies were announced as a sign that the gods were unfavourable to his candidature,—a river in Picenum had flowed with blood; in Etruria the sky had appeared in flames, and three moons had been seen at once,—but the people could not be induced to desert its favourite. The consuls marched through Liguria into the lands of the Anares or Anamares, who dwelt about Parma. With their reduction, all the Gauls to the south of the Po submitted to Rome. Flaminius then crossed the Po. His passage was attended with severe loss, for the Insubres were up in arms to oppose him, and when he reached the northern bank he was compelled to make a truce with the enemy and retreat eastward for support to the friendly Cenomani. He returned after an interval, and gave battle to the Insubres on the western bank of a river which has been identified with the Oglio. There he was compelled to break down the bridges which secured his retreat, because he feared that his allies, the Cenomani, might profit by any mishap on his part to attack him in the rear. His position was as desperate as can be imagined, for the Insubres had gathered together to the number of 50,000 men and were prepared to fight to the last; but the valour of the legionaries countervailed any indiscretion on the part of their general, and the Gauls were routed. Just before the battle Flaminius had received a despatch from the senate: judging that it was directed against himself he

refused to open it until the fight was over. He now found that he and his colleague were recalled on the plea of an informality in their election. For the present he paid no attention to the mandate, and only returned to the capital after he had wasted the length and breadth of the Insubrian lands. The senate attempted to impeach him for misconduct of the war, but the people were as ever his enthusiastic partisans, and voted him a triumph, which was duly celebrated March 10, 222 B.C.

The consuls for 222 B.C. were Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus and M. Claudius Marcellus. Both of them were born soldiers, and both were to achieve great things in the war with Hannibal. The name of Marcellus, in particular, will often recur in the narrative. Scipio and Marcellus, equally eager to earn the glory of terminating the war, secured the rejection of the Insubrians' proposals for peace, and then marched into their land. The Insubrians had been joined by 30,000 Gaesatae—free-lances from Transalpine Gaul—under a chief called Viridomarus. To effect a diversion Viridomarus crossed the Po, and proceeded to devastate the lands of the Anares, who had sworn loyalty to the Romans. On learning this Marcellus hastened to the relief with a strong force of cavalry, and came up with the Gauls at Clastidium (*Casteggio*). At the commencement of the battle he dashed forward to attack Viridomarus, who was conspicuous through his gigantic stature and his silver armour. The Roman was victorious in the combat, and with the fall of their chieftain the Gauls broke and fled. Soon afterwards the Gaesatae returned to their homes across the Alps, and when Marcellus gained possession of Mediolanum (*Milan*), their capital town, and took Comum (*Como*) as well, the Insubres submitted unconditionally. Marcellus celebrated a magnificent triumph, of which the most memorable ornament was Viridomarus' glittering armour. This, the *spolia opima*,\* he dedicated to Jupiter Feretrius, as Romulus and Cornelius Cossus were fabled to have done in bygone days.

\* The *spolia opima* were won when a Roman general slew with his own hand the leader of the enemy and stripped him of his armour. Cornelius Cossus is said thus to have slain Lars Tolumnius of Veii in 426 B.C.

The victory over the Insubres carried the limit of the Roman Empire to the foot of the Alps. South of the Po such of the Gauls as were not ousted by Roman colonists speedily adopted the speech and civilisation of their conquerors; north of that river and in the mountainous districts of the extreme west the Gauls retained for some time longer their national characteristics. The Insubres were not finally subdued until 196 B.C., and the Ligurian tribes round Genoa until a later date; even the Boii were in revolt in 193 B.C. Thus the hold of the Romans over much of the country was of a very loose character: at the same time they carefully took measures whereby they could more or less effectually repress any uprising of the vanquished Gauls. They built outposts, made roads, and sent out some powerful colonies. In 220 B.C. C. Flamininus, when censor with L. Aemilius Papus, made or improved the great road from Rome to Ariminum, which was afterwards known from his name as the *Via Flaminia*. As early as 299 B.C. this road reached as far as Narnia, and it had been extended to Spoletum in 243 B.C., the date at which the latter colony was founded. Flamininus now carried it across that pass of the Apennines near which the battle of Sentinum was fought (295 B.C.); thence along the left or northern bank of the Metaurus river until it reached the Adriatic, after which it skirted the coast as far as Ariminum. The valley of the Po was secured by the conversion of Mutina (*Modena*) into a fortress, and the despatch of two numerous colonies to Placentia (*Piacenza*) and Cremona (*Cremona*), both on the Po and in the very heart of the conquered districts.

§ 8. When Rome had completed her line of colonies—First Illyrian Ariminum (268 B.C.), Sena Gallica (289 B.C.), War, 229 B.C. Firmum (264 B.C.), Castrum Novum (264 B.C.), Hatria (289 B.C.)—by the occupation of Brundusium (*Brundisi*, 244 B.C.), it was evident that she would speedily assert control over the adjoining sea. After the first Punic war, the Adriatic became more and more infested by Illyrian pirates, who, sheltered by the dangerous creeks and innumerable islands of their wild and mountainous coast, preyed with impunity upon the merchant vessels of the Upper Sea and upon the coast towns of Greece. In the time of Hellenic

greatness order had been kept on these waters by Coreyra (*Corfu*), and later by Dionysius of Syracuse, a city which had many colonies among the islands of the Adriatic; but since the decay of Syracuse the Illyrians had been allowed to commit their depredations unmolested. Not content with capturing the merchant vessels which carried the trade of the Adriatic, they repeatedly laid waste the coast of Messenia and Elis, and even such considerable places as Apollonia (*Pollina*) and Epidamnum (or Dyrrhachium, *Durazzo*) were not secure from their raids. Opposite Coreyra the Illyrians got possession of Phoenice, an important place for the commerce of the interior. This event proved too much for the endurance of the Italian traders; and when, in 230 B.C., the people of Issa (*Lissa*), originally a Syracusan settlement, and now the only island that remained independent of the pirates, entreated the senate for protection, it was resolved to interfere in the matter. Two brothers, C. and L. Coruncanus, were sent to Illyria as envoys. On reaching Seodra (*Scutari*), the chief town of the pirates, they laid their complaints before Queen Teuta, who was governing for her young son Pinnes. When the queen declared that privateering was the national trade of the Illyrians, the younger of the envoys imprudently retorted that it would be Rome's business to divert them from such dishonest practices. Stung by this remark, Teuta caused the speaker to be assassinated on his way home. The senate had no choice but to avenge his murder, and in 229 B.C. a fleet of 200 vessels took the seas. Meanwhile Teuta had been busily engaged in an enterprise upon Coreyra. The Greeks, in desperation, appealed for help to the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, but neither were powerful by sea, and ultimately the Coreyraeans, after sustaining a complete defeat near the island Paxus, were obliged to admit an Illyrian garrison under the command of a certain Demetrius of Pharos. After this exploit the fleet sailed northwards to blockade Epidamnum. But now the Romans appeared on the scene. While on his way Cn. Fulvius received an intimation from Demetrius that under conditions he was prepared to surrender his charge. The Coreyraeans were only too glad to escape from the tyranny of the

Illyrians by placing themselves under Roman protection, and thus Fulvius won the most important island of the Adriatic. Apollonia followed the example of the Corcyraeans, and then Fulvius, who had now been joined by his colleague L. Postumius, sailed to the relief of Epidamnus. Nowhere did the Romans meet with serious resistance. Queen Teuta shut herself up in a strong fortress at Rhizon, on the Gulf of Cattaro, and, when winter came, sent ambassadors to the senate to beg for peace. It was granted on condition that the rulers of Scodra guaranteed not to molest any of the Greek towns on the Adriatic, and further promised not to sail with an armed vessel, or with more than two unarmed vessels in company, south of Lissus (*Alessio*). A tribute was also exacted from them. As a reward for his opportune treachery Demetrius of Pharos received a kind of suzerainty over the islands and coasts of Dalmatia. The states rescued from the Illyrians—Corcyra, Issa, Apollonia, Dyrrhachium—as well as some of the inland tribes in their neighbourhood, the Atintanes and Parthini—became dependents of Rome, and served to form the nucleus of the future province of Illyricum. A *praefectus* was sent out to govern Corcyra, and possibly to other of the subject towns. By this success Rome had taken the first step to her conquest of Greece and the East. For the time the Greeks were profoundly grateful to the barbarians who had freed them from their ten years' terror of the pirates. Macedonia indeed looked on the newcomers with undisguised jealousy, but Roman envoys were heartily welcomed by the leagues of Aetolia and Achaea, at the present time the chief powers in Greece. The Athenians admitted them to the sacred mysteries of Eleusis; and Corinth, not to be outdone, invited them to the Isthmian games, then in course of celebration. This was the first intercourse between the Romans and the Greeks in their native land. It was a sign that the centre of gravity in polities had shifted from the eastern to the western half of the Mediterranean, and that the coming mistress of the world was to be, not Egypt, Syria, or Macedonia, but Rome.

§ 9. For a few years the Romans experienced no further trouble in this quarter, but when they were involved in

hostilities with the Gauls, Demetrius of Pharus seized the opportunity to ally himself with Antigonus, the king of Macedonia, and to recommence his plundering expeditions with a fleet of fifty vessels. Since the first Illyrian war, Queen Teuta had died, and Demetrius, who previously had been her prime minister, now ruled with despotic authority. It was his ambition to consolidate a power which should be independent of Rome, and probably he might have succeeded in his aim had he chosen his time better. If he had waited till the Carthaginians actually appeared in Italy (218 B.C.), the Romans must have been too sorely pressed at home to spare men for crushing their ungrateful vassal. But matters came to a crisis in 219 B.C., when Hannibal was still in Spain, and so it happened that L. Aemilius Paullus, the Roman consul and commander, was able to finish the war within the year. Aemilius stormed Dimale, a strong post, apparently situated near the territory of the Parthini, and then sailed against Pharus, Demetrius' native place. As it was occupied by a powerful garrison, Aemilius first concealed a body of men in a woody part of the island, and then attempted with a second force to sail into the harbour under the eyes of the garrison. The latter rushed down to prevent the landing, and while they were engaged in a hot combat, Aemilius cut off their retreat with the men he had posted in concealment. Demetrius offered no further resistance: he fled to the court of Philip of Macedonia, who had just previously succeeded Antigonus on the throne, and there he lived to foment hostilities between the two nations.

## CHAPTER VI.

### OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

§ 1. The Barcidæ in Spain.—§ 2. Hannibal.—§ 3. Hannibal marches for Italy.—§ 4. Plans of the Romans in 218 B.C.—§ 5. Hannibal crosses the Alps.—§ 6. The Ticinus and the Trebia.—§ 7. The Second Campaign.—§ 8. Battle of Trasimenus.—§ 9. Fabius Cunctator is made Dictator.—§ 10. Hannibal in Campania.—§ 11. Fabius and Minucius.—§ 12. The Third Campaign.—§ 13. Battle of Cannæ.

§ 1. AT the close of the Inexpiable War, Hamilcar Barca <sup>The Barcidæ</sup> found himself the acknowledged leader of Carthage in Spain. The services which he had rendered to his country in Sicily against Rome and in Africa against the mercenaries had brought his party to the front, and the discredited oligarchs were obliged to look on passively while he was invested with the sole control of the army, subject only to the voice of the popular assembly. The national party was now so strong in the senate and the Hundred, that Hamilcar could reckon on carrying out his plans without hindrance from the oligarchy. He saw that Africa was not the place for organising an army or amassing treasure, so as soon as he was armed with his dictatorial authority, he unexpectedly crossed to Spain, in the determination of winning in that rich and unexhausted land a new empire, which should be a compensation for the loss of Sicily. The Spanish tribes were capable of supplying the material for armies not less valiant than numerous, and the country afforded a new and formidable base of operations against Rome. For it was no secret in Carthage that the head of the Barcidæ had pledged himself and his family to be avenged on Rome.

It was in 237 B.C. that he crossed to Spain. Gades (*Cadiz*), a Phoenician emporium of even greater antiquity

than Carthage herself, became his centre of operations, and thence he steadily pursued his schemes, organizing a military force, and conquering or winning over the native tribes until he died in battle nine years later, 228 B.C. His mantle fell upon his trusted colleague and son-in-law Hasdrubal, who founded a new capital in Carthago Nova (*Carthagena*), close to which, by a lucky chance, extensive silver mines were soon discovered. Effecting more by diplomacy than by force, Hasdrubal extended the Carthaginian power over the eastern and southern coast, until he had reduced almost the whole land south of the Iberus (*Ebro*). At this point the Romans became jealous, and besides warning Hasdrubal not to cross the Ebro, they took under their special protection Saguntum (*Murviedro*), a flourishing centre of commerce, which attributed its origin to Zacynthus (*Zante*) and the Rutulians of Ardea in Latium.\*

§ 2. When Hasdrubal fell (221 B.C.) by an assassin's hand,

Hannibal. that Hannibal whom Hamilcar had caused to swear eternal enmity to the Romans had attained maturity. He was now twenty-eight years old; his training in the hardest of military schools had made him an adept in every art of the soldier and the general. As capable of showing obedience as of demanding it, no toil was too severe for his endurance: he could suffer hunger, cold, and lack of sleep with equal patience, and in the fight he was second to none in his army. His mental qualities were as remarkable as his physical. He was endowed in the fullest degree with the subtlety and persistence of his nation. As a strategist he was unrivalled, and when his conflict of eighteen years against the full strength of Rome was over, he showed by the rehabilitation of his despairing country that he was as great a statesman as general. Of course Roman historians blackened his character so far as they were able, and have not hesitated to bring charges of fiendish cruelty and perfidy against his name.† As far as we can judge, however, he was as a rule remarkable for mildness

\* Cum hoc Hasdrubale fecerat rediviverat populus Romanus, ut alias utriusque imperio et animi Iberibus Saguntinisque neditis inter imperia duorum populorum libertas servaretur (Livy, XXI. 2).

† Cf. the words of Livy (XXI. 4): *has tantas viri virtutes in gentia virum sequuntur: inhumanam crudelitatem, perfidia plus quam Punicam, nihil veri nihil sancti, nullus deum inetus, nullum iuris iurandum, nulla religio.*

and humanity, far more so indeed than the Romans by whom he was calumniated.

Hannibal was hailed with acclamation by the officers of the army as their general, and the home government ratified the choice, 221 B.C. He at once set about the work to which his father had dedicated him. His first two campaigns were directed against the Olcades and Carpetani, petty tribes of central Spain, and then he deliberately threw down the challenge to Rome by laying siege to Saguntum. The Roman senate sent two envoys warning him to desist, but Hannibal refused even to receive them. Consequently they proceeded to Carthage, to demand the surrender of the assailant. Hanno, the old enemy of the Barcidæ, made a disgraceful speech in support of the Romans; but the Hundred were dead against compromise, and committed themselves to a policy of war almost without a dissentient voice. Meanwhile the siege of Saguntum went on. The Saguntines—true Spaniards in their capacity for stubborn resistance—held out gallantly, and on one occasion Hannibal was severely wounded. But at length the walls gave way before the Carthaginian assault. Many of the townsmen shut themselves up with their wives and children in their dwellings, which they then set on fire, and the rest fell victims to the rage of the infuriated besiegers. Saguntum thus fell in the autumn of 219 B.C. after a siege of eight months. A second embassy of the Romans proceeded to Carthage to complain of Hannibal's violation of the treaty. It was as ineffectual as the former had been, and finally its leading member, Q. Fabius, made a fold in his toga in the presence of the senate, saying, "Here we offer you war or peace. Take which of the two you will." There arose at once the cry, "Give us which you please." Then the Roman, unloosing his toga, declared that he gave them war, and the whole assembly rejoined that they welcomed it and would wage it with the same courage wherewith they welcomed it.

§ 3. Apart from the inherent weakness of their oligarchical system of government, the Carthaginians were in several points at a disadvantage as compared with the Romans: their naval force was of the weakest, their treasury had scarcely recovered

Hannibal marches from Spain.

from the exhaustion of the late struggle and the enormous indemnity exacted by Rome, and what was of greater import than all else—while Carthage found it a hard task to keep her subjects in obedience, there was growing throughout Italy the feeling that Rome deserved her position as Head of the Italian nations. Yet old sores still rankled; whatever position the Latins took up, Hannibal might reasonably hope that the Marsians, Sannites, Campanians, Lucanians, and Bruttians would remember their humiliation and rise against their masters when he appeared among them. But his surest allies were the Gauls of Northern Italy—those Boii and Insubres whom the Romans had only four years since reduced, and in whose territories they had during this very year (218 B.C.) erected the fortress colonies of Placentia and Cremona—and it was their country which he determined to make the scene of his first campaign. Outside Italy, he hoped to secure the assistance of Macedonia, whose young king, Philip V., viewed the recent advances of Rome in Illyria with uneasiness, and besides had Demetrius of Pharos at his court to urge him on to war.

Hannibal determined to attack Rome by land because in the first place a successful passage by sea was hardly possible in view of the weakness of the Carthaginian marine, and secondly the valley of the Po offered a broader base of operations than could be obtained by seizing a portion of the coast-line of Italy. Before setting out he secured the safety of Spain and Africa by despatching 20,000 Spaniards to Africa, while he brought over nearly 15,000 African foot and horse to Spain, an astute proceeding which put these troops into the position of hostages and guaranteed their loyalty to the country in whose service they were. About the end of May, 218 B.C., Hannibal began his march from Carthago Nova. He had with him 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 37 elephants. Between the Iberus and the Pyrenees the native tribes were up in arms, and offered a desperate resistance. Fortunately for Hannibal, the Romans were too dilatory to send them timely help. Still, even as matters were, their reduction was only effected at the cost of one-fourth of the Carthaginian army; so that when

Hannibal had detached a force of 10,000 men to keep them in check, and had dismissed a similar number of his troops who were fainthearted, he had remaining but 50,000 foot and 9,000 horse. The Gauls were partly intimidated, partly bought over, and Hannibal passed through Narbo (*Narbonne*) and Nemausus (*Nimes*) without opposition, and so reached the Rhone near Avennio (*Avignon*). On the eastern bank of the river the Gauls were posted to oppose his passage, but Hannibal collected all the boats on which he could lay hands, and crossed without much trouble. By this time P. Cornelius Scipio had landed with two legions at Massilia (*Marseilles*), and his cavalry had the best of a skirmish with Hannibal's Numidian horsemen. It was, however, too late to stop Hannibal, who was in full march for the Alps.

§ 4. The Romans, in fact, had missed their last chance

Plans of the Romans, 218 B.C. of intercepting the Carthaginians before they appeared in the valley of the Padus. Early in the year they had raised six legions, consisting of 24,000 foot and 1,800 horse, and to these were attached 40,000 foot and 4,400 horse of the allies. Their naval force consisted of 220 quinqueremes. The military operations were assigned to the two consuls of the year, Tiberius Sempronius Longus and P. Cornelius Scipio, of whom the former was to sail to Sicily, and thence to cross to Africa, while Scipio was to convey his army by sea to Spain, and attack Hannibal on his own ground. Sempronius had under his command two legions, or 8,000 foot and 600 horse, besides 16,000 foot and 1,800 horse of the allies. His naval force numbered 160 ships. Scipio had the same number of legionaries as Sempronius, besides 14,000 foot and 1,600 horse of the allies. His fleet consisted of 60 ships. The remainder of the forces—*i.e.* two legions, 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse of the allies—was sent to Cisalpine Gaul under the praetor L. Manlius, to ensure the submission of the Boii and Insubres. In this task Manlius was completely unsuccessful. He met with a severe repulse near Mutina (*Modena*) at the hands of the insurgent Gauls, and so precarious was his position that Scipio sent him one of his own legions as a reinforcement, while he raised another for himself in Rome. As related above, Scipio began to

coast along the Ligurian Gulf (*Gulf of Genoa*) on his way to Spain, but on reaching the friendly Greek town of Massilia (always a staunch ally of the Romans) he found, much to his surprise, that Hannibal was already on the Rhone. In fact, it had never occurred to the Romans, when they made their plan of campaign for the year, that Hannibal intended to invade Italy; they fancied that they would themselves be left to take the offensive, and that the double attack on Africa and Spain would effectually paralyse the enemy's movements. Thus Hannibal's real design came upon Scipio as a revelation, when he learned first that the Carthaginians were in Gaul, and next that they had crossed the Rhone and were marching for the passes of the Alps. The news caused no alteration in the destination of Scipio's troops, though their presence at this critical moment in the valley of the Po might, even at the eleventh hour, have ruined Hannibal's plans. But Scipio had not the strength of character to modify on his own responsibility the deliberate policy of the senate: like the thoroughly commonplace individual he was, he sent on his two legions to Spain under his brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, and himself returned to Pisae (*Pisa*).

Sempronius was equally unfortunate in his expedition to Africa. He reached Sicily just after one portion of a Carthaginian fleet of fifty-five vessels had been defeated, largely through the energy of the aged Hiero of Syracuse, in an attempt on Lilybaeum, where sympathy for the Carthaginian cause still lingered. The other portion proceeded to devastate the coast of Italy about Vibo (*Bivona*). Sempronius' first achievement was to capture Melita (*Malta*) through the treachery of its commandant: he then returned to protect the shores of Italy, but at this juncture news of Hannibal's march arrived, and he promptly conveyed his forces through the upper sea to Ariminum. He joined Scipio near the Trebia (*Trebbia*).

§ 5. Hannibal crossed the Rhone somewhere in the neighbourhood of Arausio (*Orange*). The enmity of the Ligurian tribes, and the occupation of the route along the coast by the Massiliots, deterred him from passing into Italy by the Maritime Alps. He

Hannibal  
crosses the  
Alps.

was therefore obliged to make use of one of the more northerly passes, which are in order from north to south the Great St. Bernard, the Little St. Bernard, Mont Cenis, Mont Genèvre, and the Col d'Argentière. Which of these he actually took was a subject of dispute as early as Livy's time, and the question is still far from settled. Polybius and Livy, our chief authorities, differ so essentially in their account of the march that, although the attempt has often been made, it is impossible to reconcile their conflicting statements. Livy's account points either to Mont Genèvre or the Col d'Argentière, while Polybius favours the route across Mont Cenis or the Little St. Bernard; and it must be remembered that Livy is much the later of the two historians, and had probably never seen the country he described, whereas Polybius was born during the course of the second Punic war, and, as he tells us, had visited the Alps for the express purpose of identifying Hannibal's route. Modern historians\* are practically unanimous in their preference of Polybius and the Little St. Bernard, a pass which, besides presenting fewer difficulties than the others, was the recognised path of intercourse between the Gauls of the west and their fellow-countrymen of the Italian peninsula, and was therefore familiar to the Insubres who acted as Hannibal's guides. Moreover, upon their egress from this pass the Carthaginians would be able to recruit their strength among the friendly Salassi, whereas the paths over Mont Genèvre and the Col d'Argentière would lead them into the lands of their enemies the Taurini. For all these reasons it seems best to follow Polybius.

After crossing the Rhone, Hannibal followed the course of that river until with four days' march he came to the fertile and populous "Island" of the Allobroges, so called from the fact that it is almost entirely enclosed by the Rhone and the Isère. On reaching the Isara (*Isère*), the Carthaginians might have turned aside from the Rhone and followed a shorter road along the left bank of the Isère, but this route would have led them through a barren and impracticable country. Hannibal therefore crossed the Isère, traversed the "Island" of the Allobroges, settling on

\* Niebuhr (incidentally), Mommsen, Ihne. See, however, p. 116. *note*.

the way a dispute between two Allobrogian chieftains as to the sovereignty, and reached the first terrace of the Alps at the Mont du Chat. Here his difficulties commenced. The Allobroges had beset the only path that led across the heights, and when Hannibal began to make the descent from the summit of the mountain to La Bourget, he was assaulted upon all sides with such fury that he barely saved from destruction his baggage train, upon which the safety of the whole expedition depended. The Carthaginians rested for one day in the valley of Chambéry, and then marched for three days along the upper Isère without being molested. On the fourth day they were met by the Cœtrones, who wore chaplets and offered hostages in token of friendship. But this cordiality was only a trap, and when Hannibal was involved among the precipices leading to the summit of the St. Bernard, he was attacked in flank and rear by the natives. Fortunately he had divined their plan, and had sent on his baggage train, the object of the assault, to the front for safety. On the ninth day of the ascent, after constant fighting with the mountaineers, he reached the summit. It was now late autumn, and the perils of their position, the difficulty of procuring subsistence in this bleak and arid region, the hostility of the natives, and the unwonted cold, might well dispirit his Spanish and African levies; but their courage rose when their general pointed out that friends were expecting their coming and that the spoils of Italy were now within their grasp, and after a rest of two days the descent began.

The troubles of the Carthaginians were far from over. On the very first day of the descent, the army found that the road along which they were marching had been broken away for a distance of 1,000 feet. To proceed farther was impossible, and when the Carthaginians tried to make a detour, they were prevented by a glacier, whose slippery surface admitted of no foothold. However with three days' incessant toil a way was engineered down the rocks, and on the ninth day from leaving the summit, Hannibal's forces, shrunken and shattered by the privations they had undergone, reached the plain of Eporedia (*Icrea*) on the Duria (*Dora Baltea*), where they were able to recruit their

strength among the friendly Salassi. The Alps were passed, but at an enormous cost ; for now Hannibal had remaining but 20,000 foot (12,000 Africans and 8,000 Spaniards) and 6,000 horse. Since the passage of the Pyrenees there had perished three out of every five of his infantry and a third of his horse.

Livy's version of the march is identical with that of Polybius until the passage of the Isère is described. At this point he diverges utterly from the older historian. Hannibal, he says, after settling the quarrel among the Allobroges, continued his march towards the Alps ; but instead of crossing the Isère he proceeded along the left bank of that river, through the lands of the Tricastini ; then turning southwards he skirted the borders of the Vocontii, and so came to the Tricorii, whose capital was Vapineum, now *Gap*. He was now in the valley of the upper Druentia (*Durance*), and here the ascent of the Alps commenced.\* His upward march in Livy's version is marked by much the same incidents as Polybius has described : on the ninth day he reached the summit of the range, either at the Mont Genèvre or the Col d'Argentière, the former being generally considered to be the pass intended by Livy, and thence he descended, not, as Polybius says, among the Insubres, but by the Dora Riparia, into the land of the hostile Taurini. The capital of this people, afterwards *Augusta Taurinorum* (*Turin*), he attacked and took.

§ 6. After landing at Pisa, P. Cornelius Scipio joined the two legions that were campaigning in Cisalpine Gaul. Then, crossing the Po, he hastened westward along the northern bank of the river until he heard that Hannibal was not far off. In spite of this news he crossed the river Ticinus (*Ticino*), which lay between him and the enemy, and offered battle. The engagement which ensued was chiefly a cavalry skirmish ; the Numidian horse gained the day, and Scipio received a severe wound. Hannibal expected that the conflict would be renewed on the morrow, but the Romans, daunted

\* Sedatis Hannibal certaminibus Allobrogum cum iam Alpes petret, non recta regione iter instituit, sed ad lacum in Tricastinos flexit ; inde per extremam oram Vocontiorum agri tendit in Tricorios hanc usquam impedita via, priusquam ad Druentium flumen pervenit.

by their leader's mishap, retreated with all speed and crossed the Po again at Placentia. Instead of following them at once, Hannibal marched up the river for two days, and then transported his troops to the southern bank without hindrance. He found that his victory had already inclined the Gauls to join him, but terror of the Roman power was still a predominant feeling, and a great victory was needed to secure them as his allies. Hannibal therefore pressed on Scipio, with the intention of fighting as soon as possible. After a two days' march he came to the Trebia (*Trebbia*), a small stream running from the Apennines into the Po at a distance of about six miles from Placentia. Here he found Scipio encamped. The consul, disabled by his wound and knowing that the Carthaginian superiority in cavalry rendered the open plain an unfavourable battleground for him, was altogether averse to an engagement. Besides, he was anxious to be joined by his colleague Sempronius, who had been recalled from Sicily by the senate and was now hurrying to the north. The difficulties of his position were heightened by a mutiny in his camp among the Gallie auxiliaries, who, to the number of 2,000, slaughtered the watch and made their way to Hannibal. Anxious about his safety, Scipio crossed to the right or eastern bank of the Trebia, and there pitched his camp on some hilly ground. He was now joined by Sempronius, who, disappointed of a campaign in Africa and longing to strike a decisive blow before his consulship expired, resolved to force on a battle. Scipio did his utmost to dissuade him from such rashness, but Sempronius paid no heed to his colleague's advice, thinking him either actuated by jealousy or depressed in spirits by his unhealed wound. Nothing could serve Hannibal's purpose better than such a frame of mind; to goad the Romans to action, and also to punish the Gauls for their coldness towards him, he burnt a number of villages round his camp. Sempronius sallied out to check the depredations of the Carthaginians, crossed the Trebia,

Battle of the Trebia. and won some success with his horsemen.

Knowing that Sempronius would now fight a general engagement if he had the chance, Hannibal posted his brother Mago and a squadron of cavalry in an ambush,

where rushes and brambles concealed a dried-up water-course of the Trebia, and at day-dawn sent out a detachment of Numidian horse to entice the enemy across the river. The challenge was eagerly accepted, and when the Numidians purposely retired, the Romans, though sleet was falling and they had taken no food to prepare them for the coming struggle, rushed in pursuit through the icy waters of the Trebia and past Mago's ambush. The main body of the Carthaginian forces, warm and well fed, now quitted their camp and joined in the struggle. On Hannibal's side there were 20,000 foot against the 38,000 of the Romans; but the Carthaginian cavalry (10,000 against 4,000) outnumbered their opponents by more than two to one. In spite of their cold and hunger the legions kept up the fight until Mago's detachment started from its ambush and attacked them in the rear. This decided the day: the Romans at once broke and fled in wild confusion; most of them were cut down, but a body of 10,000 fought its way through the enemy, crossed the Trebia lower down, and reached Placentia. The wind was so biting, and the sleet falling so fast, that the Carthaginians were content with pursuing them to the river. Hannibal followed up his victory by an unsuccessful assault on Placentia, and by an attempt to cross the Apennines into Etruria which was thwarted by the violence of the elements. Livy describes in picturesque language how the soldiers' tents were overthrown by the hurricane and almost buried beneath a tempest of snow and hail. However, Hannibal had every reason to be satisfied with the result of his first campaign in Italy; he had driven the Romans from the whole of Cisalpine Gaul except the two fortresses of Placentia and Cremona, and he could now be sure that the Gauls would flock in numbers to his standards. His presence, however, was not welcomed with unmitigated enthusiasm by the Gauls, who feared that they had only exchanged one master for a second, and by no means desired their land to be exhausted by the maintenance of so large an army. Hannibal therefore determined to seek a base of operations rather in Southern Italy than in Gaul, and to conciliate the Italians he treated all his prisoners of that nationality

with marked kindness, and sent them home without a ransom.

§ 7. So skilfully worded were the despatches of Sempronius <sup>the Second Campaign.</sup> that the defeat of the Trebia at first created little uneasiness at Rome, and it was only by <sup>217 B.C.</sup> degrees that men learnt that the Roman camp had been taken, that the valley of the Po was in the enemy's possession, and that the Gauls were in revolt. Four new legions were enrolled, so that, including those defeated at the Trebia, there were now thirteen in the field; reinforcements were sent to Sicily and Sardinia, and the garrison of Tarentum was strengthened. The elections for 217 B.C. were attended with violent outbursts of party feeling. The popular leader was that C. Flamininus who had carried the agrarian law of 232 B.C. and fought against the Insubres in 223 B.C. Since this latter date Flamininus had been in constant conflict with the senatorial party: on one occasion he was named by the dictator Minucius as his Master of the Horse, but his nomination was cancelled because during the ceremony a mouse had been heard to squeak, and this was an evil omen. Flamininus repaid his opponents with interest, and when in 218 B.C. the tribune C. Claudius proposed a law that no senator or son of a senator should possess a vessel of greater burden than 300 amphorae (which would enable them to convey the produce of their estates to the city, but not to engage in foreign trade) Flamininus stood alone in supporting it in the senate.\* The most vehement efforts were made to defeat his candidature for a second consulship: all kinds of prodigies were announced to deter the tribes from voting for him, but the popularity of Flamininus was sufficiently great to overbear all opposition. Yet Flamininus knew that he was not safe even yet, and that if he stayed in the city to perform the solemn rites which it was customary for a newly elected consul to go through, the priests would find some flaw in his election. Instead of staying in Rome to be removed on the pretext of some evil omen, he secretly hurried off to Ariminum. The senate insisted upon his

\* *This lex Claudiana:* *Ne quis senator, cuius senator poter fuisse in mariitimum navem quae plus quam trecentarum amphorarum esset, habeat* (Livy, XXI. 63).

immediate return, but Flaminius, not for the first time in his career, paid no heed to the demand, though the very first sacrifice he performed was marked by an untoward occurrence. Leaving his colleague Cn. Servilius with two of the newly raised legions, he himself led into Etruria the troops which had been collected in Ariminum from the campaign of the previous year, and there joined the other two legions. He pitched his camp near Arretium, whence he could guard the passes of the Apennines. As soon as spring rendered the mountains practicable Hannibal crossed the Apennines, probably by the pass that leads from Parma to Lucca, and gained the plains about the upper Arnus (*Arno*), now flooded through the melting of the snows. Here, among the swamps, his men suffered terribly: for three days they could find no dry ground on which to rest and sleep, and Hannibal himself lost an eye from ophthalmia. Of all his elephants there remained but the one upon which he rode.\*

§ 8. At length he reached Faesulae (*Fiesoli*), whence, learning that the consuls were not in conjunction, he marched past Flaminius' quarters near Arretium, and proceeded southwards until he reached the northern shore of Lake Trasimenus (*Lago di Perugia*), between Cortona and Perusia. Knowing that Flaminius must follow him to protect Rome, Hannibal waited at a point where the horns of a semicircular range of hills approached the lake so closely as to leave but a narrow defile by its shore. At the farther pass he posted some of his troops in full sight of the enemy; the rest he carefully concealed about the more northerly end of the defile. A mist hung all along the border of the lake when, in the early morning, Flaminius with his 30,000 soldiers marched into the trap. He had no idea that the enemy was so near, and did not wish to fight until he should be joined by his colleague Servilius, who was already advancing from Ariminum along the Flaminian road. Hannibal's strategy met with complete success; the Romans marched on

\* This is the picture which moved the satire of Juvenal (X. 157):—

O qualis facies et quali digna tabella  
Cum Gaetula ducem portaret belua *tuscum*.

without suspecting anything wrong, until their whole force was between the two divisions of the Carthaginian army. Then Hannibal gave the signal for attack. His troops rushed down from the hills, and while some blocked up the defile in Flamininus' rear, the others set upon the main body of the Romans. Unable to form their ranks in so confined a space, the legions were annihilated, almost without resistance. A few tried to escape by taking to the water, but the weight of their armour pressed them down; some waded out as far as they dared, only to be cut down by the enemy's cavalry. Of all the host, only a body of 6,000 forced its way out of the fatal valley, and these were soon surrounded and forced to surrender. Flamininus did his utmost to set his army in array of battle, but found the attempt impossible amid the confusion. He made no effort to escape, but fought bravely until slain by an Insubrian, who thus took vengeance for the devastation of his native land five years before. In three hours the battle was over: 15,000 Romans had fallen, an equal number surrendered, while of Hannibal's troops only 1,500, and these mostly Gauls, were slain. As after the victory at the Trebia, Hannibal dismissed the Italians free, assuring them that he had come to free them from the yoke of Rome. Soon afterwards Servilius, the other consul, was reduced to inactivity; for his cavalry, when on the way to join Flamininus, was annihilated among the Umbrian hills.

§ 9. The senate made no attempt to conceal the great disaster that had befallen the state: when news arrived a praetor addressed the anxious people with the simple words, "We have lost a great battle." Measures were at once taken to defend the city; the bridges across the Tiber were broken down, and the walls put in a state of defence. It was resolved to revive the dictatorship, an office which had not been filled since the disaster at Drepanum in the first Punic war. It was the constitutional practice for the senate to vote that a dictator was needed, and then for one of the consuls to nominate a senator to the office; but Flamininus was dead, and communication with Servilius was impossible. The matter was referred to the Comitia Centuriata, and by the

*Tabus Centuriata  
is made  
Dictator.*

vote of the people Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed pro-dictator and M. Minucius Rufus as his Master of Horse. The first act of Fabius was to propitiate the gods by a three days' feast, after which he raised two new legions to replace those lost at Trasimenus. With these troops he joined Servilius at Oericulum, a small town not far from Narnia.

Contrary to general expectation, Hannibal did not march on Rome after his victory at Trasimenus. He was fully aware that it was useless for him to attempt the siege of a place so strongly fortified, an opinion which was justified by the failure of an assault on the comparatively weak colony of Spoletum; besides, he had not forgotten the protracted resistance of Saguntum. Now, as ever, Hannibal showed that he joined to matchless boldness a caution equally remarkable, and that he would only give the mortal blow when success was beyond doubt. He therefore turned aside from Rome to pursue his plans of bringing over the Italians to his cause. This done, he would perhaps be in a position to assault the enemy's capital. Leaving Etruria, he passed through Umbria to the Adriatic Sea, and allowed his weary soldiers to rest awhile in the fertile plains of Picenum. The farmhouses were pillaged and burnt on all sides, and the able-bodied population massacred, for the district was full of the Roman colonists who had settled there in consequence of Flaminius' agrarian law. While his soldiers were recruiting their strength, Hannibal armed his Libyans with the weapons he had taken at Trasimenus and exercised them in Roman tactics. From Picenum he proceeded leisurely through the lands of the Vestini, Marrucini, and Frentani, gathering in booty from all quarters, until he came to Apulia. At Arpi he found himself once more confronted by a Roman army, but the tactics of its general were such as no Roman had ever before employed. Fabius, who, as dictator, had received full control of the war, was indeed the very opposite of Flaminius; he disliked the interference of the people as much as Flaminius welcomed it, and he was as averse to committing the fortunes of the nation to a pitched engagement as Flaminius had been eager to do so. Despite all the

provocations of Hannibal, who devastated the country before his eyes, and the impatience of his own officers, he persistently followed the Carthaginians from place to place, cutting off stragglers here, capturing a baggage train there, intent only on outwearing the invader and gaining time for Rome to recover from her wounds.

§ 10. Such a policy was the last that Hannibal desired <sup>Hannibal in</sup> in an opponent, and he resolved to change his <sup>Campagna.</sup> scene of operations to Campania, hoping that if he plundered the numerous farms of the Roman citizens in that region, Fabius would be compelled to fight by the general indignation of his countrymen. He had also received an intimation that Capua, next to Rome the most important city in Italy, was inclined to join him. Followed at the distance of a day's march by Fabius, he marched into Samnium, where he pillaged the territory of Beneventum, and took Telesia by storm. He was about to descend into the Campanian plain, when a mistake on the part of his guides led him to Allifae (*Allife*) on the upper Vulture. However, the sight of the towering heights of the Matese convinced him that he was on the wrong path: so, turning aside, he passed through the territory of Calatia (*Caiazzo*) and Cales (*Calvi*), and with a few days' march reached Campania. The whole plain of this fertile district, deservedly known as the Garden of Italy, was wasted with fire and sword as far as the coast town of Sinuessa (*Mon-dragone*). Villages and homesteads went up in flames: yet Fabius maintained his position on the Mons Massicus, unmoved by the anger of his officers and the impatient commands of Minucius, his Master of Horse. He even gave orders to his reconnoitring parties to avoid all conflict with the enemy, and Hannibal, seeing that he could not force on a battle, resolved to retrace his steps to Apulia with the rich booty he had collected. And now it seemed that Fabius' chance had come: in expectation of Hannibal's retreat, the dictator had occupied the height of Callicula and thrown a garrison into Casilinum, so blocking the road across the Vulture. Then placing a detachment at the head of the defile through which Hannibal's way led, he resolved with his main force to make a flank attack on the

Carthaginians as they were entangled in the valley. But Hannibal's craft had not deserted him ; he tied lighted faggots to the horns of some two thousand oxen—part of his Campanian spoil—and in the darkness of the night drove the terrified animals over the heights on one side of the valley. When the Romans at the head of the pass saw this multitude of lights, they imagined the enemy were trying to escape, and hurried down to oppose them. To their surprise they found only a number of cattle, and suspecting that Hannibal was trying to draw them into a trap, they had not the courage in the dark night to regain the position they had quitted. Fabius, equally surprised at the occurrence, and ignorant of its meaning, remained passive with the main body of his army. Thus Hannibal marched quietly out of the pass with all his booty. In the hope of finding allies, he then passed by Aesernia into the land of the Paeligni ; but the Sabellians were as cowed as the Campanians, and Hannibal met with no success in winning them over. It was now time to find winter quarters, and as there had been an abundant harvest in the territory of Gerunium, an Apulian town between the Tifernus (*Biferno*) and the Frento (*Fortore*), the Carthaginian army made that place its headquarters. Hannibal no doubt hoped that next year the Roman commanders would be less invulnerable antagonists. All this time Fabius had dogged his steps, and was now encamped over against him at Larinum (*Larino Vecchio*).

§ 11. The inactivity of Fabius had aroused much bitterness <sup>Fabius and Minucius.</sup> of feeling against him in Rome. All classes were angered at the tidings of the enemy's depredations which arrived from every side, and even the senate so far lost confidence in its general, that as a mark of its displeasure it refused to pay the ransom of some prisoners for whose release Fabius had bargained. About this time Fabius was obliged to proceed to the capital for the purpose of offering up a solemn sacrifice. Minucius, the young and impetuous Master of the Horse, who was left in command at Larinum, saw an opportunity of attacking the Carthaginians as they were scattered over the whole country in search of forage and provisions for the winter, and changed his camp to

lower ground. Hannibal discovered from this threatening movement that the command had changed hands, and replied by drawing closer to the Romans. Undaunted by this movement, Minucius advanced up to the Carthaginian camp with his legionaries, while he cut off the enemy's foragers by means of his horsemen and light armed troops. So precarious ultimately did Hannibal's position become that he retreated to his old camp hard by Gerumium. This success of Minucius had a great effect on parties at Rome. The outcry against Fabius became more pronounced, and his unpopularity was increased by a chance expression of his to the effect that he feared worse consequences from success than from failure. Unwilling to defend himself before the people, he left Rome after holding an election for a successor to Flaminius, which resulted in the choice falling upon M. Atilius Regulus; but on reaching the camp he learnt that the people had raised his Master of Horse to an equality with himself in the command. In spite of this disgrace, Fabius did not resign the dictatorship, but resolved to remedy, so far as he could, any disasters to which the imprudence of Minucius might lead. The two commanders divided their forces and occupied separate encampments. Fabius persisted in his old tactics; Minucius, on the contrary, was stimulated by his new authority to greater boldness, and sought every opportunity for fighting a pitched battle. Hannibal was perfectly informed of the state of affairs, and supposed that Fabius would be too much influenced by wounded self-love to assist his colleague if the latter met with disaster. He seized the height that separated his camp from that of Minucius, who at once brought out his forces to dislodge him. The Roman legions fought well, but were barely holding their ground, when 5,000 picked Carthaginian troops started upon them from an ambush. The attack of this new force threw the Romans into confusion: for a moment it seemed as though the day of Trasimenus was to be repeated; but, luckily for Minucius, Fabius had followed him to the scene of battle, and now generously afforded the fleeing troops a refuge behind his own unbroken legions. Not willing to engage this fresh enemy, Hannibal gave the signal for

retreat. The Roman army was thus saved by the prudence of Fabius, and Minucius, not to be outdone, laid down his separate authority and effected a reconciliation with his colleague. The praise of Fabius was on every one's lips: as the poet Ennius sang afterwards, the Laggard (*Cunctator*), as his enemies styled him in derision,\* had for the time "saved the state by his delay," and given to Rome a breathing space before the renewal of the struggle.

§ 12. The consular elections for 216 B.C. were attended by party quarrels of a violence that had been unknown since the long-forgotten feud between patricians and plebeians. The mass of the citizens were greatly irritated by the conduct of the war, and even assailed the senate with the unfounded accusation that the war was being protracted in their interest, with a view to the extermination of the poorer classes. The democrats declared that matters would not come right until one of themselves should be raised to the highest office in the state, and they chose as their champion C. Terentius Varro, a man of low birth, who had been one of Minucius' warmest supporters in the previous year. Varro has naturally not met with a flattering treatment at the hands of Roman historians, who were mostly partisans of the senate, but there are facts in his career which are at variance with the charges of ignorance and incompetence brought against him. In the first place, his very rise from the humble position in which he was born—he was only the son of a butcher—through the various magistracies (the quaestorship, the plebeian and curule aedileship, and the praetorship) to the consulship, prove that he was the very reverse of an incapable man; and in the second place, he was more than once employed in the public service, even after the great defeat he suffered at Cannae. As both the consuls were absent in the field, it became necessary to appoint a dictator or a "between-king" (*interrex*) to conduct the consular elections. A dictator was named, but forced

\* *Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem :*  
*Noenam (= non) rumores ponebat ante salutem,*  
*Ergo postquam magisque viri nunc gloria claret.*

"He placed not the murmurs of the people before his country's safety, therefore in these days all the brighter is his fame."

to lay down his office in consequence of an informality in his nomination; finally an interrex, P. Cornelius Asina, presided over the comitia. While the democrats were unanimous in their support of Varro, the opposite party was divided between three candidates, no doubt an indication that Fabius' policy was disliked by a portion even of the senate; and thus, while there was a great majority of centuries for Varro, no second candidate obtained a majority at all. In the interval which elapsed before the second meeting of the comitia, thus rendered necessary, the senatorial party closed its ranks by rejecting its first candidates and concentrating its strength on L. Aemilius Paullus, a man exceedingly unpopular with the commons, but who had shown his military capacity in the second Illyrian war. Shortly before he and his colleague, M. Livius Salinator, had been impeached for unfair division of the spoil, but while the latter was condemned by the tribes, Aemilius contrived to escape. He was only the more embittered against the people. The greatest exertions were made for the coming campaign. Roman generals had so often been outmanoeuvred by Hannibal that the only remedy for the situation appeared to consist in sending into the field as large forces as possible. Every day it was becoming more urgent that the Carthaginian devastations should be stopped: it could not be expected that the allies would much longer be true to their allegiance unless their farms and lands were safeguarded, and even the multitude in the city was showing dangerous signs of disaffection towards the government. The senate therefore raised four new legions, in addition to the four already under arms in Apulia, and increased the troops in each from 4,200 to 5,000, and the horse to 400. As each legion was accompanied by an equal contingent of allies, the total forces to be employed against Hannibal would amount to something like 80,000 foot and 6,000 horse. In addition, an army under the praetor and ex-consul L. Postumius Albinus was sent into Gaul, to check the reinforcements which were continually pouring thence to join Hannibal, and a second force was sent under M. Claudius Marcellus (also a praetor and ex-consul) to protect Sicily.

§ 13. Soon after their entry upon office Varro and Aemilius took over the command in Apulia from the consuls of the former year, M. Atilius Regulus and Cn. Servilius, of whom the latter remained with the army to assist with his military experience. The new consuls bore with them orders to abandon the tactics of Fabius, and give battle whenever opportunity offered. Such a policy was just what Varro desired, and even Aemilius appears to have acquiesced in it, although just before his departure from the city Fabius Cunctator had earnestly exhorted him to follow the plan of campaign which had proved so successful in his own case. Hannibal, meantime, was badly off for both provisions and money, and his soldiers were getting discontented. He suddenly quitted Gerunium, crossed the Aufidus, and seized Cannae (*Canne*), which the Romans had converted into their principal magazine. Here he found abundance of supplies; the country in the neighbourhood was teeming with the coming harvest, and was magnificently adapted, by reason of its flat expanses, for the cavalry in which lay his main strength. The consuls followed in his track, and, crossing the Aufidus, pitched their camp a few miles higher up the river, not far from Canusium. The dusty, waterless plain pleased Aemilius very little, and he would have liked to retire to some more hilly ground; but Varro, angered by his colleague's hesitation, was resolved to fight, and so close were the two armies that very soon a battle became inevitable. To cut off the enemy's foraging expeditions, the Romans sent a detachment to the left or northern bank of the river, and there made a second camp, smaller than the one they had formed on the right or southern bank. Hannibal soon sent his skirmishers across the Aufidus to provoke the Romans, and now Aemilius, fearing that a retreat could only be effected at a great risk, consented to give battle. When Varro's day of command arrived—the consuls commanded on alternate days—he boldly led the entire army to the northern side of the stream, and by a bend of the river prepared for the engagement. Ten thousand men were left behind in the larger camp, with a view to effect a diversion in the enemy's rear. The rest of the

troops, 77,000 in number, he drew up with a front of the usual breadth, but in twice the customary depth, supported on the right by the Roman horse, and on the left by that of the allies. Varro commanded on the right, Aemilius on the left, while the centre was led by the pro-consul Cn. Servilius and Minucius, the late Master of the Horse. Hannibal did not decline the challenge; he put his whole force across the Aufidus—it was little more than half as numerous as that of the Romans—and facing southwards, with the river winding along his left flank, drew up his line of battle. In the centre he arrayed in a semicircle his Gallie and Spanish foot, and there commanded in person. On either side of his main body, but somewhat behind them, was his Libyan infantry; while on both flanks, well in advance, was stationed his cavalry, a strong force of 8,000 heavy horsemen under Hasdrubal being on the left by the river, and a smaller force of 2,000 light Numidians on the right under Hanno. The battle began by Hasdrubal's horse charging the weaker Roman cavalry; after a desperate fight they routed these, and made their way behind the main force of the Romans to the opposite wing, where the Numidian horsemen, excellent skirmishers, but no match for heavy cavalry, were getting the worst of the fight. The double attack soon scattered the Roman cavalry on the left wing, and by this time the infantry, now closely engaged in the centre, was drawing nearer to the Aufidus, the Gauls and Spaniards falling back before the charge of the legions, and the Romans pressing on them in the hope of forcing them into the river. At this crisis Hasdrubal, leaving the pursuit to the Numidians, fell upon the rear of the Romans, while the Libyans, advancing to the support of the Gauls and Spaniards, were led inwards upon their flanks. Then the battle became a massacre. As at Trasimenus, the Romans had no room for manoeuvring: beset in front, flank, and rear, they fell where they stood, until after a butchery of eight hours, 50,000 (more than the whole of the enemy's army) lay dead on the field. The Roman camps on the Aufidus were both taken, and in them or elsewhere 20,000 fugitives. Aemilius Paullus was severely wounded in the

cavalry fight with which the battle opened, but did his best to rally the infantry later until he was slain. Minucius, Servilius, and no fewer than eighty senators, actual or designated, perished; but Varro with seventy horsemen made good his escape to Venusia. Thence he ventured back to Canusium, where he rallied all those who had survived the battle; these numbered 10,000 at the outside. Hannibal, on the other hand, had suffered little. Only 6,000 of his men had fallen, and these chiefly consisted of Gauls, who could be replaced without difficulty. Of his magnificent cavalry, which had won the battle, barely 200 were missing.

NOTE.—The arguments for and against the claims of the various passes of the Alps in reference to Hannibal's march are conveniently summarised in Mr. W. T. Arnold's edition of Dr. Arnold's *History of the Second Punic War*, pp. 362-373. The chief advocate for the Mont Genève route is Neumann, who argues that Polybius does, as a matter of fact, *indirectly* bring out Hannibal among the Taurini, and not the Insubres, and points to Livy's express statement that *all* writers (*i.e.*, Polybius included) declared that Hannibal came out upon Turin. The Col d'Argentière is favoured by Mr. Freshfield, whose great argument is a statement of Varro, the antiquarian contemporary of Cicero, to the effect that Hannibal crossed by the *second* pass reckoning northwards from the sea: the context shows that the Col d'Argentière must be intended. It may further be noted that the position of all three of Hannibal's great battles is uncertain: the most generally accepted view is given above, but (especially with Cannae) there are serious difficulties in the way. In the case of the Trebia, we cannot be certain whether Scipio before the battle was encamped on the right (eastern) bank and Hannibal on the left (western) bank, or vice *versa*. As the Romans crossed the river to give battle, the scene of the fight will be the left or the right bank respectively. In his narrative Livy says that those survivors of the Roman army who had saved themselves by crossing the river and taking refuge in the Roman camp, recrossed it again by night on rafts, and so got safely to Placentia. Now as Placentia is situated below the confluence of the Trebia with the Po, this would put the battle on the right bank. The battle of TRASIMENUS is differently treated by Livy and Polybius. Livy almost certainly places it on the northern shore of the Lake between the modern villages of Borghetto and Passignano. Polybius seems to represent it as occurring on the eastern shore of the Lake, and his description is supposed to refer to a valley, roughly elliptical in shape, which is found between La Torricella and Magione. [Cf. Mr. Tilley's paper in the *Classical Review* for 1893, p. 300.] The battle of CANNAE is as perplexing as that of the Trebia: we cannot be sure whether it took place upon the left or upon the right bank of the Aufidus. Most historians (including Moerssen, Ihne, and Neumann) decide for the left or northern bank, and this opinion has been followed above. The greatest difficulty in adopting this view is the positive statement of both Livy and Polybius that the Romans, while resting with their *right* wing on the river had their faces turned towards the *south*, while the Carthaginians looked north. As the Aufidus runs from the S.W. to the N.E. this can only have happened if the Romans were on the right bank. Therefore if we accept the left bank, we must reject the assertion of Livy and Polybius. On the other hand, how could the fugitives reach Canusium and Venusia if the Carthaginians were between the Roman army and those towns, as they would be on the supposition that the battle occurred on the right bank? Of course if we accept the right bank, the position of the camps (p. 115) must be readjusted. [For a discussion of these points Mr. Arnold's book (pp. 373-399) may be consulted. Mr. Strachan-Davidson has some strong arguments in favour of the right bank of the Aufidus in his *Selections from Polybius*, Prolegomena IV.; see the maps at the end of his volume.]

## CHAPTER VII.

### FROM CANNAE TO THE FALL OF CAPUA.

§ 1. Rome after Cannae.—§ 2. Changed Character of the War.—§ 3. Revolt of Capua. § 4. The Campaign of 215 B.C.—§ 5. The Campaigns of 214 and 213 B.C.—§ 6. The War in Sicily.—§ 7. The Siege of Syracuse.—§ 8. Capture of Syracuse and Pacification of Sicily.—§ 9. The War in Spain.—§ 10. The Campaign of 212 B.C. and Revolt of Tarentum.—§ 11. The Fall of Capua.

§ 1. ANY state but Rome would have abandoned the struggle after so frightful a defeat, and even at <sup>Rome after Cannae.</sup> Rome for a short time there was panic. One of the consuls had perished, and many of the other magistrates were either dead or absent from the city. The senate was reduced to a mere handful; for not only had a fourth of its entire number perished at Cannae, but a great number were away with the armies in Sicily and Spain. The loss of men and treasure was also beginning to be severely felt; how severely we may imagine when we recollect that the successive disasters of the Trebia, Trasimenus, and Cannae must have swept off at the lowest estimate 50,000 citizens, an appalling proportion of the total number on the census lists. But not only were all these homes left vacant or ruined, but the domain land, the public pasture grounds, and the mines of Southern Italy were in the hands of the enemy; and as long as this remained the case there must be a grievous diminution in the revenues on which the government chiefly depended. After the first shock, however, hope revived: there was no fear of the revolt of the cities of Latium or of the many colonies and fortresses wherewith Italy was studded. Fabius the "Laggard," to whom all men instinctively turned for

advice, speedily restored order in the city. He ordered the walls to be manned, and bade the women keep within doors and there await news of the fate that had befallen their husbands and sons. M. Claudius Marcellus, who was at Ostia and about to sail to Sicily, was ordered to proceed with his legions to Apulia. M. Junius Pera, who was created dictator, enrolled four new legions, in which even youths under sixteen were included, and 8,000 slaves were bought from their masters and equipped for service in the field. Another force was formed out of 6,000 criminals and debtors. To show their contempt for men who preferred captivity to death, the senate refused to ransom any of the prisoners whom Hannibal had taken, and sent all the other survivors into dishonourable service in Sicily.

§ 2. The character of the war now undergoes a change :

<sup>Character of the</sup> the onward sweep of Hannibal's career, which  
<sup>War after</sup> <sup>Cannae.</sup> lends such interest to his first three campaigns,

terminates with this, his greatest victory. The war becomes a record of sieges and marches and counter-marches, in which Hannibal's genius, though in reality as great as ever, shows to less brilliant effect. The Romans, indeed, gave him little opportunity of dealing any further crushing blows : they reverted to the tactics of Fabius, who had first taught them how to withstand their terrible antagonist, and resolved for the future never to stake everything on a pitched battle, but to rely chiefly on the network of fortresses which they had spread over Italy. Keeping thus on the defensive at home, they were able to pass to the offensive abroad, and finally to compel the withdrawal of Hannibal from Italy for the defence of his native land. Such a policy was the last for which Hannibal could have wished. It was only by brilliant victories that he could hope to win to his side the subjects of Rome in Italy : he must show himself able to defend them if they dared to renounce their allegiance, and it was to prove this that he had thrice welcomed the hazard of a pitched battle. His sole hope of ultimate success lay in the dissolution of the Roman confederacy ; for his own forces were too few to capture Rome, no matter how often they might defeat her armies. He was perfectly aware that he had neither

the materials nor the numbers requisite for a regular siege, and it was this knowledge that caused him to smile at Maharbal's impetuosity, when that dashing cavalry officer offered, just after the victory of Cannae, to plant the Carthaginian flag on the Capitol in five days, if he were permitted to advance at once. Later historians wondered whether such an attack would have proved successful, and the theme was often debated in the schools of rhetoric; but there is no doubt that Hannibal was right in declining an attack on Rome at this moment, just as he had been right in declining it after Trasimenus. Before he could do anything, he must win over the peoples of Southern Italy; he must get further help from Carthage; and he must secure the alliance of all those foreign powers which looked with apprehension on the growing power of Rome. At the moment of his triumph it seemed as though the Italians were about to realise his hopes. He was joined by many Apulian cities—notably Arpi (*Arpa*), Salapia (*Salpi*), and Herdonia (*Orthona*); by the Lucanians and Bruttians; and by those inveterate enemies of the Roman power, the Samnite cantons of the Hirpini and Caudini. But the strength of the Samnites was no longer what it had been; and, like all Southern Italy, they were dominated by Roman colonies. Beneventum and Aesernia, Luceria and Venusia, and their fellows—these were the pillars of Roman rule. Unable to revolt—for they knew what fate was in store for them if they should be taken by the native peoples upon whose lands they were settled—and too strong to be captured against their will, they formed a perpetual hindrance to Hannibal's plans. The Greek cities on the coast also for a time remained loyal to Rome; for they saw that their old enemies, the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites, had joined the Carthaginians. There was, however, in most of them a strong party which detested Rome, and this fact generally secured their surrender when Hannibal appeared before their walls with an army.

§ 3. Immediately after Cannae Hannibal sent his brother Mago with the news to Carthage. It was received with enthusiasm. Hanno was as antagonistic as ever, but his voice was drowned in the universal rejoicing. But though

the Carthaginians welcomed Hannibal's success, they did not make any great sacrifice to help him to complete the victory; and all that the government did was to vote that 4,000 Numidians, 40 elephants, and a sum of money should be sent to him—an amount of assistance that was absurdly inadequate to the necessities of the case. However, at this Revolt of Capua, point a piece of the greatest good fortune befell

216 B.C.

Hannibal. He marched from Cannae across

Samnium, and when he reached Campania he was admitted into Capua. Parties in Capua were much divided as to the wisdom of this policy. The mass of the population was in favour of joining the Carthaginians; but the aristocratic party, the knights, were as a rule devoted to the Romans, with whom they had made frequent intermarriages, and who had not only granted them an income from the Campanian domain lands, but even bestowed upon them the much-coveted honour of the full franchise. Moreover, at this time 300 of them were serving with the Roman armies in Sicily, and all these would be liable to be seized as hostages for the loyalty of their fellow-countrymen. One of the Capuan senators, however, Pacuvius Calavius, was a staunch partisan of Hannibal; and, supported by the populace, he extorted from his compeers a sullen assent to his policy. Soon after his entry into Capua, Hannibal addressed the senate: he promised that no Capuan should be set under the command of any Carthaginian officer, and that their town should retain its own laws and government. He declared that, if they were true to him, he would speedily make Capua the first city in Italy. To a man in Hannibal's position no resistance could be offered; and at his request Decius Magius, his chief opponent in the city, was delivered up to him. His attempts on the other towns of Campania were not attended with marked success. The walls of Neapolis proved too strong for him, though he greatly coveted the place for a seaport, to secure his communications with Carthage. At Nola there was a considerable party desirous of giving up the town to him; but the senate, strongly Roman as usual, sent for Marcellus in all haste from Casilinum, where he was encamped; and that general, on reaching Nola, executed seventy of the Carthaginian party,

and confiscated their property. Foiled here, Hannibal turned to Nuceria (*Nocera*), which he succeeded in taking. Soon afterwards he stormed and plundered Aceriae (*Acerra*). Then he set about the siege of Casilinum, a strong post situated on the Vulturnus, a few miles to the west of Capua, and garrisoned by 500 men from Praeneste and 450 Etruscans of Perusia. Failing to storm the place, he left a force to blockade it, while he himself went into winter quarters at Capua. Though the garrison soon felt the extremities of famine, even devouring the leather of their shields to satisfy their hunger, they held out bravely for several months, and only capitulated on honourable terms. To show that it appreciated the services of these brave allies, the Roman senate granted them double pay, and even offered them the franchise. Hannibal spent the winter at Capua. Roman historians were fond of asserting that his soldiers were so corrupted by the luxury of that wealthy city as never again to be capable of the toils they had once endured. Capua, they said, proved to be Hannibal's Cannae. The assertion is assuredly not substantiated by the further history of the war, for the Carthaginians continued as invincible as ever.

§ 4. At Rome the winter was spent in preparations for the ensuing campaign. It was first of all necessary to increase the senate to its usual number of 300, but there was some difficulty in finding a suitable person for this onerous task. Finally, notwithstanding that there was one dictator in the field already, it was determined that a second should be nominated for the sole purpose of filling up the vacancies. Varro accordingly came to Rome for a few days, named M. Fabius Buteo dictator, and then went back to his army. Buteo had no fewer than 177 places to fill; he selected first all those who had filled a curule office, then ex-plebeian aediles, ex-tribunes of the plebs, and ex-quaestors; and, finally, such as had gained distinction by their personal bravery in the war. The election for consuls was won by Tib. Sempronius Gracchus and L. Postumius Albinus; but the latter was cut off with his whole army in Gallia Cisalpina before he could enter upon his office. Everywhere matters went badly with

the Romans. Petelia\* and Cosentia, the only towns in Bruttium which had refused entrance to the Carthaginians, were lost; Crotona was stormed by the Bruttians; Locri capitulated. In Sicily and Sardinia the Roman generals were sorely in need of supplies, but could get no help from the capital; only from Spain (§ 9) did there come a ray of hope. It seemed as though Hannibal's triumph was merely a question of time.

The chief scene of the war in Italy during the year 215 B.C. was Campania, whither the Romans sent

The Fourth Campaign,  
215 B.C.

three armies of two legions each, or something

like 60,000 men, under the command of Fabius Cunctator, Tib. Sempronius Gracchus (these two being consuls for the year), and M. Claudius Marcellus. The war in Apulia was entrusted to the praetor M. Valerius Laevinus, who had at his orders a squadron of twenty-five ships, with which to protect the coast and also to observe the movements of Philip of Macedonia. All through the year the Romans pursued cautious tactics, making it their chief object to protect such of the Campanian towns as were still faithful to their allegiance. In this they were generally successful, for they protected Nola against a second attack of the Carthaginians, and raided the lands of the Samnites with merciless severity. Hannibal and his allies met with two reverses of some importance. It was the custom of the Campanian towns to celebrate a festival in common at Hamae, not far from Cumae, and the Capuans, taking advantage of this fact, invited the senators of Cumae to join with them in discussing the best procedure for the Campanian towns to adopt. The Cumaeans believed, or at least asserted, that they were threatened with a treacherous seizure, and invited the consul Sempronius, who was encamped at Liternum, to hasten up with a force and cut off the Capuans. On the night of the festival, Sempronius fell on the Capuans, and slew 2,000 of them, among these being the Medix Tutilius, their highest magistrate. On learning the disaster Hannibal marched against Sempronius, in the hope that he might take him

\* Petelia, in spite of its insignificance, offered a desperate resistance to Himilco, which is glanced at in Vergil's description "parva subiecta Petelia muto" (Aeneid III. 102), "little Petelia buttressed by its wall."

unawares ; but the consul prudently took refuge behind the walls of Cumae, where he was in perfect safety. The other reverse occurred at Grumentum in Lucania, where Hanno was defeated by Tib. Sempronius Longus, an officer of the praetor M. Valerius Laevinus.

The only event of the year which promised to turn out favourably to Hannibal was a treaty of alliance <sup>Alliance of</sup> <sub>Hannibal with</sub> which he made with Macedonia. Philip, the Macedonian king, viewed the recent progress of the Romans in Illyria with natural jealousy, which was sedulously encouraged by the exiled Demetrius of Pharos. Already in the previous year, when news of Trasimenus reached him, he had precipitately ended his war with the Aetolian league, and turned his army against the Romans in Apollonia, and now the victory of Cannae and the revolt of Capua encouraged him to conclude a formal treaty with Hannibal ; he promised to give the Carthaginians active assistance in Italy, while they were to cross the Adriatic when the Romans were subdued, and impose the yoke of Macedonia upon all Greece. As soon as the senate heard of this alliance, which it did through capturing the Carthaginian envoys at sea, it strengthened the forces of the praetor Laevinus in Apulia. It had no great reason for alarm, for Philip was so bent on selfishly aggrandising himself in Greece that it was never found needful to detach any large force for service beyond the Adriatic.

§ 5. The favourable turn which the war had assumed in <sup>The Fifth</sup> <sub>215 b.c.</sub> encouraged the senate to still greater exertions for the following campaign. At the <sup>Consular election</sup> <sub>214 b.c.</sub> consular elections Fabius Cunctator, the presiding magistrate, showed the same determination to have his own way which he had evinced in conducting the war. The *tribus praerogativa*, which chanced to be the *Aniensis iuniorum*, voted for M. Aemilius Regulus and T. Otacilius Crassus, neither of them men of remarkable ability. Fabius declared that Aemilius was incapacitated for command by the fact that he was a flamen of Quirinus ; while Crassus, though his relation by marriage, had shown so little energy during his praetorship in Sicily as to be quite unfit for troubled times like the present. He there-

fore bade the tribe choose other men, and finally Fabius himself and M. Claudius Marcellus were unanimously elected. For the campaign, 18 legions, or 180,000 men, were enrolled, and even this enormous force, comprising one fourth of the whole fighting population of Italy, did not include the troops already in Spain. Four of these legions were led by the consuls into Campania, four more were stationed in Apulia, one was employed near Brundusium to check any hostile proceedings of the Macedonians, two served as a garrison to Rome, and the rest were distributed between Sicily, Sardinia, and Gaul. To keep all these forces in the field entailed a heavy charge on the exchequer, already depleted by the expenses of four campaigns; but all classes of citizens cheerfully undertook their share of the burden: the wealthy supplied rowers for the navy; the horsemen refused pay for their services; the contractors of public works agreed to wait for the end of the war before demanding payment from the state. Various sumptuary laws were passed; among them was one proposed by the tribune Oppius to the effect that no woman should possess personal ornaments of gold of a greater weight than half an ounce, should wear robes of purple, or ride within the city in a carriage.\* As in 215 b.c., the chief interest of the campaign centred in Campania. Hannibal, as before, occupied Mt. Tifata, whence he could command Capua and Casilinum. He made some attempts to secure a seaport by the seizure of one of the Greek towns on the coast, but neither at Cumae, Neapolis, nor Puteoli did he meet with any success, although his partisans in these places had promised to rise against the government when his army appeared before the walls. When the summer was well advanced Hannibal quitted Campania and marched into the territory of Tarentum, which he hoped would open its gates to him. But here again he was disappointed: three days before his arrival the garrison had been strengthened, and its commandant, M. Livius Macatus, had carefully secured every post with troops upon whose fidelity he could rely. All that Hannibal gained by his march was a great quantity of

\* The *lex Oppia* ran: *Nequa mulier plus semunciam auri haberet, nec vestimento versicolori interetur, nec in uno vehiculo in urbe oppidove aut proprius inde mille passus nisi sacrorum publicorum causa veheretur* (Livy, XXIV. 1).

booty—corn from the lands of Metapontum and Heraclea, and horses from the territory of the Sallentini. After this he retired into winter quarters at Salapia in Apulia. While Hannibal thus suffered no defeat in person, matters went somewhat badly with his lieutenants. Casilinum, a place of great importance for the safeguarding of Campania, was in cowardly fashion surrendered by its garrison, and Hanno, who had been successful in bringing over all Bruttium except Rhegium to the Carthaginian cause, met with a disastrous reverse at Beneventum. His entire army of 17,000 men, mostly Bruttians and Lucanians, was practically annihilated by the slave legion of Sempronius Gracchus, who had promised his men their freedom if they distinguished themselves by their bravery.

During this year Philip of Macedonia commenced hostilities against Rome in earnest, by taking the coast town of Oricum and laying siege to Apollonia. To save this town Valerius Laevinus sailed across the Adriatic from Brundusium; he recaptured Oricum without much difficulty, and sent his lieutenant, Q. Naevius Crista, forward to the mouth of the Aous. The enemy's camp before Apollonia was in confusion, and Crista, approaching it without being noticed, assaulted it by night. His boldness met with the success it deserved. Philip barely escaped capture, burnt his fleet, and retreated into Macedonia. So ended for the time Hannibal's hopes of assistance from the East.

The consuls for the year 213 B.C. were Tib. Sempronius The Sixth Cam-  
pagn, 213 B.C. Gracchus, the victor of Beneventum, and Q. Fabius Maximus the younger, who was accompanied to the war by his father, Fabius Cunetator. Besides filling up the gaps in the eighteen legions already in the field, the consuls enrolled two more. With these forces the Romans maintained their ground, and won a few trifling successes; Sempronius got possession of some small places in Lucania, and recovered the Bruttian towns of Consentia and Thurii. Fabius made an assault on Arpi, which was garrisoned by 5,000 Spanish troops, and, owing to the negligence of the commandant, seized the town. These were the only events of importance in the campaign in Italy. Hannibal spent the summer in the neighbourhood

of Tarentum, hoping in vain for a movement of his partisans within ; but nothing of the sort happened, and the consuls were careful not to come to an engagement. Thus the year slipped away.

§ 6. Meanwhile events had occurred in Sicily which seemed to presage much advantage to the Carthaginians. After a prosperous reign of more than fifty years Hiero had died. Ever since the beginning of the first Punic war he had been the faithful and indefatigable ally of Rome. We have seen with what unwearied energy he had supplied the Roman forces with provisions in their first struggle with Carthage. Since then he had helped Rome on many occasions ; in 237 b.c., at a time when the seizure of Sardinia rendered him uneasy about the fate of his own dominions, he had visited Rome and distributed 200,000 modii of corn among the citizens ; after Trasimenus he had sent a fleet to Rome with a great quantity of wheat and barley, and despatched a body of 1,000 Cretan archers to serve against Hannibal's Balearic slingers ; and he had given further help in the following year. By this unwavering adhesion to the Roman alliance, Hiero was able to secure to Syracuse a long lease of peace, during which the city recovered from the anarchy of the preceding years. During his long reign no conspiracy was formed against him, for, unlike most despots, he neither exiled nor slew a single citizen. Nor were his good deeds confined to his own land ; once when Rhodes was partially destroyed by a terrible earthquake, he contributed a hundred and fifty talents to the rebuilding of the city. By kindnesses such as this, by his patronage of art and literature, Hiero won a name second to none throughout the Greek world, and it was amid universal regret that he died at the great age of ninety-four (early in 215 b.c.). His son Gelo had predeceased him, and he was now succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus, a boy of fifteen. Andranodorus, one of the guardians of the young prince and his uncle by marriage, brought about the removal of the council of regency, which Hiero had appointed with the especial purpose of continuing his own policy towards Rome, and induced Hieronymus to open

The War in Sicily, 214-210 b.c.

communications with Hannibal. Hieronymus' demand that the whole island should be ceded to him upon the expulsion of the Romans was readily granted by the Carthaginians, who knew how useful the resources of Syracuse and its powerful navy would prove if ranged upon their side. Appius Claudius, the praetor in Sicily, warned the prince not to draw upon himself the enmity of Rome; but he had no force wherewith to coerce him, and had therefore to look towards other means of maintaining Roman influence. He was assisted by the foolish arrogance of Hieronymus himself, who made many enemies among the better class of citizens by his parade of royal insignia and his display of armed mercenaries in his train. This faction, consisting largely of wealthy merchants whose sympathies lay entirely with the Roman oligarchical system of government, formed many plots against Hieronymus, and in 214 B.C. secured his assassination as he was passing through Leontini. Andranodorus, who was compelled to give up Syracuse, acquiesced in the establishment of a republic, and was himself made one of the chief magistrates; but his connection with the royal family proved his ruin, and he perished in a massacre, along with the whole line of Hiero's descendants. The populace, which had a strong leaning towards Carthage, was roused to action by this atrocity, and to replace the murdered magistrates elected Hippocrates and Epicydes, both of whom had for some time past been busily engaged in furthering the designs of Hannibal upon Syracuse. Hippocrates, as soon as he was entrusted with a military force, attacked a frontier post of the Romans; but the rest of the magistrates disclaimed any connivance in this aggression, and sent a force of 8,000 men to assist M. Claudius Marcellus, the Roman praetor for 214 B.C., who at once marched against Hippocrates. Marcellus easily mastered Leontini, but his victory was marked by such wanton bloodshed that the Syracusan troops sent against Hippocrates made common cause with him, and under his leadership marched back on the capital with the intention of overthrowing the government. A scene of terrible anarchy ensued, the upshot of which was that the populace joined the army in expelling or murdering the

Romanising leaders, and in handing over the city to Hippocrates and Epicydes.

§ 7. At this time Syracuse comprised a number of quarters, each with its own walls and fortifications. The southernmost of these was Ortygia, situated on a small island, and therefore peculiarly suitable for a stronghold. It had first of all been a Phoenician trading centre, after which it was occupied by Greek colonists from Corinth; now it had been cleared of all the dwelling-houses upon it, and was a strongly walled fortress, containing the magazine and treasury of the city, and garrisoned by a large body of mercenaries. North of Ortygia, and next to it in antiquity, lay Achradina; while beyond this, and extending over the triangular plateau to the west, were the more recent suburbs of Neapolis, Tyche, and Epipolae, these together forming the third main division of the city. As soon as Marcellus heard of the revolution in Syracuse, he at once marched upon it, hoping to take it with the assistance of the fleet under Appius Claudius. Syracuse, however, had been provided with every variety of machines for its defence by King Hiero, who had employed for this purpose the genius of Archimedes, the greatest mathematician the world had yet seen. Archimedes prided himself most on his theoretical discoveries, and would no doubt have been content with these results alone for his labours; but Hiero was anxious to see them turned to practical account, and induced the philosopher to construct a multitude of catapults and other engines of war of unexampled magnitude and power. When the Roman ships approached the fortifications of Achradina they were received with a storm of missiles, including enormous masses of rock and lead; some of the more daring, which ventured too close to the walls, were lifted out of the water by iron hooks attached to cranes, then suddenly released and sunk by the waves. The alarm among the Romans soon became so great that, as Plutarch relates, the mere appearance of a beam or rope upon the walls was sufficient to cause them to retire with the cry, "Another machine!" When Marcellus saw that his own incompetent engineers were no match for the genius

Siege of  
Syracuse,  
214—212 B.C.

of Archimedes, he put two-thirds of his army under the pro praetor Appius Claudius, and converted the siege into a blockade. With the rest of his forces he marched against and reduced some places, among them Herbesus and Megara Hyblaea, which had gone over to the Carthaginian side. By this time the Carthaginian government, acting on Hannibal's advice, had determined to profit by the disturbed condition of Sicily, and sent no fewer than 25,000 foot and 3,000 horse into the island. Their general, Himilco, landed at Heraclea Minoa, and encamped at Agrigentum, which, despite its storm in the first Punic war, was still of importance from a military point of view. The arrival of these forces rendered the Carthaginian party in Syracuse so confident that Hippocrates left the city with 10,000 foot with a view to joining Himilco. Though defeated by Marcellus at Acrillæ, a place on the road from Acræ to Gela, he effected his purpose, and the two generals encamped on the Anapus, just outside Syracuse. Soon afterwards they were joined by a fleet of fifty-five vessels from Carthage. The position of Marcellus was thus rendered very precarious, and his anxiety was increased by revolts in the subject towns. The commandant of Enna, a strong place in the centre of the island, suspecting that there too treachery was at work, summoned the townspeople into the theatre, on pretext of reading a proclamation, and massacred them indiscriminately. The result was that the disaffection towards the Romans spread throughout the island.

§ 8. By this time Marcellus had given up all hope of reducing Syracuse by blockade, but he still lingered in its neighbourhood, hoping that the Romanising faction might be able to admit him within the walls. He guaranteed that, if they did so, Syracuse should retain its own laws and government, that, in fact, it should be on exactly the same footing as it had been in the time of Hiero. Epicydes became aware of the conspiracy, and put to death eighty of those implicated in it. Thus for the present nothing more was to be hoped for from that quarter. Marcellus, however, did not despair: he had observed that the fortifications on the northern side of the city were lower

and weaker than elsewhere. He ordered scaling ladders to be prepared, and when the great three days' festival of Artemis had arrived, and the whole city was given up to revelry, easily mastered a part of the wall. The guards were too drunken to offer any resistance, and the Romans were soon in possession of Epipolae. The suburbs of Tyche and Neapolis were next gained, but though Marcellus had won an important advantage, he was still far from the realisation of his ends: for not only were Achradina and the well-nigh impregnable Ortygia in the hands of the enemy, but he had also to reckon with the forces under Hippocrates and Himilco entrenched just outside the gates. As often in the history of Syracuse, a terrible pestilence broke out in the army encamped among the marshes, and while Marcellus' forces were protected against the burning sun by the houses of Tyche and Neapolis, the Carthaginians died off by thousands, and both their generals perished. Up to this point Epicydes had conducted the defence with unflinching bravery; but now he saw that his case was hopeless unless he could procure help from another quarter. At this time Bomilcar, who had just been sent to Sicily by the Carthaginian government, was at Agrigentum with a large fleet. Thither Epicydes repaired; but Bomilcar, in place of relieving Syracuse, as his instructions directed, sailed away to Tarentum. After this strange conduct of the admiral, Epicydes made no attempt to hold Syracuse longer, but remained at Agrigentum. Thus deprived of their only capable leader, the Syracusans indulged in a series of bloody feuds, in which the Romanising faction, after temporarily getting the better of the mercenaries, was almost exterminated. Achradina, garrisoned by Roman deserters, who had no hope of mercy if they should fall into Marcellus' hands, held out as desperately as ever, but in Ortygia there was a Spanish officer, Mericus by name, who agreed to admit the Romans in return for a safe conduct for himself and his soldiers. Ortygia thus fell, and soon afterwards Achradina was taken: after a siege of more than two years the Romans were masters of the city. It might have been expected that Syracuse, which had for more than fifty years under the rule of Hiero rendered such valuable services

to the Roman cause, would have escaped the worst horrors of a storm, but Marcellus either could not or would not restrain the fury of his soldiers. The city, which for centuries had been a centre of Hellenic civilisation in the west, was a scene of bloodshed and pillage. Among those murdered was Archimedes: according to one version of his death, he was engaged over a mathematical problem when a soldier discovered and slew him. Marcellus was sincerely grieved at his death, and erected over his tomb a monument commemorating one of his greatest discoveries—the relation which a cylinder bears to the inscribed sphere. The booty of Syracuse was of enormous worth: not merely was private property carried off, but all the statues and pictures in the city were deported to Rome, where they served to give the barbarian conqueror his first appreciation of Greek art.

The war in Sicily dragged on for two years after the <sup>Pacification of</sup> downfall of Syracuse. The two commanders in Sicily, Agrigentum, Hanno and Epicydes, were joined by Mutines, a daring cavalry officer, whose untiring energy gave the Romans no peace. In 211 B.C. Marcellus gained an important success over Hanno and Epicydes at the river Himera; but this was his last exploit in Sicily, and when he returned to Rome in the same year the conquest of the island was far from complete. Indeed it appears that the Carthaginians, using Agrigentum as their centre of operations, were able to bring over to their side almost all the towns of the interior. But a bitter feud between Hanno and Mutines ruined all prospect of ultimate success: Hanno transferred the command of the horse from Mutines to his own son, and Mutines, angered beyond endurance at the undeserved insult, and encouraged by the support of his troops, turned traitor, and admitted the Romans into Agrigentum, 210 B.C. This ended the struggle: Hanno and Epicydes fled back to Africa, and all the revolted towns returned to their allegiance; forty places surrendered of their own accord, twenty more were betrayed, and only six needed to be coerced into submission. After this the island became once more a peaceful province, whose destiny it was to provide corn for its masters, and submit patiently to all those evils which were the common lot of every province—

the extortions of the governors, tax-collectors, and usurers of victorious Rome. Its old glory was gone, and many centuries were to elapse before it had again a history of its own.

§ 9. The year 212 B.C. was thus marked by a signal and most important gain in Sicily; elsewhere it brought serious disaster upon the Roman arms.

<sup>The War in Spain, 218—</sup> Both in Italy and in Spain the tide was with the Carthaginians. It will be remembered that P. Cornelius Scipio, after failing to intercept Hannibal near the Rhone, sent forward his army under his brother Gnaeus Scipio into Spain, 218 B.C. Making the country between the Pyrenees and the Ebro the scene of his operations, he soon won over to Rome the tribes of this region, who had only just been conquered by Hannibal and bore the Carthaginian yoke with impatience. After defeating Hanno and the 10,000 troops left behind by Hannibal, Scipio made Tarraco (*Tarrugona*) his headquarters, and here in 217 B.C., after he had defeated a Carthaginian fleet at the mouth of the Ebro with a loss of twenty-five ships, he was joined by his brother Publius, the consul of 218 B.C., with 8,000 troops. This energetic action of the Romans (which, it must be remembered, occurred after the disastrous battle of Trasimenus) had great influence on the war, for although in 217 B.C. nothing occurred beyond a few expeditions across the Ebro, in 216 B.C., the year of Cannae, the Scipios won an important success. After routing the Tartesii in the valley of the Baetis (*Guadalquivir*), Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother and commander-in-chief in Spain, marched to the Ebro with the intention of making his way to Italy. At Ibera, a place whose position is unknown, he was met by the Scipios and utterly routed. But for this check, the Romans would have been obliged to meet two armies in Italy at the most critical period of the struggle, and with Hasdrubal devastating the north, while Hannibal held the south, they would possibly have been forced to submit. The victory was attended by a further benefit: a powerful reinforcement of 12,000 foot, which Mago had been commissioned by the Carthaginian government to lead to Italy, was thereby diverted to Spain. Emboldened by their success, the

Scipios carried on the struggle with vigour: in 215 B.C. they boldly crossed the Ebro and defeated the Carthaginians at Iliturgi near the Baetis and again at Indibili. In the first of these battles they are said to have routed an army of 60,000 men with a force barely a fourth as numerous. No doubt there is an exaggeration in this account—as there is in many other actions of the Scipios described by their panegyrists—but there is a good deal of truth concealed beneath the fiction, for we find the Scipios in the following year (214 B.C.) retaking Saguntum, and defeating Hasdrubal as far to the south as Munda. While the Roman armies were thus scouring Spain almost to the Pillars of Hercules, the Carthaginians were paralysed at home by the insurrection of Syphax, a Numidian chieftain: so threatening was the situation that both Hasdrubal and Mago were recalled to Africa to crush this new enemy. The Scipios saw how useful an ally Syphax might prove to the Romans, and sent officers to organise his forces. In Spain they hired mercenaries on a large scale, a policy novel to Roman generals, and showed themselves so active in winning over the native tribes that the Carthaginians seemed to be in danger of losing Spain completely. But at last Syphax was defeated and driven into exile, and now Hasdrubal and Mago were free to unite in attacking the Scipios. They recrossed from Africa with all their forces, and in the campaign of 212 B.C. cut off the armies of P. and Cn. Scipio in detail. Both the brothers died at the head of their troops, and only a mere fraction of their army was saved by a brave knight, L. Marcius. By this victory the Romans were driven back to the Pyrenees, Carthaginian influence was fully re-established in Spain, and it seemed as though the often discussed project of sending reinforcements thence to Hannibal was about to attain realisation.

§ 10. The consuls for 212 B.C. were Q. Fulvius Flaccus

The Seventh Campaign, 212 B.C. and Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had recently been in command in Sicily. Great exertions

were made to keep the army a match for Hannibal; the gaps in the existing twenty-one legions were filled up, and two additional legions enrolled. Yet, though the Romans put this enormous force in the field, the year

proved to be one of the most disastrous in the war. One of the first events was the loss of Tarentum, in importance the third city of Italy. This disaster was due to an act which can only be described as one of useless cruelty. Some Tarentine hostages who were in custody in the Temple of Liberty tried to escape from Rome: they got as far as Tarracina, but were then brought back and killed by being thrown from the Tarpeian Rock. The young Tarentines took a general oath to be revenged on Rome, and opened negotiations with Hannibal, who, as in the preceding year, was encamped some three days' march from the city. They slew the guards at two of the gates, and let in Hannibal's troops, who were waiting in the neighbourhood, as had been arranged. The governor, M. Livius Macatus, was so overpowered by a midnight debauch as to be incapable of taking action in the emergency. However, he contrived to make his way to the citadel, where he defied all Hannibal's attempts to dislodge him. The example of Tarentum was followed by Metapontum, Thurii, and Heraclea, so that Rhegium was the only city on the southern coast that remained faithful to the Romans. But Hannibal still found it impossible to gain a permanent footing in the cities round Capua—Nola, Neapolis, Cumae, Puteoli, Casilinum were true as ever to the Roman cause—and Capua itself was every day being hemmed in more and more closely by the legions. The Romans, in fact, whose armies had hovered about the rebel city in the two last campaigns, were resolved to make the punishment of Capua the first object of the war, and to take such vengeance as should effectually keep the other cities of Italy to their allegiance. The Capuans became straitened for provisions: they appealed for help to Hannibal, who entrusted Hanno with the task of collecting supplies in the territory of Beneventum. He had brought together in his camp an enormous quantity of wheat, and all that now remained was for the Capuans to despatch waggons and a sufficient guard to escort it to the besieged city. They executed their part of the task so remissly that Hanno had to compel them to provide further means of transport. While these preparations were going on, the colonists of Beneventum

informed the consuls that the Punic camp was in the greatest disorder from the accumulation of provisions and was only guarded by a weak force. Fulvius profited by the news to assail it: his enterprise was completely successful; he slew 6,000 of the enemy and captured all the results of their foraging labours. This blow made it necessary for Hannibal to appear in person to relieve the blockade; the consuls retired as soon as they heard of his approach, and for the time Capua was saved. Hastening south again, Hannibal marched against the other armies that Rome had put in the field: in Lucania he cut to pieces a body of 15,000 volunteers and Italians under the command of Centenius, and then turned against the praetor Cn. Fulvius, who was at the head of 18,000 troops in Apulia. He came up with the Romans in the neighbourhood of Herdomea, broke through their line without difficulty when they offered battle, and cut down the fugitives so mercilessly that of the whole army only 2,000 escaped. Cn. Fulvius was subsequently brought to trial at Rome, and, despite the support of his brother the consul, driven into banishment to Tarquinii.

Meantime the two consuls had again united their forces before Capua, where they were joined by a third detachment under C. Claudius Nero. The combined armies gathered round the doomed city, and beleaguered it with a double line of works, to keep off the attacks of the Capuans and Hannibal respectively. Between the two lines the Romans pitched their camps. Once more the Capuans appealed for succour: Hannibal promised that he would appear at the fit season, but for the present lingered round Tarentum in the hope of seizing the citadel. An attempt on Brundusium was without result.

§ 11. In the spring of 211 B.C. the Capuans felt that <sup>Fall of Capua.</sup> they could hold out no longer. On learning <sup>211 B.C.</sup> their danger, Hannibal marched again into Campania, hoping that the legions would scatter at his approach, as they had done in the preceding year. But by this time they were secure behind their entrenchments, and though Hannibal pitched his camp hard by on Mount Tifata, they stirred not. An attempt of the Carthaginians

to break through the double lines was a failure : a Spanish cohort did indeed force its way into the Roman camp, but it was ultimately driven back by the desperate exertions of the defenders, and an effort of the Capuans from within the city was easily repulsed. Thus foiled, Hannibal could only draw off his troops towards Rome on the chance that some at least of the besieging forces would follow and be tempted to an engagement. Even should nothing else come of his design, such partial withdrawal of the Romans would relieve the pressure upon the Capuans and perhaps make it possible for them to break through the weakened lines. Hannibal broke up his camp at night, and, crossing the Vulture, proceeded leisurely along the Latin way ; finally, he pitched his camp on the Anio, three miles from Rome. News of his approach had already reached the capital, and despite the general panic every precaution was taken which the circumstances admitted of : two newly levied legions were entrusted with the defence, and an urgent message for assistance was sent to the forces before Capua. Though the situation was so threatening, only one of the three armies was withdrawn from the siege. With this, numbering 16,000 men, the proconsul Q. Fulvius Flaccus hastened along the Appian road and arrived before the Porta Capena almost as soon as the Carthaginians. Hannibal stayed before Rome for some days, but it was out of the question to assault those massive walls, and after ravaging the neighbouring country in the hope of tempting Fulvius to an engagement, he turned away into the Sabine land. Thence he marched through the Marsi and Paeligni, and so swept back into Campania. Capua was more closely invested than ever, but Hannibal was powerless to help it ; he therefore passed on into Bruttium, where he allowed his soldiers to rest after their great exertions. An attack on Rhegium proved a failure.

Soon afterwards Capua surrendered. The leaders of the revolt, some thirty in all, had already put themselves beyond human vengeance. The remaining senators, less deeply implicated, hoped to obtain pardon from Rome. They were disappointed : twenty-eight were sent in bonds to Teanum, and there executed ; the same fate befell twenty-

five more in Cales. It is said that the senate sent orders for them to be respited and tried individually at Rome, but Q. Fulvius was resolved to sate his lust for blood, and only opened the despatch after the execution. Atella and Calatia, which had also revolted, experienced the same harshness as Capua. Three hundred of the chief citizens of these three towns were thrown into prison at Rome to die of starvation, while the common people were either sold into slavery or distributed among the Latin colonies. The whole territory of Capua was confiscated to the Roman State; the city was deprived of its autonomy and put under the control of a prefect (*praefectus iuri dicundo*) from Rome. Such was the fall of Capua, nor did it ever recover from its overthrow.

Since his undignified retreat from Apollonia in 215 B.C.,

<sup>Macedonia.</sup> Philip of Macedonia had been too much occupied  
<sup>211 B.C.</sup> by quarrels with his Thracian and Illyrian neighbours to concern himself with the advance of Rome. The propraetor M. Valerius Laevinus, whose duty it was to guard the interests of his country beyond the Adriatic, profited by this inactivity of Philip to conclude a treaty with the Aetolian League against Macedonia. The Aetolians were to make war on Philip by land, and as their reward were to receive the territory of Acarnania and South-Western Epirus; the Romans engaged to support them with a fleet of twenty-five vessels. To show that he was a man of his word, Laevinus, as soon as the treaty was concluded, conquered Zaczynthus and wrested Oeniadae and Nasus from the Acarnanians: these were at once handed over to the Aetolians, as an incentive to active co-operation on their part.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### END OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

§ 1. The Ninth Campaign, 210 B.C.—§ 2. The Tenth Campaign, 209 B.C.—§ 3. The Eleventh Campaign, and Death of Marcellus.—§ 4. Scipio in Spain ; March of Hasdrubal for Italy.—§ 5. The Battle of the Metaurus.—§ 6. The Carthaginians lose Spain.—§ 7. Scipio Consul.—§ 8. The First Macedonian War.—§ 9. Capture of Locri.—§ 10. Scipio in Africa.—§ 11. Zama.—§ 12. Results of the War.

§ 1. THE loss of Capua was the greatest blow that had yet befallen Hannibal. It was useless now for him to hope that smaller towns would join him, or that there would occur any serious revolt from Rome. Yet, though driven out of Campania, he was still master of Southern Italy, and still more than a match for any general and army that could be sent against him. At the election of consuls for 210 B.C., the choice of the *centuria praerogativa*, which was the *Veturia iuniorum*, had fallen upon T. Manlius Torquatus and T. Otacilius ; but Torquatus declined the office on the ground of weakness of sight, and it was finally agreed to select M. Claudius Marcellus and M. Valerius Laevinus, of whom the latter had won favour through his successful efforts against Macedonia. The first event of the campaign in Italy, where Marcellus had the supreme command, was the surrender of Salapia to the Romans. This place, one of the strongest in Apulia, had gone over to the Carthaginians after the battle of Cannae, and was garrisoned by 500 Numidian horse. The Romanising party in Salapia was encouraged by the fall of Capua to open the gates to a detachment of Marcellus' army. The Numidians offered a desperate resistance, and were cut

down almost to the last man. Marcellus followed up this success by taking some unimportant towns in Samnium; while Hannibal made an expedition into Bruttium, apparently with a view to surprise Rhegium. He was still in this district when news reached him that the Romanising party in Herdonea, one of the few remaining Apulian places in his possession, were busily intriguing with Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, who had the command in Apulia. Hannibal hastened by forced marches to Herdonea, and in a pitched battle almost annihilated the two legions of Centumalus. The proconsul himself, eleven military tribunes, and 13,000 of the rank and file perished. The defeat was almost as decisive as that won ten years before—also against a Fulvius. In spite of this brilliant victory Hannibal could not maintain his ground in Herdonea; and to prevent the place being handed over to the Romans, he set it in flames, and transported the population to Metapontum and Thurii. Towards the end of the year Hannibal fought a battle with Marcellus at Numistro, a place supposed to lie in Lucania.

§ 2. The consular elections for 209 B.C., conducted by

The Tenth Campaign, 209 B.C. Q. Fulvius Flaccus as Dictator, were won by Fabius Cunctator and Flaccus himself. Some of the tribunes complained that it was a violation of constitutional usage for one man to hold the same office twice within ten years, and also for the president of the election to secure his own return; but the senate decided that it was to the benefit of the state for men of tried worth to be elected. The legions in the field at this time amounted to nineteen, a number which was with difficulty maintained, owing to the exhaustion among all classes of people. For the first time in the war the Latins showed symptoms of disaffection. Twelve of their colonies declared that they were too impoverished to be able to supply more troops and money. The other eighteen, however, were still ready to wage the struggle to the end,\* and M. Sextilius, a citizen of Fregellae, who acted as their spokesman, declared that

\* The twelve recalcitrant colonies were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba Fucensis, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa Ocrea, Setia, Cales, Namina, and Interamnia. The eighteen were Signia, Norba, Satricum, Fregellae, Luceria, Venosa, Brundisium, Hatria, Firmum, Ariminum, Pontiae, Paestum, Cosa, Beneventum, Asculum, Spoleto, Placentia, Cremona.

they would make even greater sacrifices than were demanded from them. The reason for the refusal of the twelve colonies is unknown: probably it was sheer exhaustion, for they were mostly places of secondary importance. They lay nearer to the capital than the others, a fact which Ihne thinks might cause them to resent all the more keenly their exclusion from the franchise. In this campaign the Romans determined to concentrate their whole strength against Tarentum, just as they had done previously so successfully in the case of Capua. They had six legions in Southern Italy, two each under the command of Fabius Cunctator, Fulvius, and Marcellus, besides a miscellaneous force of 8,000 in Bruttium—something like 70,000 men in all. While Fabius Maximus was patiently waiting for an opportunity to seize Tarentum, Hannibal encountered Marcellus, and outgeneralled him so completely that he was glad to seek shelter behind the walls of Venusia. Marcellus was subsequently accused at Rome of incapacity; but the people acquitted him, and elected him to the consulship for the following year. After worsting Marcellus, Hannibal hurried into Bruttium, where he defeated and captured the 8,000 men in that district who were engaged in besieging Caulonia. He then turned back to keep Fabius in check; but when he reached Metapontum he learned that Tarentum had admitted the Romans. A Bruttian officer in the garrison had turned traitor. The victors treated the captured city with all the harshness that custom allowed: they sold 30,000 of its people into slavery, and, as at Syracuse, carried off all its famous statues and pictures to Rome. If Hannibal still had hopes of active assistance from Philip of Macedon, they must have been sadly weakened by the loss of this harbour.

§ 3. The consuls for 208 B.C. were Marcellus, for the fifth time, and T. Quintius Crispinus. The chief object of the campaign was the recovery of Loeri, the only important town now remaining to the Carthaginians. But though the Romans attacked it by sea and land, they were foiled by the matchless activity of Hannibal, who cut to pieces two legions at Petelia, while on the march from Tarentum; and the chief result of the

The Eleventh  
Campaign,  
208 B.C.

war was the death of Marcellus near Venusia. He and his fellow consul Crispinus, with an escort of a few horsemen from Etruria and Praeneste, had ridden out of their camp to reconnoitre, when they fell into an ambush of Numidian cavalry. The surprised Romans resisted desperately, and

Death of few of their number were taken prisoners.

Marcellus. Marcellus was among the slain, while Crispinus was wounded so desperately that he died soon afterwards, when on his way to Rome. For some time the Carthaginians were ignorant of the rank of the slain man; but when they found the consul's lictors among the dead, they knew with whom they had been fighting. When Hannibal saw the corpse of his most persistent antagonist, his face showed not a trace of joy, nor did a word of satisfaction escape his lips. He burnt Marcellus' body on the funeral pyre with all due ceremony, and sent back his ashes to Rome. If Marcellus was not a general of the highest class, he was at least loyal and stout-hearted, and his loss was hard to replace. It is true that he had never routed Hannibal in a pitched battle, but neither had he been routed like Varro or Flaminius; and he had done what no one else had done in history in taking Syracuse by fair siege. Taken collectively, he deserves the place which the Romans assigned him by the side of Fabius: as they said, Marcellus was the spear of Rome, just as Fabius was its shield. No further event of consequence occurred after the death of the consuls. The Romans spent the rest of the year in inactivity; while Hannibal, marching back from Apulia into Bruttium, discomfited and scattered, by his mere appearance, an army that was engaged in besieging Locri. Though Hannibal had lost ground continuously in Southern Italy during these last campaigns, there at last appeared a chance of a rising in Etruria. For the first seven years of the war that country contributed its contingents of troops and its supplies of grain without murmuring; but about 212 B.C. symptoms of discontent showed themselves, and it was found necessary to despatch a Roman army to secure its allegiance. In 208 B.C. Arretium manifested fresh signs of insubordination; but Varro, the consul of 216 B.C., quieted matters by deporting 120 hostages to Rome. For

the present Hannibal's expectation of help from this quarter died away; but there at last reached him news that his brother Hasdrubal had eluded the Romans in Spain, and was in full march for Italy. Could he only effect a junction with his brother, he might yet be able to renew the struggle on equal terms.

§ 4. Though the death of the Scipios had apparently left Spain in the hands of the Carthaginians, the senate despatched 12,000 troops, under the praetor C. Claudius Nero, in the following year to contest the prize with them. Nero had orders to effect a junction with the remnants of the Scipios' army, and to hold the passes of the Pyrenees at all cost; but he soon showed that he was no match for Hasdrubal, either as a general or a diplomatist. When further reinforcements were sent in 210 B.C., the people insisted on giving the command to P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of the dead P. Scipio, the consul of 218 B.C. The new general was only twenty-four years old, but he had already showed himself possessed of courage and resolution: at the skirmish of the Ticinus (218 B.C.) he was believed to have saved his father's life, and after Cannae he had forced from their design some young nobles who had planned to sail away from Italy and leave their country to its fate. In 212 B.C., though not yet of the legal age, he had been elected to the aedileship, and now every one turned to him as the man who had a peculiar right to conduct a Spanish war and avenge the death of his father and uncle. He early justified the choice of the citizens. Soon after landing at Emporiae (*Ampurias*), he learnt that the three Carthaginian commanders in Spain were stationed at great distances from one another, and were engaged in reducing the refractory tribes without giving much heed to the Romans. In the hope of striking a decisive blow, Scipio conceived the idea of marching 300 miles through hostile territory, and assaulting Carthago Nova. Although that town was the chief stronghold of the Carthaginians in Spain, it was occupied only by a weak garrison. It was, however, strongly situated, being protected on the south and west by the bay on which it stood, and on the north by a lagoon. Scipio discovered from

some fishermen that the ebb of the tide left so little water in the lagoon that it was possible to wade through it to the town walls, there of little strength. The Romans began operations by a furious attack on the eastern side of the town : their scaling ladders proved too short for the walls, and they were beaten off with severe loss. None the less, in the evening they returned to the assault ; and meanwhile, the tide being now on the ebb, another detachment, 500 strong, waded through the lagoon and scaled the northern wall. In the town Scipio found a great quantity of treasure and engines of war. Many of the prisoners he used for the purpose of manning his fleet, promising them that if they behaved well they should be set free at the end of the war. He also captured seventeen distinguished Carthaginians, members either of the Gerusia or the Hundred : these he sent to Rome. The Spanish hostages, whom the Carthaginians were detaining in the town, he sent back to their several tribes, so securing their loyal assistance in the war. After this great success, which forced the Carthaginians back upon Gades, Scipio returned to Tarraco, and there spent the winter. When the spring of 208 B.C. arrived, Hasdrubal Barca resolved at every cost to make his way into Italy, and to his brother Hannibal, whose only hope of continuing the struggle lay in the arrival of a powerful reinforcement. Leaving the Romans in undisputed possession of Carthago Nova, he set out on the long march which he had been meditating for eight years. He is said to have been routed by Scipio at Baecula (*Boyle*), on the Upper Baetis (*Guadalquivir*), with a loss of 20,000 men ; but his defeat, if it ever happened, must have been much exaggerated, possibly to exculpate Scipio for allowing so terrible a foe to descend on Italy. Scipio blocked up the eastern passes of the Pyrenees, supposing that Hasdrubal would march through them, as his brother had done ; but Hasdrubal made a detour by the western passes, and had arrived in Gaul before Scipio knew what had become of him. In Gaul he experienced no resistance : the powerful Arverni showed themselves favourable to his enterprise, and he crossed the Rhone without loss. In the early spring of 207 B.C. he passed the Alps and descended into the valley

of the Po. He was joined by considerable numbers of the Gauls and Ligurians, so that his forces amounted to 48,000 foot and 8,000 horse. After an attack on Placentia had miscarried, he advanced past Ariminum along the Flaminian Road in the direction of Rome.

§ 5. The Romans had long been aware of Hasdrubal's intentions, and made their preparations for this critical campaign with more than their usual care. They put twenty-three legions in the field—fifteen for the defence of Italy, four for Spain, and two each for Sicily and Sardinia—and as there was a difficulty in filling up the ranks, they even compelled the citizen colonies on the sea-coast, hitherto exempted, to furnish troops. Ostia and Antium were alone excused from this duty. The consuls for 207 B.C. were C. Claudius Nero, a great-grandson of the famous Censor, and M. Livius Salinator. Claudius Nero had lately been engaged in Spain, but Livius Salinator had taken little part in public life since he had been condemned for an unjust distribution of the booty won in the last Illyrian war. But now that Marcellus was dead, and experienced generals were scarce, he consented to his election as consul, despite the further drawback that Nero was his personal enemy. The command in Northern Italy was entrusted to Livius, while Nero was commissioned to watch Hannibal in the south, and if possible to blockade him in Bruttium. Hannibal, however, showed his old skill in tricking his antagonists: he marched to Grumentum in Lucania, where he is said, probably untruly, to have been worsted by Nero with a loss of 8,000 men; at all events, he proceeded to Venusia; thence, hearing no tidings of his brother, to Metapontum; and after this back to Canusium in Apulia, where he pitched a camp. While Hannibal was engaged in marching about Southern Italy in the face of superior numbers, Hasdrubal had reached Sema. He sent a letter to his brother asking him to meet him in Umbria; but the messengers, Gallic and Numidian horsemen, instead of finding him, fell into the hands of the Romans near Tarentum. Thus Nero was perfectly informed of Hasdrubal's movements, while Hannibal was still ignorant of them. He at once took upon

The Battle of  
the Metaurus,

207 B.C.

himself the responsibility of quitting his own province, regardless of the result, and with a picked force of 8,000 troops set out without attracting the notice of Hannibal, and joined Livius before Sena. The doubled signals in the Roman camp told Hasdrubal that both the consuls were opposed to him. The only conclusion he could draw was that his brother had been defeated; and seeing no chance of fighting with success, he prepared to retreat across the Metaurus (*Metauro*) and collect fresh forces in Gaul. His guides misled him in the darkness of the night, and when day dawned the Romans had come up with him; and he had no alternative but to prepare for battle, with troops exhausted by the night march, and an impassable river behind him. He posted his untrustworthy Gauls on some almost impregnable ground on the left: the Ligurians were in the centre, and the brave Spaniards on the right wing. The Spaniards stubbornly resisted the attack of Livius, and only gave ground when Nero, unable to make any impression on the Gauls, assailed them in flank. With their discomfiture the battle was lost; and Hasdrubal, seeing that all hope was gone, threw himself into the thickest of the fight, and so perished. The loss on both sides is variously estimated: Polybius states that the Carthaginians lost 10,000 men, while of the Romans only 2,000 perished; Livy, following some annalists who wanted to make the battle a set-off to Cannae, more than quadruples these figures. Immediately after the battle Nero marched back to Canusium, where Hannibal was still in ignorance of his absence, and ordered Hasdrubal's head to be thrown into the enemy's camp. To this brutal act, in so strong contrast to his own honourable treatment of Marcellus' body, Hannibal only replied that he recognised the doom of Carthage, and abandoning his camp, withdrew into the recesses of Bruttium. He took with him all his adherents in Metapontum and Lucania, in order that they might not fall into the hands of the Romans. In 205 B.C. he lost Loeri, and learnt that Philip had concluded peace with Rome; after which he had nothing more to lose but his ability,—that he never lost; and amongst the uplands of Bruttium he continued the struggle, invincible as ever,

until he was summoned home to defend Carthage. The news of the great victory was received at Rome with joy as unbounded as the anxiety had been, and both consuls celebrated a triumph. On the day of the procession Livius was attended by all his legions; yet though Nero was not followed by a single soldier, because the battle had not been fought in his province or under his auspices, he was greeted with the heartier welcome.

§ 6. The defeat of Hasdrubal was doubly disastrous, for it involved the loss of Spain. The year in which <sup>The</sup> Carthaginians <sub>lose Spain.</sub> he departed for Italy (208 B.C.) was marked by no events of the first importance, but the campaign as a whole went in favour of the Romans. The propraetor M. Junius Silanus defeated 9,000 Spaniards in Carthaginian pay, and took prisoner Hanno, their general; while L. Scipio, the brother of Publius, captured a place called Orongis.\* In the year 207 B.C. the two Carthaginian generals, Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, and Mago, the younger brother of Hannibal, were in command of no fewer than 70,000 foot and 4,500 horse. Against these Scipio had only 45,000 troops, but he was successful at Ilipa, on the Lower Baetis; and his victory, indecisive though it was, caused the Spaniards to desert the Carthaginian camp by whole battalions. His lieutenant, Silanus, followed the enemy in vigorous pursuit, and by the end of the year all that was left of the Carthaginian empire in Spain was Gades and a few other strongholds in Baetica. About this time Scipio began to form those plans for carrying the war into Africa which he was destined to see fulfilled a few years later. Syphax, the chieftain of the Massaesyle or Western Numidians, who had a few years before revolted from Carthage and been driven into exile, was again in possession of his kingdom. He entered into negotiations with Rome, and might perhaps have definitely gone over to them, but Masinissa, the chief of the Massyli or Eastern Numidians, and his hated rival, had also been intriguing with Rome, and this fact kept Syphax true to Carthage. Scipio was naturally anxious to secure so power-

\* Said to be the same as Aurgi (*Jaen*), south of the Baetis, and different from Aurinx or Auringis.

ful an ally; and if we believe a romantic story related by Livy, actually crossed to Africa with only the slight protection of two quinqueremes, in the hopes of winning his friendship. By a strange coincidence Hasdrubal Gisgo, the defeated Carthaginian general, was also at the court of Syphax; but Scipio obtained his object, thanks to the deep impression his brilliant personal qualities made on the Numidian. In the year 206 B.C. the Romans won further successes in Spain: they captured Illiturgi, on the Baetis, and put its entire population to the sword, for an act of treachery committed some years before. Castulo surrendered without a blow. The people of Astapa, however, refused to surrender their town; and after casting all their treasures into the flames and killing their women and children, rushed against the enemy's lines and fell to the last man. Shortly after this Scipio was taken dangerously ill, and for a moment it seemed as though his work might be undone. Not only did the Spaniards show symptoms of disaffection, but a body of 8,000 troops stationed in camp on the river Suero (*Jucar*) broke out into mutiny, and began to raid the surrounding country. Scipio, however, contrived to entice them to New Carthage; his popularity was sufficient to bring them to reason, and with the execution of the ringleaders the danger passed away. Scipio was next obliged to undertake a campaign against the Ilergetes and Lacetani, two tribes dwelling between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. He compelled their chiefs, Mandonius and Indibilis, to pay an indemnity, and then turned against Gades, the last Punic stronghold in the land. He had no need to use force, for Mago had already received orders from the home government to abandon the town and to proceed to Italy, to raise troops for his brother among the Ligurians and Gauls. He took away with him all the public treasure in the town, and even pillaged the great temple of Hercules, so that it might not become the spoil of the Romans. When he sailed away to the Balearic Isles, Gades opened its gates to the foreigner. As one of the *civitates foederatae*, it long flourished under Roman rule.

§ 7. In the autumn of 206 B.C., when the conquest of Spain was practically complete, Scipio returned to Rome

with the determination of attacking Carthage at home. Scipio Consul, The people welcomed their hero with the utmost 205 B.C. enthusiasm, and unanimously elected him to the consulship. The senate was by no means so partial to him: in the first place, it felt that it was inconsistent with the rule of an oligarchy for one of their number to win, as Scipio had done, an almost regal position; and, secondly, Fabius Cunctator, and the party which he headed, protested against any change in the method of carrying on the war. They pointed out that, with the exception of Bruttium, the whole of Italy had been recovered; Sicily was peaceful; there was no enemy in Spain. Without any exertion of the Romans, Hannibal's strength was steadily wasting away, and he would soon be reduced to impotence: whereas an expedition to Africa might prove as unfortunate as the last enterprise of that nature—namely, that undertaken by Regulus. Scipio was not to be turned from his purpose; and backed by the people and by the younger and more adventurous among the senators, he obtained Sicily as his province, with a grudging permission to carry the war into Africa, if that course should seem advisable. For such a purpose neither men nor ships were voted on an adequate scale, but he was allowed to call upon the allies for contingents, and he soon had a sufficient army of Italian volunteers, while the Etruscan towns furnished him with the materials for a fleet. In all he collected 7,000 men, mostly Umbrians and Sabines, which, when united with the two legions in Sicily, formed a respectable army.

§ 8. We have seen how Laevinus induced the Aetolian League to make war on Philip in 211 B.C. In 211-205 B.C. the hostilities that followed Macedon was supported by the powerful Achaean League under Aratus, and by the minor peoples of Epirus, Thessaly, Acarnania, and Boeotia. In union with the Aetolians and Rome were all those states of Central and Southern Greece which were aggrieved by the influence of the Achaean League—Athens, Elis, Messenia, and above all Sparta, now ruled by the tyrant Machanidas. In Asia Rome could rely on the active assistance of Attalus of Pergamus, who saw in her a possible protector against his dangerous neighbours, Antiochus of

Syria and Philip. The senate gained its object : for seven years Greece was distracted by a war that wasted her forces and resources, while Laevinius and (after 210) his successor, P. Sulpicius Galba, looked on and fomented the feud. In this policy they were assisted by Philip's own folly : instead of quieting matters in Greece, and then boldly effecting a junction with Hannibal in Italy, where his numerous and well-disciplined forces would have turned the scale against the Romans, he exhausted his strength in fruitless victories over his compatriots. In 208 B.C. King Ptolemy of Egypt endeavoured to induce the combatants to make peace ; but the only result was an armistice of thirty days. In 207 B.C. the news of Hasdrubal's march upon Italy forced the Romans to withdraw their whole force, and in the following year they remained inactive. Meantime Philopoemen, the new general of the Achaean League, inflicted a ruinous defeat at Mantinea on Machanidas of Sparta, and Philip penetrated to Thermum, the capital of the Aetolians. Thus threatened on all sides and deserted by their allies, the Aetolians made peace with Philip, 205 B.C. Although the Romans had lately taken no active part in the struggle, they reproached the Aetolians with cowardice and sent the proconsul P. Sempronius with 10,000 foot to encourage them to further action. But by this time the Aetolians, who had suffered as much as anybody, were tired of the suicidal struggle, and would fight no more. Thereupon the Romans also made peace with Philip : they gained no territory, but they were only waiting until Hannibal was off their hands to reduce Macedon to subjection. Five years afterwards, when Carthage was prostrate before her conqueror, Philip had to fight single-handed the enemy whom he had foolishly refused to attack under conditions that made success almost inevitable.

§ 9. While Scipio was preparing in Sicily for his expedition to Africa, he contrived to possess <sup>The Capture of</sup> Locri. himself of Locri, Hannibal's last stronghold, by the aid of traitors within the town. Locri belonged properly to the province of Licinius, the other consul, but he was prevented from approaching it by the presence of Hannibal, and Scipio was able to capture it by detachments from

Messana and Rhegium. The town became the scene of the worst outrages on the part of the victors ; they spared neither woman nor child in their fury, and pillaged the famous Temple of Proserpina of its treasures. Neither Pleminius, Scipio's legate, nor the two tribunes, Sergius and Matienus, tried to stop the brutalities of their men ; but soon a dispute arose about the division of the spoil, and the tribunes' soldiers, considering that they had been cheated, attacked and mutilated Pleminius in a ghastly fashion. The appearance of Scipio restored order, but no sooner was his back turned than Pleminius, instead of sending the tribunes to Rome for trial, as Scipio had commanded, tortured them to death. Meantime envoys from the Locrians had proceeded to Rome to demand redress, and Fabius' party, thinking it a favourable opportunity for humiliating Scipio, sent out a commission of ten to investigate the matter. If they found that the atrocities had been perpetrated by order of Scipio, they were to supersede him in the command and bring him back to Rome for trial. The Locrians proved their case without difficulty, but when asked by the commissioners whether they complained of Scipio personally, they replied they were convinced that Pleminius had abused his general's confidence and that Scipio had no share in the outrages. The commissioners were only too glad to escape from a task which promised such unpleasantness and even danger, and contented themselves with sending Pleminius to Rome, where he died in prison before he could be brought to trial. Proceeding to Syracuse, they reviewed Scipio's army and fleet and visited his magazines, and on their return to Rome, they were able to report that the preparations for the expedition were progressing rapidly, and that Scipio was showing the utmost energy in accomplishing his task. The year 205 B.C. passed away, unmarked save by a reconnoitring expedition of C. Laelius, Scipio's closest friend, to the African coast ; but when the spring of the following year came, Scipio, now proconsul, sailed away from Lilybaeum with 400 transports and 40 men of war.

§ 10. He intended to land his army, which numbered about 30,000 soldiers, on the coast of the Lesser Syrtis, but

a dense mist and contrary winds drove him from his course, <sup>Superat</sup> and he disembarked instead near the Fair <sup>near Utica</sup> Promontory (*Pr. Pulchrum*) on the western <sup>coast</sup> horn of the Gulf of Carthage, not far from Utica, which he at once proceeded to besiege. He had expected to receive effective help from the Numidian princes Syphax and Masinissa, or at least from one of them. Syphax had borne a great respect for Scipio since the latter made his adventurous journey to his court, and seemed at one time likely to join the Romans; but his marriage with the beautiful and accomplished Sophonisba, daughter of Hasdrubal Gisgo, brought him completely under Carthaginian influence. Therefore, as soon as he heard of Scipio's projected invasion, he sent envoys to Sicily urging him in the strongest terms to desist. The adhesion of Syphax to Carthage of course led to Masinissa's espousing the Roman cause, but unfortunately Masinissa, shortly before Scipio's arrival, had been ejected from his kingdom by Syphax and was wandering in exile with a scanty body of followers. However, he did good service to the Romans by accustoming them to Numidian tactics, and by his craft enabled them to win a great victory. Finding that he could not reduce Utica by force, Scipio drew off his men from before the city and encamped on a promontory in the neighbourhood, while Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo, who had come to the relief of Utica, also pitched their camps not far off. In the winter of 204-3 B.C. Scipio, acting on the advice of Masinissa, set fire to the rush-covered huts of the Carthaginians and Numidians, and then took advantage of the enemy's panic to penetrate to the middle of their camps. A terrible slaughter ensued, in which 40,000 or even 90,000 of the enemy's 93,000 troops are said to have perished, but Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax made their escape to levy a second army, and Utica was still untaken. Scipio's successes continued into the summer of 203 B.C. Leaving the siege of Utica for a while, he defeated Hasdrubal and Syphax at a place called the "Great Plains,"\* after which

\* *Meyndre melior.* The date of the battle was June 24. Here refer Ovid's lines (*Fasti VI. 760*):

*Postera lux melior. Superat Masinissa Syphacem,  
Et ecceit telis Hasdrubal ipse suis.*

the latter general returned home with his Numidians. He was followed by Masinissa, who raised an army composed partly of Romans, partly of his own compatriots, who welcomed their old leader with enthusiasm. He took Syphax prisoner, and the capture of their chieftain at once caused the Numidians to deliver up their capital Cirta (*Constantine*), with all its treasure and munitions of war, to the Romans. According to the story, Sophonisba, the wife of Syphax, fell into the hands of her old suitor Masinissa, who at once married her. As soon, however, as Scipio heard of this occurrence, he demanded her surrender, for he feared she would undermine the loyalty of Masinissa ; whereupon Masinissa sent poison to her, bidding her die as became one of her station, and Sophonisba obeyed. Whatever the truth about this tragic episode, the overthrow of Syphax was a severe blow for the Carthaginians, inasmuch as they had now to make head against the united strength of the whole Numidian people as well as against Rome. About this time they gained a success over Scipio's fleet before Utica, and they frustrated an attempt of the Romans on Hippo ; but they felt that they could not continue the struggle longer, and opened negotiations for peace. They offered to surrender all their prisoners of war, to withdraw their armies from Italy and Gaul, to resign Spain, and pay a war indemnity of 5,000 talents. Scipio was willing to grant them these terms, and, on condition that Hannibal and Mago evacuated Italy, gave them an armistice, which would enable their ambassadors to lay the proposed treaty of peace before the senate at Rome. The senate dismissed the envoys almost without an answer, and by this time both Hannibal and his brother Mago had quitted Italy. Mago had been entrusted with the task of rousing the Ligurians to action, and if possible of marching overland into Macedonia and drawing Philip into the war. He landed at Genoa, but among the Insubres encountered a Roman army of four legions. He was victorious in the engagement, but severely wounded, and when, in obedience to orders from Carthage, he set sail for Italy, he died before he could reach home. Hannibal's last work in Italy was to set up some bronze tablets in the Temple

of Juno on the Lacinian promontory describing the course of the war. They were in Carthaginian and Greek, and still existed in the time of Polybius, who studied them carefully.

§ 11. In the autumn Hannibal, abandoning with many a regret the Italian land over which he had <sup>Battle of Zama.</sup> ranged at will for fifteen years, quitted Crotona, his last refuge, and landed at the Lesser Leptis. After being joined by Mago's army, he wintered at Hadrumetum, and then took the field in 202 B.C. for the last time. He turned towards Numidia, and defeated Masinissa, but now Scipio marched against him from Tunes, threatening him on the east, while the Numidians advanced from the west. On October 19th, 202 B.C., occurred Hannibal's first and final defeat: the battle is usually known as the battle of Zama, though that place was some days' march to the east. Not far from Naraggara Hannibal drew up his army of 50,000 men in three lines: in the first were the Ligurians, Gauls, Spaniards, and other mercenaries; in the second, the Libyans and Carthaginians; in the third, the veteran troops which he had brought with him from Italy. In the front were posted the elephants, 80 in number, and the cavalry was on the wings. Scipio's force, 35,000 men, was inferior to Hannibal's, but his Numidian allies gave him the preponderance in horse. The Romans were arrayed in the usual three lines, but the maniples, instead of being arranged in quincunx formation, stood in parallel columns, so that a number of open passages were left to allow the enemy's elephants free course. The first line of the Romans was able to drive back the Carthaginian mercenaries upon their second line, and the latter, suspecting that treason was at work, turned their arms against their own comrades with the intent of forcing them again into action. At last the fight centred round Hannibal's veterans, who, though surrounded by the legions, kept their ground and died where they stood. The victory of the Romans was complete, and Scipio at once marched upon Carthage. Hannibal saw that further resistance was useless, and counselled the people to open negotiations for peace. The terms offered by Scipio were severe: the Carthaginians were to surrender all their

elephants; to give up all their ships of war save ten; to pay 10,000 talents in fifty years; to recognise Masinissa as king of Numidia; to give up Spain and such islands of the Mediterranean as they still retained; and, worst of all, to wage no war in Africa or elsewhere without the consent of Rome.\* The Carthaginians accepted peace on these conditions, which were subsequently ratified by the people and senate at Rome. His task thus completed, Scipio returned to Rome: he celebrated a splendid triumph, and was henceforth known by the surname of Africanus.

§ 12. The results of the second Punic war may be summed up as follows:—Abroad Spain became a Roman province, although nearly two centuries were to elapse before its unruly tribes submitted entirely to the foreign rule; the hitherto independent state of Syracuse was amalgamated with the rest of Sicily, and placed under the authority of the Roman praetor; Numidia passed into dependence on Rome, to be utilised as a convenient tool for the humiliation of Carthage; and Carthage was degraded into a helpless mercantile city without army or freedom of action.

In Italy the entire non-Roman population was humiliated and degraded. Those districts which had sided with Hannibal were punished without mercy: we have seen what was the fate of Capua; the Bruttians were converted into a kind of Helots, bondsmen of the state, and for ever denied the right of appearing in arms; and many districts in Lucania and Apulia, in Samnium and Picenum, became *ager publicus*, which went to furnishing settlements for Scipio's veterans. The Gauls saw that they were doomed, and under the leadership of the Carthaginian Hamilcar, whom Hannibal had left behind to fan the national discontent, the Boii and Insubres rose in one last revolt.

\* Ut liberi legibus suis viverent, quas urbes quosque agros quibusque finibus ante bellum tenuissent, tenebent; per fugas fugitivosque et captivos omnes redderent Romanis et naves nostratas praeter decem triremes traerent elephantesque quos haberent domitos, neque domarent alios; bellum neve in Africa neque extra Africam iniussu populi Romani gererent; Masinissae res redderent foedusque cum eo facerent; decem milia talentum argenti, descripta pensionibus aequis in annos quinquaginta solerent; oblates centum arbitratu Scipionis darent ne minores quatuordecim annis neu triginta maiores (Livy, XXX. 37).

Now that Rome's hands were free, the reduction of the insurgents was only a question of time: by 196 B.C. the Insubres were crushed, and five years later the Boii submitted. In the terms of peace granted to the Insubres, it was expressly declared that the Transalpine Gauls should never attain the Roman franchise. This was an instance of the growing policy of exclusion which the Romans began to practise towards the other peoples of Italy. For though after the conclusion of the war many of the communities in possession of the passive franchise (*civitas sine suffragio*) were advanced to the full franchise, the position of the Latins was altered so much for the worse that few of the allies cared to exchange their own charters of federation for the once envied Latin rights. It has been mentioned that no citizen of any Latin colony founded since 268 B.C. enjoyed the privilege of migrating to Rome at pleasure, and now at times (as in 187 B.C.) Latins domiciled at Rome were summarily ejected and dismissed to their native towns without compensation or warning. Of similar tendency was the refusal of the senate to establish any further Latin colonies. It is true that Copia, on the site of Thurii (193 B.C.), Valentia, near the ancient Vibo (192 B.C.), Bononia (189 B.C.), were founded with Latin rights, but with Aquileia (184 B.C.) these were the last Latin colonies planted in Italy, and it was only after a long interval that any were created in the provinces. The result of all this was that the entire peninsula was parted into two hostile camps, that of the Roman citizens and that of the non-citizens.

Socially, the most patent result of the war was the depopulation of Italy. It was estimated that four hundred townships had been utterly ruined, and amongst these were necessarily the chief cities of the land (e.g. Capua), for which Roman and Carthaginian had struggled most eagerly. In course of time many of these recovered something of their former prosperity, but for the present the desolation was terrible. At Cannae alone 80,000 Romans and Italians had fallen, and the total sum of the losses during the war was put at 300,000 fighting men: Rome herself was computed to have lost one-fourth of her burgesses. The small farmers,

the stalwart class that had won so many victories for the republic, seemed in danger of disappearing outright: for not only had so many thousands of their number perished on the battlefield, but such as survived the war found that the changed economic conditions made it almost impossible for them to earn a livelihood. It was upon their homesteads that the whole force of the Carthaginian attack fell: their crops, their stores, their implements, and their houses were alike destroyed, and there was not enough wealth left in the country to enable them to tide over the critical time. Some took service in the legions, but others had recourse to less honourable vocations: so that Italy became filled with bands of ruffians, of whom many, no doubt, were runaway slaves, but many more had once been honest and thrifty farmers. Those who still struggled to exist on their little farms found many circumstances unfavourable to them. Most inimical of all was the greed of wealthy neighbours, who seized by force or fraud their holdings; but besides this they had to contend against the importation of corn from Egypt and Sicily, and—a still more difficult task—against the cheaper labour of slaves, who were being deported after every successful campaign into Italy in ever-increasing numbers by the wealthy. When the capitalist had dispossessed his poorer neighbour, he converted his widely spreading fields (*latifundia*) into grass farms, and tended them by the labour of his slaves. As a rule he preferred cattle-raising to agriculture: to grow crops requires continuous labour and some knowledge of the laws by which land is used to the utmost, yet rather improved than exhausted; to rear cattle, on the other hand, requires nothing beyond wide acres and a few scattered herdsmen. Cattle-farming took the place of agriculture: where there were once fields and cottages there were now only ranches and the watch-huts of slaves. Depopulation grew apace in Apulia, Lucania, and Samnium, but the plight of Etruria—as Tiberius Gracchus saw and noted some seventy years later—was worst of all. It seemed as though Italy was about to revert to her original condition as a land of un-tilled marsh and mountain. For the first few years after the second Punic war the senate did something to remedy

these evils: besides the Latin colonies mentioned above, colonies of citizens were sent out to Vulturnum, Liternum, Puteoli, Salernum in Campania (197 B.C.), to Buxentum in Lucania (197 B.C.), to Tempsa and Crotona in Bruttium (194 B.C.), to Sipontum in Apulia. Yet these settlements were but a drop in the ocean, and (in 187 B.C.) a whole Ligurian tribe, 47,000 in number, could be comfortably planted in the heart of Samnium.

All this time the converse process was going on, and the population of the country districts was flocking to Rome by thousands. If they were already Roman citizens, they did not, of course, lose their franchise by change of residence, and they soon found that their votes were of value to the wealthy man who was desirous of office with all its distinction and profit. To purchase the support of the proletariat, all sorts of engines of corruption were devised. The curule aediles spent immense sums of money in celebrating the great festivals and games under their charge, for they knew that this was the surest way of gaining election to the higher offices of the praetorship and consulship. Of the same corrupting tendency were the gladiatorial combats, the fights of wild beasts (*renationes*), and the free gifts of grain (*frumentationes*), which became common after 201 B.C. It was thus possible for a rabble of many thousands to make a living and find amusement while existing in utter idleness and beggary.

The senate made some half-hearted efforts to stop these abuses by the enactment of bribery laws, but as a rule it was content with a policy of *laissez faire*. Its own position had been much improved by the successful struggle against Pyrrhus and Hannibal: no one could deny that it had shown wonderful stoutness of heart throughout the dreadful conflict of the second Punic war, or that the comitia had decayed through the disappearance of the middle class of citizens, the growing worthlessness of the mob, and the increasing inability of a popular assembly to cope with the complex problems which came into existence with the extension of Rome's power abroad. Hence the senate quietly put the comitia on one side, and ruled with dictatorial power. The comitia exercised an imaginary freedom in

electing magistrates, but for the rest did what the senate desired. For seventy years after the battle of Zama the government maintained its authority unquestioned, but then the proletariat began to reassert its latent powers, and when there arose as well a permanent army, the senate was doomed.

## CHAPTER IX.

### LITERATURE.

§ 1. Ballads. — § 2. Greek Influence.—§ 3. Livius Andronicus.—  
§ 4. Naevius. — § 5. The Beginnings of the Drama, the *Fescennine*  
and *Atellan* Plays.—§ 6. Greek Influence on the Drama: *Palliatae*,  
*Togatae*, and *Prætextatae*.—§ 7. Plautus.—§ 8. History.

§ 1. PREVIOUS to the conquest of *Magna Graecia* (270 B.C.), which brought Rome into direct contact with Ballads. Greek writings, there had flourished in Latium a native literature consisting of ballads such as are always found developing spontaneously, amongst peoples of Aryan race, with a vigour proportionate to the military vigour of each nation. We have no fragments of these ballads, but they are alluded to by Ennius and Cato as already lost and regretted—by Fabius Pictor as still surviving amid the country folk; and they are mentioned also by Cicero, by Vergil, and by Horace. Their subjects were the great deeds of bygone men, the legends of Romulus and the building of Rome; and their metre was the so-called *Saturnian*\* verse. Niebuhr saw in these the relics of a golden age of native minstrelsy, but his conclusions are not generally accepted. Macaulay quotes as an English example of *Saturnian* metre the line

“The queen was in her parlour eating bread and honey.”

The same metre was used by earlier Greek writers, and probably, though not certainly, it may have been derived from a Greek source. If so, however, its foreign origin was early forgotten: Naevius was the last poet to employ

\* *Saturnus* was the Italian god of the seed-time (*seu*), whence Italy is known as *Saturnia terra*. Later, this deity was identified with the Greek *Cronos*, and the adjective *Saturnine* came to signify anything archaic.

it, and he did so as a protest against the influx of Greek metres.\*

§ 2. As we have it, Roman literature is mere imitation, Greek more or less disguised according to the gifts of Influence. the particular author, and usually the imitation was frankly avowed. Two chief causes operated towards the rapid spread of the Hellenistic style—the desire for amusement, and the need of a literature for educational purposes. On the one hand, the new culture demanded a field in which to train and discipline the mind; on the other, all classes were eagerly on the look-out for novel entertainments. The first want was met by the professional schoolmaster, the second by the professional playwright. It was not to be expected that a true inspiration could come from such motives. Even the secondary motives which actuated such men as the Scipios and their *protégés* were little less material: a Scipio patronised an Ennius or Terence, not because the *protégé* was a great poet, but because he was artist enough to use Greek models with skill in the glorification of his patron; the motive of the *protégé* was to curry favour by his talents, the more so as the lot of a literary man at Rome without patrons was hard and unprofitable.

§ 3. The first professional Grecist was a slave named <sup>Livius</sup> Andronicus, brought by M. Livius Salinator <sup>Andronicus</sup> from Tarentum in the year 272 B.C. at the age of ten years. His intelligence ultimately won him his freedom, and he was thenceforth known as L. Livius Andronicus, taking his patron's *nomen*, according to the custom of the times. He made a livelihood by teaching, and was at once brought face to face with the difficulty of finding a Latin literature which might provide him with school books. He solved the problem by turning into Latin the works of the Greek writers which lay ready to his hand—it would have been too much to expect a hard-worked

\* It was, like all early metres, exceedingly rough, but in its most regular form it consisted of two halves, the first of which was in upward or iambic rhythm, the second in downward or trochaic. It is found in old epitaphs e.g.

"Cornel- | ius | Luci- | us | Scipi- | ó Barb- | átus."

a line from the epitaph of the conqueror of Samnium, who died 280 B.C. Also see the lines quoted on p. 62.

schoolmaster to *invent* a literature for his pupils. Livius showed judgment in selecting Homer's *Odyssey* for his first experiment : he turned it into barbarous Saturnians, without one redeeming feature of sound or sense or inspiration. He even mistranslated so flagrantly as to prove that he was not a true Greek by birth, but more probably an African. He next undertook to provide dramas for the Roman stage, and translated a considerable number of Greek tragedies for the purpose, adopting the Greek metres. His first play appeared in 240 B.C., and in the year 207 B.C. his genius was rewarded by a commission to write on behalf of the state a poem commemorating the victory over Hasdrubal at the Metaurus. He died in 204 B.C. Even in Horace's boyhood his *Odyssey* was still a text-book in Roman schools, and that poet had not very pleasant recollections of it :—

“ Non equidem insector delendaque carmina Livi  
Esse reor, memini quae plagosum mihi parvo  
Orbilium dictare; sed emendata videri  
Pulchraque et exactis minimum distantia miror.” \*

§ 4. Gnaeus Naevius was a contemporary of Livius, born about 269 B.C. and dying about 199 B.C. He was a native of Campania, and served during the first Punic war as a *socius*. At about thirty-five years of age he commenced his literary career as a dramatist (235 B.C.), and for several years was an active writer. Like those of Livius, his works in this direction were mainly translations, but they were characterised by a vigour of action, a smoothness of language, and an Italian humour, entirely wanting in Livius' laboured caricatures. He was better as a comedian than as a tragedian, and he so far followed the traditions of the old Greek Comedy as to get into trouble with the great statesmen of his time, notably with the *gens Metella* and with Scipio Africanus. Even imprisonment could not check his freedom of opinion, and he was forced at length to leave Rome. In so doing he lost a sphere for his dramatic productions, but his exile stirred up a patriotism which had thus far lain dormant. He turned his mind to epic writing, and during the years

\* Ep. II, i. 69.

of his residence at Utica he put together the first Latin Epic, a history of the first Punic war. The work is wholly lost, but nearly two centuries after Vergil was not ashamed to borrow from it various scenes and lines of the *Aeneid*, the crowning monument of Roman epic. The visit of Aeneas to Carthage, and the story of Dido, are creations of Naevius, not of Vergil. Naevius recognised sadly the change which was coming over Italian literature—the decay of the old native style, and the complete domination of Greek influences; and as a protest against it he employed the Saturnian metre in his epic. His championship was futile, and he knew it; and in the epitaph which was to be cut upon his tomb he confessed himself the last of the old school:—

“ Mortales inmortales flere si foret fas,  
Flerent divae Camenae Naevium poetam.  
Itaque postquam est Orcino traditus thesauro,  
Obliti sunt Romae loquier Latina lingua.”

He was still read and quoted in the time of Horace—because he was antique, says the critic:—

“ Naevius in manibus non est et mentibus haeret  
Paene recens? Adeo sanctum est vetus omne poema.”

§ 5. There had from the most ancient times been a rude variety of drama amongst the Italian peoples. At vintage festivals and similar holiday seasons, the chief entertainment of the population was something of this sort, and to very late times there were cultivated two varieties, named, from the towns whence they were said to have been originally derived, Fescennine and Atellan farces.\* Upon these were grafted the Roman tragedy and comedy, such as they were, which were the chief literary production of the period under review. Two other varieties were named *Saturae* and *Mimi* respectively: the former ceased to be dramatic in the days of Ennius, and after fifty years of abeyance revived in the form of the genuine Roman Satire; the latter only came to the front in the last century B.C., and is therefore outside the scope of this chapter.

The Fescennine and Atellan farces were in origin identical

\* From Fescennium in Etruria, and Atella in Campania.

—extempore performances by holiday making villagers, and characterised accordingly by a good deal of very broad humour and coarse personality. The two, however, differentiated to some extent at an early date, the one taking from Etruscan influences a markedly sensual and indecent character, the other, in Oscan hands and possibly affected by the neighbourhood of the Greek cities of Magna Graecia, tending towards a more elaborate artistic finish; the development in either case being aided by the fact that while the Fescennines remained exclusively in the hands of the lower classes, the Atellan farce came under the patronage of the better class of Oscan nobles, who carefully prevented the intrusion of any professional element which might "pollute" the performance, as Livy phrases it. The Italians never had much of dramatic taste: so long as they had sufficient buffoonery and personality, they easily dispensed with plot, fine language, and moral precept; and to the last the drama remained with them only an amusement and not at all a means of instruction.

Both forms of the native drama early made their way to Rome, but it was not until 364 B.C. that they received the sanction of the government. In that year a definite sum was set apart to meet the cost of erecting a stage and providing players during the three days of the Latin games. The sum was small, the stage a mere platform, the players as rude as might be expected from the times and from the small encouragement accorded to them. Nevertheless, the annual performances came to be a matter of some importance, and the aediles, to whom fell the duty of providing them, gradually came to curry favour with the populace by going to voluntary expense in their production.

The Fescennine plays, originally performed as dialogues, gradually passed into a low-class recitative, confined to wedding ceremonies. The original Saturnian metre was exchanged for others of Greek origin, and the whole resultant was the Epithalamium or Nuptial-hymn—something which the better class tolerated only because it was so deeply rooted in the favour of the lower classes.

The *Fabula Atellana*, transplanted to Rome somewhat later than the Fescennines, retained its special characteristics

much longer : indeed, it came to have a fixed set of characters analogous to those of an English harlequinade. But for two reasons it could not be very popular : firstly, it was confined to young men of good family, as has been said, although for such an one to take part in any other stage performance was to incur disenfranchisement and lasting disgrace ; secondly, the government would not tolerate that freedom of speech which had been the most attractive feature of the Atellans in their original form. This restriction caused the total disappearance of the *Satura* from the stage, but the *Atellana* was kept up by the interest of the young nobles, and only disappeared when the *Mimus* replaced it.

§ 6. However, *Fescenninae* and *Atellanae* had proved that Greek Influence on the Drama. the Romans needed a drama, and had secured a state endowment-fund ; and with these inducements it was easy for Livius Andronicus to make the experiment of producing tragedies translated from the Greek. The experiment was a success, and from that date there was no lack of dramatists for a century or more. They were, however, little but translators and adapters : there never was a genuine Italian drama which attained to any high degree of elaboration. The new drama was divided into three kinds. The great bulk were merely Latin reproductions of a Greek play or plays, preserving the names and scenery unchanged, and altering only the language : these were known as *Palliatae*. In some cases, however, the dramatist was content to borrow his plot only, making the persons and scenes of his play alike Italian : such plays were known as *Togatae*. The third kind was named *Praetextatae*, and included a very few plays which clothed in dramatic dress more or less original some historical event of the Roman annals\*—Ennius wrote some few such ; but historical plays are rarely very successful, and they were least of all fitted to arouse the enthusiasm of a Roman audience. Indeed, that audience was always thankless, and though it would crowd to the theatre in default of other amusements, it would leave the finest tragedy or the most

\* Instances are the *Romulus* of Naevius, and the *Brutus* of Accius or Attius. The latter was founded on the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome.

amusing comedy to witness a combat of gladiators, a *renatio* or even a rope dancer or juggler.

§ 7. Both Andronicus and Naevius adapted comedies, but <sup>Plautus.</sup> they were far surpassed by Plautus. T. Maccius Plautus (254-184 B.C.), an Umbrian of Sursina, earned his living at Rome as a miller, and wrote his comedies—forty at the lowest estimate, at the highest a hundred and thirty—during his leisure moments. He succeeded Andronicus and Naevius, of whom we have already spoken, and was a rival of Ennius, and the high estimation in which his comedies were held is proved by the simple fact that we still have twenty of them entire. Translating and adapting from the Greek Comedy of Manners (new comedy), he made no pretence to originality, unless it was in the skill where-with he would throw into one Latin play two Greek dramas, borrowing from each whatever seemed likely to succeed either in plot or character, by the process known as *contaminatio*. Like his fellow-comedians, Plautus frankly declared the source of his inspirations—usually Menander, Philemon, Diphilus, or Apollodorus—and candidly omitted whatever was merely witty to find room for what was simply farcical. He had no mission beyond that of providing amusement for his audience, and to his audience only rapid action was amusing, so that the result is what we should call broad farce or burlesque. It is the varied dialogue which prevents us wearying of the monotonous characters and still more monotonous plot—for in comedy, as in the Atellan farce, certain types tended more and more to become constant. The theme is almost invariably the troubles of family life—penurious fathers and spendthrift sons, faithless lovers and jealous husbands, slaves who cheat every one and end with either the punishment of the cross or the reward of emancipation. There is always a love affair, and very often a case of mistaken identity; and the general moral of the whole is that we should enjoy life at any risk, whether of honour or character or even life. Cato and his school had good reason to cry out against the new style in the theatres.

The prevailing Hellenism is vividly proved by the free use, in Plautus and his successors, of words of Greek origin,

often purely Greek, which could only be allowable on the understanding that the Greek language was already very familiar in Rome. Their vocabulary contains many words which are not found in Ciceronian Latin, numbers of comic compounds of abnormal length, and the most complete collection of colloquial idioms which we possess. One of Plautus' favourite means to raise a laugh is to introduce every-day Roman expressions amidst scenes thoroughly Greek. Horace speaks with admiration of his delineation of characters,\* notes his use of Greek words and compounds,† and complains that the older Romans were too longsuffering in their endurance of his bad witticisms.‡

§ 8. Prose literature is always slower to develop than is poetry, and, at any rate in an uncritical society, it is more difficult to make attractive. Society

at Rome could hardly be called critical as yet, for the circles of the Scipios were quite exceptional. It was for these circles, and for other advocates of Hellenism, that the first Roman historians wrote, and they therefore wrote in Greek. These were Q. Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus. They both took an active part in the second Punic war, in which indeed Cincius was made prisoner, a fact to which he owed his exceptional knowledge of the movements and resources of Hannibal during the war. Both wrote a so-called History of Rome from the very earliest times—little more than a bare compilation from such state documents as the Pontifical Archives with their lists of events, portentous and otherwise, which called for the attention of the State Religion, and the Linen Rolls (*Libri Linteii*), containing mere lists of the annual magistrates; and they had access also to the family archives of the great nobles, in which would be recorded something that was truth under a cloak of exaggeration or misrepresentation. Their work, again, was shackled by the habit of chronicling events year by year, without any connection of cause and effect, or any attempt to draw from facts the lessons which alone make history worthy of study.

\* Ep. II. i. 170.

† A. P. 54.

‡ A. P. 270.

TEST QUESTIONS  
ON  
ROMAN HISTORY, 287—202 B.C.

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1. Draw an outline map showing the extent of (a) the Roman dominions, (b) the Roman sphere of influence in Italy at the commencement of this period. Insert the names of the more important citizen and Latin colonies, distinguishing between the two.
2. Define the rights and duties of the Passive Citizens of Rome. Mention as many communities of this class as you are able, adding the dates at which they were incorporated with Rome.
3. Explain the importance of the rights of *commercium* and *conubium*. How far, if at all, were they possessed in regard to Rome by (a) the Passive Citizens, (b) the Latins, (c) the *Socii*?
4. Estimate briefly the position of the Senate in 287 B.C. with regard to (a) the Magistrates, (b) the Comitia.
5. In an outline map insert the chief settlements of the Greeks in Italy. Add where you can their modern names and the date of their foundation.
6. Sketch briefly the relations (down to 287 B.C.) of the Greek cities of Italy towards (a) Syracuse, (b) the Lucanians, (c) the Samnites, (d) Rome.

7. What instances before the time of Pyrrhus are there of Greek captains being invited to Italy by their fellow-countrymen?

8. Under what circumstances did Pyrrhus cross to Italy? Explain what were his aims, and estimate his chances of success.

9. Draw an outline map of Sicily, and insert the chief cities with their modern names. In the case of the Greek colonies give their mother city and the date of their foundation. Which of them were of Dorian origin?

10. Describe very briefly the three Italian campaigns of Pyrrhus, and estimate the result of each.

11. Explain the leading features of the policy by which Rome consolidated her rule in Italy. Illustrate by reference to her actions after the subjugation of Magna Graecia (272 B.C.).

12. Write a note on the *ius Ariminii*.

13. What was the extent of the Carthaginian empire at the outbreak of the first Punic war?

14. Sketch briefly the constitution of Carthage, noting any points on which our knowledge is defective.

15. Describe generally the policy of Carthage towards her subjects.

16. Mention the chief points in which the government and national life of Carthage show an inferiority as compared with those of Rome.

17. Who were the Mamertines, and how did they cause the first Punic war?

18. What were the chief arguments for and against Roman interference in Sicily?

19. Describe very briefly the circumstances under which the battles of Mylae and Ecnomus were fought. What was the result of these engagements?

20. Relate the story of the equipment of the first Roman fleet, adding any criticisms that occur to you.

21. Narrate briefly the African expedition of Regulus.

22. Relate the story of Regulus' death as given by

Roman historians, noting any points on which it is open to criticism. What verdict is generally passed on it by modern historians?

23. Describe the general characteristics of the warfare of the last seven years of the first Punic war. On what conditions was peace made?

24. Relate very briefly the circumstances under which the battles of Panormus and Drepanum were fought.

25. Describe the reform of the Comitia Centuriata, noting any points in the change about which uncertainty exists. To what date is it assigned, and why?

26. What were the results of the wars against the Gauls, in which Rome was engaged between the first and second Punic wars?

27. What was the object of the Agrarian Law of Flaminus? Why does Polybius regard its passing as a step in the decline of the Roman constitution? How far is his remark justifiable?

28. Where are Telamon, Spoletium, Apollonia, Scodra, and Pharus? What is the modern name of each, and for what are they notable in the history of this period?

29. Write a narrative of Hannibal's passage of the Alps. By what ancient historians has it been described? Which of these do you follow, and why? Draw a map showing the two routes which are regarded as the most probable by historians.

30. Describe the resources of Rome and Carthage at the outbreak of the second Punic war. What circumstances favoured Hannibal's enterprise?

31. Draw a map indicating Hannibal's marches in his first three campaigns in Italy.

32. Describe the battle of Cannae, and, if you can, add a plan to explain your narrative.

33. To what extent did the battle of Cannae improve the position of Hannibal? Is there any reason to suppose that he could have surprised Rome if he had marched upon it at once?

34. Write a narrative of the siege of Syracuse.

35. Narrate briefly the achievements of the Scipio brothers in Spain.

36. When and why did Tarentum revolt to Hannibal? At what date was it recovered by the Romans? What happened to the citadel of Tarentum?

37. Describe the position of Hannibal in Italy after (a) the battle of Cannae, (b) the fall of Capua, (c) the fall of Tarentum.

38. Write short notices of M. Claudius Marcellus, Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, C. Terentius Varro.

39. Describe the circumstances of the battle of the Metaurus.

40. Narrate briefly the exploits of Scipio (Africanus) in Spain. What traces of exaggeration exist in this portion of Roman history, and how are they to be explained?

41. Describe the position of parties in the Senate in the last years of the second Punic war.

42. Narrate briefly the course of events in Greece (218—205 B.C.), so far as they have a bearing upon Roman history. What do you suppose would have been the result of Philip's intervention in Italy?

43. Write a short narrative of Scipio's campaigns in Africa.

44. What part was played by Syphax and Masinissa in the struggle between Carthage and Rome? What do you know of the subsequent history of Masinissa?

45. Describe briefly the battle of Zama. Why is Zama a misnomer?

46. On what conditions was peace made at the close of the second Punic war?

47. Summarise the effects of the second Punic war upon (a) Rome's relations with the other nations of Italy, (b) the yeomen and the proletariat, (c) the supremacy of the Senate.

48. What do you know of the life and writings of Livius Andronicus, Naevius, and Plautus?

49. Give some account of Greek influence on the literature of the period.

50. Mention some of the earliest Roman writers of history.

51. What are the chief original authorities for the history of the period?

52. In what connection are the following mentioned during this period?—Ti. Coruncanius, C. Fabricius, M. Curius Dentatus, Cineas.

53. C. Duilius, Valerius Messalla, L. Caecilius Metellus.

54. C. Atilius Regulus, C. Flaminius, Demetrius of Pharus.

55. L. Aemilius Paullus, M. Valerius Laevinus, M. Minucius Rufus.

56. Q. Fabius Maximus, M. Livius Salinator, Q. Fulvius Flaccus.

57. C. Laelius, Pleminius, Hasdrubal Gisgo, Mago.

58. Define the position of the following places, add the modern name (if such exists), and mention some historical event connected with them during this period:—Heraclea, Asculum, Beneventum, Lilybaeum, Drepanum.

59. Solus, Tauromenium, Messana, Lacinium Promunturium, Thurii.

60. Lake Vadimo, Aesernia, Ariminum, Metapontum.

61. Panormus, Tyndaris, Lipara, Aleria, Clupea.

62. Venusia, Canusium, Gerunium, Epidamnus, Saguntum.

63. Petelia, Cosentia, Nola, Casilinum, Neapolis.

64. Tarraco, Carthago Nova, Illiturgi, Locri, Herdonea.

65. Salapia, Arretium, Grumentum, Astapa, Gades.

66. Describe the organisation of Sicily under Roman rule.

67. Mention any changes made in the magistracies during this period.

68. To what do you attribute Hannibal's early successes in Italy and ultimate failure?

69. What additions to the Roman dominions were made during this period? In the case of each give the date.

70. Distinguish *cives sine suffragio, nomen Latinum, socii.*

In which of these classes did the following towns fall: Neapolis, Spoletium, Beneventum, Capua, Messana, Cumae?

71. Describe the powers of the Senate. From whom and by whom were its members chosen? Explain Mommsen's statement that they were "called to power . . . substantially through the free choice of the nation."

72. To what do the following allusions refer?—

- (a) Cannarum vindex ac tanti sanguinis ultor  
Annulus.
- (b) Par  
Virtute atque fide, sed maior clade Saguntus  
Tale quid excusat.
- (c) Regulum et Scauros animaque magnae  
Prodigum Paullum superante Poeno  
Gratus insigni referam Camena  
Fabriciumque.
- (d) Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.

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